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1this is a book about difference, but more importantly, about how we stare at difference. As disability scholar Rosemarie Garland-Thomson remarks, “we don’t usually stare at people we know, but instead when 
unfamiliar people take us by surprise.”1 Recovering Disability in Early Mod-
ern England encourages us to stare at the extraordinary and to honor the 
surprise, discomfort, and bewilderment that come with noting the unfamil-
iar. Our book does not condone detached gazing but instead insists upon 
productive looking. The essays that follow play to our human penchant for 
“obsessive ocularity,”2 asking readers to grapple with non-normative bodies 
and minds as well as the radically different social, historical, and literary con-
texts in which those bodies and minds were assigned and helped make mean-
ing. This encounter with embodied difference and with a past that embodies 
that difference enables a reimagining of what we think we know about dis-
ability in an early modern context.
 Toward this end, Garland-Thomson’s seminal rehabilitation of the star-
ing encounter as a “conduit to knowledge” and “an opportunity to recognize 
one another in new ways”3 functions as a key logic shaping this collection. 
Following Garland-Thomson, we propose early modern disability studies, as 
exemplified by the essays assembled here, as a means for more ethical star-
ing practices and hence robust and transformative scholarship. “Productive 
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interactions”4 with literary history and the representations produced therein 
require, in other words, new ways of looking. In its efforts to recover disabil-
ity in early modern England, our collection suggests that we have not been 
staring hard or well enough at representations of disability right beneath our 
noses and, moreover, that the encounters we have had with those represen-
tations—the ways we stared upon finally recognizing them—should better 
reflect efforts toward ethical beholding. This generous stare at history, litera-
ture, and disability representation should, to borrow again from Garland-
Thomson, “be understood as a potential act of be-holding, of holding the 
being of another particular individual in the eye of the beholder.”5
 Certain social, cultural, and intellectual prohibitions, akin to those that 
police our daily staring practices, have made it difficult for early modernists 
to identify disability in their midst and, even more so, to acknowledge it as 
worthy of scholarly pursuit. Recovering Disability in Early Modern England, as 
it cements early modern disability studies as a field of inquiry, calls attention 
to what Sharon Snyder and David Mitchell have described as “the myriad 
ways that traditional fields have been willing to study their topic from a dis-
tance without embracing the ideas of disabled persons concerning their own 
predicament.”6 This collection invites readers to reflect on their own relation-
ship to disability both now and in the English Renaissance and prods us to 
stare differently at disability, disability histories, and disability representa-
tions. It mandates that we stop refusing to look or that we, equally problem-
atically, cease gawking unilaterally at the extraordinary; instead, it proposes 
engagement in a reciprocal interaction in which disability, disability histories, 
and disability representations stare back. This reciprocity and mutual recogni-
tion may cause unease in readers, but such is the price, and ultimate advan-
tage, of ethical staring encounters.
 As they practice ethical staring, these essays unapologetically make visible 
“urgent efforts to make the unknown known, to render legible something that 
seems at first glance incomprehensible.”7 They also, as good staring should, 
“[offer] an occasion to rethink the status quo,” presenting and corroborating 
Garland-Thomson’s insistence that “who we are can shift into focus by star-
ing at who we think we are not.”8 This volume thus confirms that, as she puts 
it, “things happen when people stare.”9 In the case of Recovering Disability in 
Early Modern England, a proper beholding of the early modern English past 
in which we look ethically and with fresh eyes reveals a new disability his-
tory, a new early modern scholarship, and a new commitment to “redress the 
exclusion of disability and disabled people from our critical discourses, our 
scholarly imaginations, and our classrooms.”10
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Disability Studies
In nearly all its iterations, our world is a place of compulsory able-bodied-
ness that insidiously excludes, stigmatizes, and devalues difference.11 Disabil-
ity studies and its attention to the non-normative uncloak this compulsory 
demand for ability and strive, as Snyder and Mitchell explain, “to oper-
ationalize some maneuverability for bodies deemed excessive, insufficient, 
or inappropriate on the basis of their impairments (actual or perceived).”12 
Disability studies also reveals how these “insufficient” bodies and persons, 
paradoxically, are made less visible the more they demand notice, or, as 
Tobin Siebers offers, “according to the logic of compulsory able-bodiedness, 
the more visible the disability, the greater the chance that the disabled per-
son will be repressed from public view and forgotten.”13 As this collection 
uncovers narratives and representations of early modern disability, it first 
illuminates how normativity requires and rewards the repression or forget-
ting of disability difference. Second, the volume’s recovery work explores the 
potency of reading disability representation as a theoretical, practical, and 
political strategy for dismantling this ableist silence. Again, Siebers explains:
Narratives about disability identity are theoretical because they posit a 
different experience that clashes with how social existence is usually con-
structed and recorded. They are practical because they often contain solu-
tions to problems experienced by disabled and nondisabled people alike. 
They are political because they offer a basis for identity politics, allowing 
people with different disabilities to tell a story about their common cause.14
Identifying and constructing new disability narratives in the English Renais-
sance unites the personal, political, and theoretical to unpack, and often to 
undermine, current cultural imaginations of disability. Together, the essays 
assembled here employ disability theory to read literary representations of 
non-normativity and, in doing so, expose ableist hegemony so as to resist 
and subvert its dominance.
 With its interest in revealing the contingent and constructed nature of 
“normal,” disability studies appeals to professionals beyond the fields of 
medicine, rehabilitation, special education, social services, and civil rights. 
More pointedly, disability studies cultivates a wide-ranging audience in large 
part because of its interdisciplinary, intersectional, and strategically open 
theoretical nature. Historian Catherine Kudlick defines disability studies 
as “an interdisciplinary field dating from the mid-1980s that invites schol-
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ars to think about disability not as an isolated, individual medical pathol-
ogy but instead as a key defining social category on par with race, class, 
and gender.”15 As her definition makes clear, disability studies is invested 
in approaching disability “as a social category rather than as an individ-
ual characteristic”16 and theorizes difference through a complex, multiva-
lent sense of what constitutes disability identity. The 1990 Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA), as well as its more recent amendments, leaves much 
room for interpreting disability and deliberately works against too narrowly 
defining the term: “The term ‘disability’ means, with respect to an indi-
vidual: (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or 
more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an 
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”17 While 
the ADA’s definition certainly addresses the “individual,” the looseness of 
its prescriptive categories (note the flexible language of “limit” and “regard,” 
for example) allows for broader theorizing about the nature of individual 
experience as it is situated in particular historical moments and cultural 
imaginaries.18
 Since its inception, disability studies has theorized difference in a num-
ber of ways. As Simi Linton explains, “disability studies takes for its subject 
matter not simply the variations that exist in human behavior, appearance, 
functioning, sensory acuity, and cognitive processing but, more crucially, the 
meaning we make of those variations.”19 The field has defined and explained 
this meaning-making by responding, first, to a “medical model” of disability. 
This model, while instrumental in preventing disease and enabling human 
vitality, has been heavily critiqued for its pathologizing of difference. Under 
the medical model, individual impairment remains a personal matter that 
reduces disabled people to objects of medical scrutiny. It also assumes that 
disability needs to be “cured” and that pitiable, impaired “sufferers” crave the 
“health” and normativity that medicine might provide them.
 Constructivist models of disability have resisted this pathologizing of dif-
ference by refusing to mark disability—and its associated impairments— 
biomedically. These models instead understand disability, and disabled peo-
ple, as a sociopolitical category defined by common experience. Constructiv-
ist models are emblematic of New Disability Studies, whose goal, according 
to Garland-Thomson, is to “transfigure disability within the cultural imag-
ination.”20 “This new critical perspective,” she outlines, “conceptualizes 
disability as a representational system rather than a medical problem, a dis-
cursive construction rather than a personal misfortune or a bodily flaw, and a 
subject appropriate for wide-ranging cultural analysis within the humanities 
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instead of an applied field within medicine, rehabilitation, or social work.”21 
Perhaps even more importantly, New Disability Studies makes visible the 
myriad ways that embodied difference “is part of a historically constructed 
discourse . . . [and] social process that intimately involves everyone who has 
a body and lives in the world of the senses.”22
 Two of the most dominant critical perspectives in New Disability Stud-
ies are the social and cultural models of disability.23 As medieval disability 
scholar Joshua Eyler explains, these constructivist models “acknowledge both 
the specific, individual realities of people with disabilities and also the role 
played by society in constructing disability by imposing definitions of nor-
mativity and ability onto the social world, which consequently limits access, 
in all its forms, for people with physical and mental differences.”24 The social 
model determinedly separates “impairment” from “disability,” suggesting 
that impairment connotes corporeal difference that becomes disability only 
when social obstruction denies access or accommodation for that difference. 
Lennard Davis clarifies this distinction: “Impairment is the physical fact of 
lacking an arm or a leg. Disability is the social process that turns an impair-
ment into a negative by creating barriers to access.”25
 Contrastingly, the cultural model—sometimes described as the mate-
rial model—reunites impairment and disability to “theorize [the] interac-
tional space between embodiment and social ideology.”26 This model attends 
to the ways lived particularity interacts with environment, and it especially 
understands the meanings and consequences of disability as determined by 
embodiment’s interface with cultural narratives, language, and representa-
tions. Materiality itself is a social process,27 in other words, such that cultural 
narratives and representations of disability have the power to shape corpo-
real experience even as those narratives themselves are being shaped by the 
material realities of non-normative bodies and minds. This model responds 
to a certain dis-embodiment inherent in the social model by expanding “the 
social construction of reality toward a material-discursive understanding of 
phenomena and matter.”28 The cultural model instead emphasizes the reci-
procity between body and culture, between lived corporeal difference and 
social perception of that lived difference. It destigmatizes disability while still 
preserving individual, lived experience; as Eyler notes, it “allows us to take 
into account the entire spectrum of experience for people with disabilities 
and does not force us to focus on constructed perceptions of disability at the 
expense of real, bodily phenomena.”29
 As one might imagine, social and cultural models of disability are not 
the only concepts theorized in disability studies. Modern American literature 
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and disability scholar Michael Davidson, for example, conceives in his work 
of a “disability aesthetics.”30 Interested in the formal nature of artistic works, 
he uses disability theory to articulate how disability shapes artistry and artis-
tic production. For Davidson, the materiality of art depends on the material-
ity of the—often exceptional—body. His scholarship focuses on the “spectral 
body of the other that disability brings to the fore, reminding us of the 
contingent, interdependent nature of bodies and their situated relationship 
to physical ideals.”31 Davidson’s disability aesthetics foregrounds, in other 
words, “the extent to which the body becomes thinkable when its total-
ity can no longer be taken for granted, when the social meanings attached 
to sensory and cognitive values cannot be assumed.”32 Following Davidson, 
who interrogates the crucial sense of defamiliarization and aesthetic distinc-
tiveness embodied within, and prompted by, art, disability, and disability art, 
Tobin Siebers specifically theorizes the representation of disability in modern 
art to “return aesthetics forcefully to .  .  . the body and its affective sphere” 
and, moreover, to make “obvious” the relationship of aesthetic history to “the 
influence of disability.”33 For Siebers, “disability aesthetics refuses to recog-
nize the representation of the healthy body—and its definition of harmony, 
integrity, and beauty—as the sole determination of the aesthetic”; this refusal 
forces reckoning with new perspectives and bodies that “test presuppositions 
dear to the history of aesthetics.”34
 Like these two scholars, Lennard Davis argues for a conception—and 
utility—of disability that moves beyond the social and cultural models. He 
argues, in Bending over Backwards: Disability, Dismodernism, and Other Diffi-
cult Positions, for disability as the quintessential postmodern subject position. 
For Davis, all humans are “wounded” and disability is, therefore, the norm: 
“impairment is the rule, and normalcy is the fantasy.”35 Furthermore, Davis 
understands disability as a provocatively unstable category that transcends 
identity politics.36 Insofar as “disability” lacks internal coherence—people can 
fall in and out of disability (and disability identification) at various points in 
their lives, for example—it functions as hard evidence of the general insta-
bility of “identity politics” in postmodernity. The main problem with an 
identity group model, according to Davis, is its exclusivity, and disability’s 
inherent lack of fixity instead promotes a radical inclusivity that “create[s] 
a new category based on the partial, incomplete subject whose realization is 
not autonomy and independence but dependency and interdependence.”37 
For Davis, experiencing the body’s limitations provokes a usefully different 
universal, and this new “normal” “argues for a commonality of bodies within 
the notion of difference” and hence “create[s] a dismodernist approach to 
disability as a neoidentity.”38
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Disability histories
Responding in part to Paul Longmore’s call for “careful studies of disability-
specific histories and contemporary experiences as the foundation for rigor-
ous analysis of disability as a common category,”39 Recovering Disability in 
Early Modern England attempts to perform in early modern English studies 
what David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder have described as “a new historicism 
of disability representations.”40 Agreeing that the disabled body is indeed a 
“cultural artifact produced by material, discursive, and aesthetic practices 
that interpret bodily variation,”41 this book examines those variations as well 
as the various practices that constituted those “differences.” Representations 
of non-normativity in the Renaissance serve for us as viable mechanisms 
for recreating, interpreting, and understanding a historically remote cultural 
imagination of disability. More specifically, this collection recovers disability 
in the English Renaissance by exploring the link between representation and 
embodiment. The essays in this volume undo the impulse to read early mod-
ern disability as predominately metaphorical, for example, and instead insist, 
as Sally Chivers and Nicole Markotić do, that “how experience is represented 
textually and how that representation is projected onto and via audiences 
are both central aspects of the experience itself. That is, the representation 
of disability does not exist separate from disability itself.”42 Early modern 
representations of disability not only function toward metaphorical ends, in 
other words, but rather offer insights into the material, lived experiences of 
disabled individuals in the distant past.
 As we have argued previously in a special issue of the open-access, online 
journal Disability Studies Quarterly, the notion of early modern disability 
is not anachronistic because human variation, though conceived of and 
responded to diversely, has always existed.43 Careful excavation of this varia-
tion via representations from the early modern period requires sensitivity to 
how, as Lois Bragg clarifies, disability has been sequentially redefined over 
time44 and hence how disability “looks” and “means” differently in sixteenth- 
and seventeenth-century England. “Disabled” was indeed an operational 
identity category in the English Renaissance, though it continues to be mis-
identified, or at the very least underexplored, in early modern scholarship. 
Many useful and important, though discursively and theoretically inflex-
ible works, insist on inertly conceptualizing the marvelous, monstrous, and 
deformed, for instance, to describe early modern bodily difference. Recov-
ering Disability in Early Modern England resists limiting early modern dis-
ability as such. It encourages scholars who have been pursuing a kind of 
disability analysis, but overlooking the field’s rich theoretical paradigm, to 
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explore the incisive ways disability methodologies might productively inform 
their work. In doing so, our book promotes an early modern disability stud-
ies that transcends static readings of disability in its premodern iterations—
via stark categories such as “monster” or “fool,” for example—by recognizing 
how such iterations both explicitly and implicitly function in the theoretical 
context of contemporary disability studies.
 To be clear, we are not advocating a wholesale appropriation of “mod-
ern” disability and its attendant language and ideas onto the Renaissance. 
Certainly, as Margaret Winzer points out, “the concept of exceptionality 
throughout history has not been static.”45 We should, in other words, care-
fully contextualize even the notion of “extraordinariness” with which we 
began this introductory essay, acknowledging that the material conditions 
of everyday life in the early modern period support the assumption that 
impairments, especially physical ones, “were noticeably more prominent 
than they are today.”46 Daily realities such as unchecked illness, unsanitary 
conditions, the perils of pregnancy and childbirth, and rampant war made 
the presence and visibility of disabled individuals in the Middle Ages and 
Renaissance more likely and hence, in certain ways, less exceptional. In his 
searching account of the history of western cultural responses to disability, 
Henri-Jacques Stiker clarifies that in medieval Europe, for instance, “normal-
ity was a hodgepodge, and no one was concerned with segregation, for it was 
natural that there should be malformations.  .  .  . There was an acceptance, 
at times awkward, at times brutal, at times compassionate, a kind of indif-
ferent, fatalistic integration.”47 However, insofar as disabled individuals most 
often were “integrated” into medieval communities of the poor and indigent 
and, eventually, within early modern internment facilities for the “mad” and 
“incurable,” even less “exceptional” human variations in pre- and early mod-
ern societies came to be constructed, contained, and policed in very particu-
lar—and often notably disabling—ways.
 We agree, that is, with Joshua Eyler on two counts: first, that early mod-
ernists, like medievalists, have too often relied on “easy stereotypes and 
one-dimensional paradigms as explanatory mechanisms” of disability;48 and 
second, that an unthoughtful mapping of disability onto an early modern 
context is not necessarily a way out of this conundrum. Eyler suggests, and 
we concur, that we must innovate new models of disability studies that are 
historically specific and less broadly constructivist.49 A historically oriented 
disability studies must, to echo Eyler, “scrutiniz[e] the very terms in which 
we talk about the subject in order to determine the degree to which such 
terms are relevant.”50 This sort of ethical staring at disability representation 
has already begun in medieval studies, a field to which early modernists 
alliSOn P. hObgOOD anD DaviD hOUSTOn WOOD • 9
might look for models of new disability history-making and intradiscipline 
dialogue.
 Jeffrey Jerome Cohen’s Of Giants: Sex, Monsters, and the Middle Ages, 
for example, initiates a critical reassessment of “‘subjectivity’ as something 
that occurs only in, through, and upon bodies, and only in somatic terms; 
and ‘embodiment’ as a corporeal process suspended in a psychical and social 
matrix.”51 Cohen, we would argue, evidences an overt interest in disabil-
ity matters; for instance, he discusses, in language that anticipates Gar-
land-Thomson’s Staring, the “visual and epistemological impossibility” of 
“comprehend[ing] simultaneously both the body of the giant and the human 
body as complex, totalized wholes.”52 Of Giants never mentions disability, 
however, but rather strictly aligns itself with a psychoanalytically informed 
cultural theory. While we are not insisting that Cohen’s book serve a dis-
ability purpose, we do want to draw attention to the fruitful conversation 
that occurs when this scholarship is augmented by a book such as David M. 
Turner and Kevin Stagg’s Social Histories of Disability and Deformity. In an 
effort to elaborate the relationship between disability, deformity, and defect, 
Turner and Stagg’s volume contextualizes “monstrosity” from within an early 
modern disability discourse. The chapters in Social Histories “set out to pro-
vide a more complex understanding of processes of devaluation associated 
with human anomaly in past societies” by exposing how “in the early mod-
ern period the concept of disability was subsumed under other categories, 
notably deformity and monstrosity.”53
 As in Turner and Stagg’s work, the ever-burgeoning field of medieval 
disability studies has fully embraced Lennard Davis’s sense that the disabled 
body “is never a single thing so much as a series of attitudes toward it.”54 
Scholars such as Lois Bragg, Joshua Eyler, Irina Metzler, Tory Vandeventer 
Pearman, and Edward Wheatley especially have worked to excavate, histo-
ricize, and understand those competing attitudes.55 Valuably, these scholars 
productively disagree about the nature of disability in the medieval period 
as well as the discursive and methodological uses of contemporary disability 
studies in their field. For instance, Eyler and Metzler debate best practices 
around how medievalists should rely upon constructivist models of disabil-
ity. In Disability in Medieval Europe: Thinking about Physical Impairment 
during the High Middle Ages, Metzler employs a social model, starkly dif-
ferentiating “impairment” from “disability” in order to make more visible 
the ways that physical difference is constructed as disability through social 
obstructions that deny access to non-normative bodies. Contrastingly, Eyler’s 
Disability in the Middle Ages: Rehabilitations, Reconsiderations, Reverberations 
advocates for a cultural model of disability that acknowledges and unites 
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embodiment and corporeal difference. For Eyler, an ideal disability model is 
more broadly encompassing insofar as it fuses bodily experience and social 
perception.
 Renaissance scholars should look to this compelling work in the medi-
eval period as we forge our own early modern disability studies. As Metzler 
suggests, and the essays in this volume perform, our goal is not merely to 
“catalogue evidence of different impairments or ‘disabilities’  .  .  .  , but to 
try and explain their meanings within a specific cultural context.”56 Ideally, 
this new scholarship initiates an ethical staring encounter both across time 
and between disciplines. Renaissance scholarship should not single-mindedly 
benefit from disability studies, that is, but rather each discipline should gen-
erously behold the other. Recovering Disability in Early Modern England is a 
book that holds appeal for both early modernists and contemporary disabil-
ity scholars as it not only reveals the utility of disability studies to early mod-
ern scholarship but also advocates a thesis we have asserted elsewhere: “that 
Renaissance cultural representations of non-standard bodies might provide 
new models for theorizing disability that are simultaneously more inclusive 
and specific than those currently available.”57
 Like Kim F. Hall in the epilogue to her groundbreaking study Things of 
Darkness: Economies of Race and Gender in Early Modern England, we worry 
that current tendencies to deem the study of Renaissance disability some-
how anachronistic or to “impose absolute historical boundaries between 
early modern and contemporary constructions” of normativity provide us 
the unfortunate “luxury of not thinking” about such matters.58 More pre-
cisely, these tendencies maintain and encourage ableist privilege especially in 
early modern studies as they dismissively mute—purportedly in the name of 
ahistoricity—socially responsible dialogue about anti-ableist politics and dis-
ability advocacy in both our work and classrooms. Forging alliances between 
disability and early modern studies, then, makes a number of important 
sparks fly, and it does so in a reciprocal manner across both disciplines. For 
example, new historicist impulses in Renaissance scholarship can shake up 
the now seemingly unspoken assumption in disability studies that the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries introduced “the systematized, divided 
structure of normal and abnormal bodies whose various disabilities are to be 
institutionalized, treated, and made into a semiology of metonymic mean-
ings.”59 Likewise, recent emphasis in early modern studies on gendered and 
raced bodies and their distinct corporeal materialities will enhance conver-
sations in disability scholarship about how to attend more carefully to the 
deeply embodied nature of impairment. Conversely, employing disabil-
ity studies contemporizes theoretically the processes of deep historicization 
engaged by Renaissance literary scholars and, perhaps more crucially, politi-
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cizes work that might otherwise seem to function predominately as an apo-
litical reconstruction of the past and its modes of representation.
Early Modern Disability histories
Our “Disabled Shakespeares” collection, published in Disability Studies 
Quarterly, set out to explore the unexamined ubiquity of Shakespearean dis-
ability representations. Those essays variously investigate the ways Shake-
spearean drama engages disability both on its own terms (via keen, new 
critical reading strategies, for example) and by squaring such non-normative 
psychophysiological representations within the sociopolitico-theological cli-
mates that furnished disabled selves with a range of cultural associations. 
Certainly, Shakespeare’s literary interest in staging disability begins early in 
his career, with numerous mutilated bodies in Titus Andronicus and the con-
genital deformity of Richard Gloucester in the first Henriad, and ranges 
through to his career’s end in the psychosomatic breakdown of Leontes in 
The Winter’s Tale and the extraordinary representation of the “savage and 
deformed native of the island,” Caliban, in The Tempest.60 Between these book-
ends, Shakespeare’s creative output encompasses a broad range of disabled 
selfhoods: it moves across a spectrum from bodily to metaphysical disfigure-
ment, ranging from instances of blindness to limping, from alcoholism to 
excessive fat, from infertility to war wounds, from cognitive impairments to 
epilepsy, from senility to “madness,” and from feigned disability to actual. 
Our extension in this collection beyond Shakespeare into other early mod-
ern English disability representations similarly illustrates the cultural inher-
itance that pervasively defines ableist discourses and corporeal “norms” 
against disability and non-normativity. Recovering Disability in Early Mod-
ern England thus takes as its impetus the ubiquity of early modern disabil-
ity representations across the literary record, in canonical and noncanonical 
works alike.
 Shakespeare’s consistent literary exploration of stigmatized, disabled oth-
erness is, accordingly, not a singular fixation unique to his own character-
ological obsessions and literary output. Far from it: the humoral medical 
paradigm so important to Renaissance conceptions of the body, for example, 
sheds important light as we define early modern disability discourses. Early 
modern selfhood, in this somatic sense, can be construed as a historicized 
exploration of corporeal variation and difference that highlights the ubiquity 
of disability in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England. After all, early 
modern theories of health and illness hinged upon the psychosomatic con-
struct of embodied selfhood espoused by humoral theory, which flowered 
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in early modern England out of classical origins.61 It comes as no surprise 
to anyone interested in Renaissance literature and culture, of course, that 
illness, disease, and deformity serve as hallmark representations of the self 
during the period. But it is important to acknowledge that the fundamental 
concept of material embodiment as understood within humoral theory, in 
the relative mixture of the four principal humors (choler, sanguinity, melan-
choly, and phlegm), is implicitly based upon aberration, imperfection, and 
thus corporeal difference: excesses or deficiencies of these humoral compo-
nents, early modern medical theorists insist, manifestly explain the very con-
cepts of health and illness.62
 The normative states of flux and volatility that characterize early modern 
selfhood within humoral theory, further, center upon their involvement with 
a range of environmental stimuli—such as relative caloric and moisture reg-
isters—especially worthy of consideration in a disability context. Indeed, the 
very porousness by which humoral selves were conceived grants them what 
can best be understood as a receding horizon of normalcy. While the salubri-
ous goal of individual health was an apparently rare humoral equipoise, such 
moments of humoral stasis were belied by the ostensible norms of humoral 
imbalance. The ubiquity of such imbalances, however, should not shield us 
from the stigmatizing otherness they facilitated, as Ben Jonson’s grotesque 
humoral types reveal. At the same time, though, the dynamic, transformative 
representations of humoral selves in works by Shakespeare, among others, 
indicate the shifting and even volatile stuff of which the early modern self 
was composed. In this sense, early modern categories of disability must be 
perceived as far more labile than we today presume them to be.
 Indeed, the diurnal and seasonal regimens prescribed by late medieval 
and early modern physicians—that of “purging” choler through bleeding, 
for example—indicate that before the discovery of the circulation of the 
blood by Englishman William Harvey was published in 1628 (Latin) and 
1649 (English), and the gradual implementation of such observation-driven 
science over the latter half of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the 
interactive flux of self and environment that constitutes early modern self-
hood helps define embodied disability in the period. As Gail Kern Paster and 
John Sutton have shown, the transformation from humoral conceptions of 
the self to Cartesian modes of subjectivity, while far from immediate, was 
remarkable. With this shift, early modern theories of personhood changed 
from perceiving the self as humorally porous, and thus essentially unitary 
both in its integration of mind and body and its interaction with the envi-
ronment, to an estranged concept of the self that stressed both its mind-body 
duality and its essential isolation from environmental situatedness.
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 This profound early modern shift in defining precisely what a self is 
becomes crucial to any understanding of early modern disability discourses. 
What Paster presents as the “semi-permeable irrigated container”63 of the 
humoral self yields to the Cartesian self John Sutton describes as “a static, 
solid container, only barely breached, in principle autonomous from culture 
and environment, tampered with only by diseases and experts.”64 Writing on 
the verge of this tectonic transformation from humoral to Enlightenment 
philosophies of mind, early modern English authors portray stigmatized ill-
ness, disease, and deformity—in a word, disability—by conceiving of it in 
ways that can simultaneously appear either entirely alien to current Western 
(that is, Cartesian) ways of thinking or, on the contrary, as utterly and even 
painfully familiar. Just as Erving Goffman and Lerita Coleman acknowledge 
that different cultures stigmatize differently, so too does humoral theory, as 
employed by English Renaissance physicians and artists, display hierarchies 
of value that stigmatize differences, both inward and outward.65
 Humoral theory thus offers one useful lens through which we might 
begin to engage the three rival methodologies most closely associated with 
disability studies. Each methodology, we would argue, responds differently 
to the material fabrics of embodiment as they are couched within humoral 
theory and other early modern philosophies of the self. For example, the first 
methodology, the medical model, quite literally medicalizes the humoral self 
as susceptible to various sorts of aberration and non-normativity—and such 
potentially stigmatizing medicalization can then serve as the narrative cata-
lysts Mitchell and Snyder identify as narrative prostheses, or spurs to nar-
rative. As they define the notion, stories frequently set forth disability as an 
aberration for which a narrative subsequently seeks to account by examining 
its origins and manifestation within the work. Ultimately, Mitchell and Sny-
der suggest, disability must be either rehabilitated or expunged: this “cure 
or kill” phenomenon thus medicalizes disability as it serves as an essentialist 
discourse that treats variation as pathology.66
 As we suggest above, two constructivist models have arisen within dis-
ability scholarship in reaction to this medical model: the social and the cul-
tural. The social, particularly as it is taken up in our collection, identifies 
psychophysiological impairments (often tied to humoral aberrations) and 
suggests that those differences manifest within an early modern English cul-
tural environment whose systemic barriers transformed impairment into dis-
ability. The rival constructivist model, the cultural, is represented as well in 
this volume and critiques the social model by accounting more deliberately 
for corporeality and embodiment, fusing lived materiality with social ideol-
ogy and marking the ways disabled bodies and minds both shaped and were 
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shaped by their cultural environments. Subtending all three of these models 
as we present them here is the diminishment of disability framed merely as 
metaphor and, consequently, an escalating interest in early modern disability 
representations as embodied, early modern verisimilitude.
 But against this burgeoning investment in such ostensible materialism, 
the tug of metaphor remains keen. Particularly in the theological realm, 
early modern disability depictions often present an explicitly figurative link 
whereby character disfigurements and impairments function, put simply, 
as penalties for sin.67 This metaphorically driven discourse of disability is 
one Edward Wheatley has termed, using medieval examples, the “religious 
model” of disability, and it is traceable in medieval writers who Wheatley 
suggests generally script “exemplary texts featuring characters with disabili-
ties [that] do not engage in what readers would call ‘characterization’ of 
them; [such characters] remain flat and emblematic, the site where God’s 
work can be made manifest.”68 Wheatley proceeds to link, provocatively, 
medieval views on religion to modern medical views,69 situating the two as 
adjuncts to the medical model of disability. Wheatley thus identifies “resem-
blances between [the] discursive power of religion in the Middle Ages and 
that of medicine in the modern world. At its most restrictive, medicine 
tends to view a disability as an absence of full health that requires a cure; 
similarly, medieval Christianity often constructed disability as a spiritu-
ally pathological site of absence of the divine.”70 Where modern medicine, 
he continues, “holds out the possibility of cures through development in 
research[,] medieval Christianity held out the possibility of cure through 
freedom from sin and increased personal faith”; thus, in both schemas, 
“there is a tacit implication that somehow the disabled person is to blame 
for resisting a cure.”71
 While the religious model certainly offers a useful groundwork for engag-
ing premodern disability representations, Joshua Eyler rightly observes that 
medieval Christianity was surely far more multifaceted than this top-down 
approach allows.72 The tidiness of Wheatley’s religious model—similar to 
Metzler’s medieval social model, which, we would argue, too neatly demar-
cates “impairment” from “disability”—requires nuance and dynamism, espe-
cially as we approach the Renaissance era. We share in terms of our own 
historical focus, that is, Eyler’s call for disability “models that examine many 
different kinds of texts in an effort to determine how, precisely, medieval 
people viewed disability and how they rectified their religious views with 
the reality of corporeal difference.”73 Such a pursuit, as it examines disability 
representations well beyond post-Reformation England, involves engaging a 
period of great cultural transition in which the turn from Roman Catholic 
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to Protestant ideologies—in all its fits and starts—produced a sea change in 
attitudes toward disability.
 Lindsey Row-Heyveld’s work notably takes up this radical shift and illu-
minates how an investigation of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England 
requires that we complicate current medieval disability scholarship some-
what. More precisely, Row-Heyveld’s work reveals that Wheatley and Met-
zler’s assessments of medieval disability serve as but pieces of a decidedly 
more complex disability story in England ranging from the Middle Ages 
to the Reformation. “Disability in the Middle Ages was characterized by its 
important role in a system of spiritual exchange in which the non-standard 
body served as a conduit for God,” explains Row-Heyveld; “this exchange 
granted people with non-normative bodies a level of subjectivity and spiri-
tual agency that their early modern counterparts did not experience.”74 She 
clarifies:
In part due to the example of Francis of Assisi and the rise of the Fran-
ciscans in the thirteenth century, disabled people regularly engaged in a 
mutually beneficial exchange with the normative population. Able-bod-
ied Christians gave them alms . . . and, in return, experienced an encoun-
ter with the divine facilitated by the disabled person. . . . In this capacity, 
people with physical impairments—commonly and ironically called “the 
limbs of God”—provided a necessary service to society.  .  .  . This type of 
charity was not a one-sided act but a mutual exchange—salvation for alms, 
alms for salvation—with disability as the crux on which this commerce 
balanced.75
While medieval theological doctrine initially integrated disabled individu-
als into a mutually beneficial exchange with able-bodied people, Protestant 
doctrinal focus upon human inner depravity and secularizing theological sys-
tems of charity led to a remarkable hierarchical disempowerment of disabled 
individuals over the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. As in 
so many other ways, that is, the English Reformation crucially transformed 
categories of sensory, somatic, and mental non-normativity. As Row-Heyveld 
has suggested, after the Reformation in England,
Prayers could no longer be purchased formally  .  .  .  and, therefore, dis-
abled persons had no services to offer in exchange for the aid given to 
them. Without this tradition of spiritual commerce to frame an important 
mutuality between able-bodied and disabled Christians, their relationship 
quickly became solely hierarchical.  .  .  . The goods and services that had 
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been traded in exchange for prayers or affirmations of salvation now sim-
ply became charity.76
The cultural legacy we share regarding disability and disabled selves, in other 
words, has been preconditioned in part by these extraordinary shifts from 
premodern taxonomies of psychophysiological variation that facilitated 
mutuality toward an early modern, unilateral power hierarchy in which “per-
sons with disabilities became objects to be acted upon rather than individu-
als to be interacted with.”77 The essays in this collection, both implicitly and 
explicitly, confirm how the English Reformation foreclosed a more multi-
valent legacy of medieval Christian attitudes to disability and incited new 
challenges and complexities around disability—and the agency of disabled 
individuals—in the early modern era.
Disabling the English Renaissance
As they unsettle standard narratives about the English Renaissance and early 
modern subjectivities, the essays in Recovering Disability in Early Modern 
England speak to one another across time, genre, methodology, and disci-
pline. Sara van den Berg’s “Dwarf Aesthetics in Spenser’s Faerie Queene and 
the Early Modern Court” opens the volume by calling attention to often 
overlooked dwarf bodies in the Renaissance. Specifically, van den Berg exam-
ines the ways that Spenser’s fictional dwarfs compare with the lives of real 
dwarfs in the courts of early modern Europe. Spenser’s poem, in van den 
Berg’s account, “itself is a kind of court, where dwarfs play significant roles 
as characters and narrators” and hence, as a group, “chart the development 
of Spenser’s authorial narrator and the moral complexity of his allegorical fic-
tion.” Like van den Berg, Emily Bowles rereads the stigmatized early modern 
body through an exploration of Restoration writer Aphra Behn’s fascination 
with the intersection of sexuality and disability. Drawing on Aristotelian 
and Galenic models of human sexuality, organs, and gendered traits, Bowles 
shows how Behn literalizes the relationship between defect and femaleness 
by satirizing contemporary social and scientific discourses that showcase “her 
awareness of the limitations that her contemporaries’ understanding of gen-
der, sex, and sexuality placed on women’s bodies via representation of the 
slippages between desirability and disability.”
 Interested in how cultural narratives of disability influenced early mod-
ern literary form, David M. Turner, Lindsey Row-Heyveld, and Rachel E. 
Hile all reimagine traditional literary genres from non-normative perspec-
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tives. Turner examines English jest books and the ways disability humor 
“shaped meanings of embodied difference.” He argues that humor had the 
potential to “interrogate conventional wisdom about bodily norms,” and he 
redefines comic narratives of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as both 
evidencing and sculpting the English cultural imagination of disability and 
the social experiences of early modern disabled individuals. Similarly, Row-
Heyveld reconceives genre but, in this case, with a focus upon the English 
stage. Her essay offers a new study of madness as disability as it reconsid-
ers the role of “insanity” within the revenge tragedy tradition. She suggests 
that madness has an explicit narrative function in revenge plays, “making 
the morally ambiguous revenge tradition palatable for early modern audi-
ences” and hence “facilitating the consumption of its ethically compromised 
but emotionally cathartic plot for audiences trained to condemn but hungry 
for vigilante justice.” Rachel E. Hile likewise examines genre and audience 
response but in the context of Spenserian readership. “Disabling Allegories in 
Edmund Spenser’s Faerie Queene” illuminates how Spenser’s narrative mech-
anisms, allegory specifically, deploy disability. Arguing that reader response 
determines metaphorical meaning, Hile identifies the narrative ways Spenser 
calls on “his audience’s shared biases and preconceptions related to bodily 
differences” in order to achieve “desired moral interpretations.” According 
to Hile, Spenser’s impaired allegorical figures conjure disgust and rejection, 
leading readers to moral conclusions not through intellectual reasoning but 
emotional impulse.
 In contrast, Simone Chess, Lauren Coker, and Marcela Kostihová focus 
squarely upon the materiality of bodily difference in the Renaissance. Chess’s 
essay, “Performing Blindness: Representing Disability in Early Modern Pop-
ular Performance and Print,” examines early modern interest and invest-
ment in medical knowledge and in lived experiences of the blind. Chess 
uncovers literary instances in which the metaphorical trappings of visual 
impairment fade in order to foreground blindness as an embodied physi-
cal condition that engages material, early modern disability concerns. Chess 
reads sixteenth- and seventeenth-century scientific texts, cheap-print ballads, 
and broadsides in order to explore “how examining these representations of 
blindness on the stage and in print (and, alongside them, representations 
of the adaptive technologies used by early modern blind individuals) can 
unsettle the relationship between seeing and knowing, disability and agency, 
blindness as metaphor and as experiential.” Similarly interested in embodied 
experience, Lauren Coker reads “disability drag” in Ben Jonson’s Volpone to 
stress how the metatheatrical staging of disability showcases the possibility of 
corporeal deceit via the disconnect between Volpone’s decision to appear ail-
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ing while acknowledging his able-bodiedness to the audience. Coker argues 
that this metatheatrical imposture of disability accentuates Volpone’s manip-
ulation of social practices and institutions intended for the early modern ail-
ing poor and likewise “undercuts the perception of disability as a material 
and lived bodily condition.” Although the metatheatricality of Jonson’s play 
reinforces social models of disability, Coker concludes that its deployment of 
disability drag provokes questions about embodiment and the “il/legitimacy” 
of disability that affect people of all social strata.
 Marcela Kostihová, in “Richard Recast: Renaissance Disability in a Post-
communist Culture,” discusses the disability context of a recent, and “wildly 
popular,” staging of Shakespeare’s Richard III in the postcommunist Czech 
Republic. Kostihová pursues the ways in which a “particular case of dis-
abling the Renaissance may feed off of—and feed into—contemporary polit-
ical tensions surrounding the normative discourses of humanity, masculinity, 
and citizenship.” As Kostihová explains, the major draw of the Czech pro-
duction rested on the interpretation of Richard’s famed “deformity” in cast-
ing disabled actor Jan Potměšil, a veteran of the 1989 Velvet Revolution, in 
the leading role. Kostihová observes the ways that Potměšil’s performance 
“blurred the boundaries between the actor and character by foregrounding 
the actor’s past in all promotional and evaluative materials, frequently as 
the defining feature of the production and of the entire collective.” Kosti-
hová outlines the cultural implications of fusing Richard’s ambiguous “natu-
ral deformity” with Potměšil’s accidental disability acquired in the process of 
political activism, suggesting that “this production’s version of Renaissance 
disability, in its multivalent ambiguity, uneasily captures a postcommunist 
transitionality wherein (corpo)realities are in flux, the future multiple and 
uncertain, and the narratives of the past uncomfortably unsettled.”
 In essays by Mardy Philippian, Jr., and Nancy J. Hirschmann, finally, we 
close by returning to narratives of the past to reconsider construction of the 
“individual” in Renaissance society. Philippian’s work engages the Book of 
Common Prayer as a “therapeutic” instance of textual accessibility in early 
modern England. He calls attention to a “methodological logocentrism” in 
the study of literary history, examining this devotional text as “a behavioral 
script that ushered those of atypical cognitive development into corporate 
religious and social life.” More specifically, he argues that the Book of Com-
mon Prayer functioned in early modern England as an inclusive “textual 
apparatus” and “communicative mode” that uniquely made accessible to 
both disabled and nondisabled parishioners an emerging post-Reformation 
theological system of beliefs and practices. Nancy J. Hirschmann’s “Freedom 
and (Dis)Ability in Early Modern Political Thought” likewise explores the 
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individual within the social body but through an analysis of Enlightenment 
conceptions of freedom in Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Hirschmann 
employs a disability perspective to reveal how early modern political phi-
losophy defines freedom by depending on “a particular body with particular 
physical and mental capacities and orientations, a particular set of assump-
tions about what constitutes a human being, and a particular set of social 
relations that exclude disabled individuals from the role of political citizen.” 
She articulates, in other words, how for Hobbes and Locke “what the dis-
abled body or mind can or cannot do shapes the parameters of what free-
dom can mean.” Aptly, Hirschmann’s work brings our volume’s historicism 
into the twenty-first century as it illuminates how these inherently able-
ist Enlightenment conceptions of freedom determine even our postmodern 
ideas about freedom and political citizenship.
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in “An Execration upon Vulcan,” Ben Jonson dismissed “Dames and Dwarfes” along with “the whole summe / Of errant Knighthood.”1 He was describing the romance tradition since Malory’s Morte d’Arthur, but 
he might well have included Spenser’s Faerie Queene, an epic narrative of 
questing knights and alluring ladies, four of whom are accompanied by 
dwarfs. Most of the dwarfs in romances play minor roles as gatekeepers, 
attendants, and messengers. Spenser, however, gives them more important 
roles as allegorical figures who contribute to the layered meanings of the 
poem. In this meaningfulness, Spenser’s dwarfs are comparable to those in 
actual courts of early modern Europe. The dwarf could carry political, reli-
gious, psychological, and aesthetic meaning, serving as a surrogate for the 
ruler, the subject, the self, and perhaps the artist.2 These meanings constitute 
a “dwarf aesthetics” that was adapted and expanded in literature and art. 
Spenser’s poem itself is a kind of court, where the dwarfs play a significant 
role as characters and as narrators. Many speakers offer interpolated narra-
tives throughout The Faerie Queene, but the dwarf narrators as a group chart 
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the development of Spenser’s authorial narrator and the moral complexity of 
his allegorical fiction.3
 It is not entirely clear why dwarfs were such a prominent feature of the 
early modern European court. Yet there they are, “marvelous monsters,” 
unexamined and enigmatic.4 Of the many different types of dwarfism then 
and now, the two most common are pituitary dwarfism, in which the body 
is perfectly proportioned, and achondroplasia, in which the body is marked 
by a normal-sized torso and shortened arms and legs. The many portraits of 
early modern court dwarfs indicate that all types were valued as members of 
an aristocratic entourage.5 The only common denominator was their small 
size. It is the exceptional size of the dwarf body in relation to others that will 
be the main determinant of its meaning.
 To decode the meaning of the dwarf body, we can begin with the more 
general problem of the human body as a cultural signifier. Mary Douglas 
argues that the human body is both a complex structure and “a source of 
symbols for other complex structures.”6 More recent critics have focused 
attention on the body in earlier eras—perhaps in order to understand our 
own cultural preoccupation with the body. Since Leonard Barkan’s pioneer-
ing account of early modern symbolic readings of the ideal body, there has 
been an outpouring of cultural studies of early modern bodies—gendered, 
mutilated, deformed, monstrous.7 Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, turning 
from the ideal body to its opposite, argues that both extremes pose a cul-
tural problem: “By its very presence, the exceptional body seems to compel 
explanation, inspire representation, and incite regulation.”8 The term “defor-
mity” was used in the early modern era to keep the focus on divergence from 
ideal form, whether from birth or from injury; “disability,” the term in use 
today, emphasizes bodily performance rather than form. Disability theorists 
focus on the specific enigma of the disabled body9 and have appropriated 
the methodology of cultural studies in part to redeem disabled people from 
the monolithic construct of Disability. To achieve that goal, disability stud-
ies scholars show how the disabled body is socially constructed as abnormal, 
and how the dichotomy of normal/abnormal constrains and regulates differ-
ence. In the history of disability, the struggle has always been to expose the 
social construction of disability and to oppose the medical reification of the 
disabled body.
 Dwarfs, because they can often function normally, both are and are not 
disabled. Early modern medical texts, for example, barely mention dwarfs in 
the catalogue of monstrous deformities.10 As a result, the dwarf body is and 
is not subject to the social construction of deformity in the early modern era 
or of disability today. In some cases, dwarfs are limited only by their size; 
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in myth and literature, they often demonstrate remarkable agility, strength, 
and speed. The perspective of disability studies, however, remains especially 
useful to any discussion of the cultural meaning of the dwarf body. Dwarfs 
occupy a liminal position at the intersection of self and other, human and 
monster. Because of their liminal position, Leslie Fiedler called dwarfs “the 
most favored, the most successful, the most conspicuous and articulate” 
of human freaks, “but by the same token, the most feared and reviled.”11 
Dwarfs, moreover, serve as an instrument of social construction. They may 
be regulated as individual people, but as symbolic figures they may also be a 
means of regulating others, even the most powerful. Indeed, dwarfs are the 
only human group to have become a common verb to evaluate literal or figu-
rative size: something large or important is said to “dwarf ” something else. 
Even then, agency is given to the larger entity that constructs the other as 
“dwarfed.”
 In early modern courts, it was not just the dwarf body that was socially 
constructed but also the symbolic meaning of that body. The court dwarf 
gained symbolic meaning in an era when the discourse of power emphasized 
the royal body. As a frequent companion to authority, yet entirely lacking 
authority, the dwarf signifies and critiques the power of others.12 The dwarf 
could also provide religious, psychological, and aesthetic meaning, serving 
as a surrogate for and critique of the subject, the self, and the artist as well 
as the ruler. These meanings constitute a “dwarf aesthetic”—playful and 
contradictory, decorative and enigmatic, pure and transgressive, powerless 
and powerful—that challenged humanist ideals of perspective, proportion, 
and stable form in art and in politics. In this aesthetic, there is a surprising 
realignment of the ordinary link between size and value. Small size can con-
tradict and critique accepted values, forcing on others a point of view that 
can diminish their stature to that of a dwarf.13
 That aesthetic is embodied in the dwarfs of the early modern court. Court 
dwarfs were at once prominent and invisible, public and private. Some were 
trusted officials and attendants; a dwarf ’s position at court depended entirely 
on the favor of the ruler, whose attitude might veer from respect to con-
tempt, affection to condescension, intimacy to indifference. More often the 
court dwarf functioned as a resident entertainer, free to offer cynical com-
mentary or bawdy jokes. Licensed to mock, the dwarf was often the object 
of mockery as well. Frequently an attendant to noble children, the dwarf 
was often seen as a kind of child, but as a companion for a ruler the dwarf 
could also seem a kind of human pet, more associated with leisure than with 
labor, whose presence testified to the luxury and magnificence of the court.14 
In social terms, the dwarf served as a commodity fetish, a luxurious acces-
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sory whose value lay precisely in being exempt from productive labor. The 
court dwarf was an ornament, and the combination of small size and intri-
cate detail was often part of the dwarf ’s value. For example, in the course 
of preparing a major portrait of the Countess of Arundel, Rubens drew an 
elaborate sketch of her dwarf, including extensive notes about his luxurious 
clothing.15
 The miniature body of the dwarf also had a more disturbing appeal. 
Dwarfs were disturbing in their difference and may have been brought to 
court in part to deflect the threat of difference by converting it into enter-
tainment. Susan Stewart argues that a miniature body, like a miniature 
book, “presents a diminutive, and thereby manipulable, version of experi-
ence, a version which is domesticated and protected from contamination. 
It marks the pure body.”16 However, the dwarf could represent danger as 
well as purity.17 In psychological terms, the dwarf body could represent, and 
thereby deflect, a range of sexual fears, from asexuality to insatiable appetite. 
Other kinds of fear—of vulnerability, of deficiency, of rejection—are also 
emblemized and allayed by the presence of the court dwarf. Patricia Fum-
erton contends that the miniature was not just an ornament but because of 
its size functioned as a sign of inwardness, intimacy, and the “private” or 
“true” self.18 The dwarf as a living miniature became one sign of the possibil-
ity of secrecy, privacy, and intimacy in the public world of the early modern 
court.19
 As a material object on display, the dwarf body fascinated early modern 
artists.20 The dwarf challenged everything they knew about how to repre-
sent the human body. In social terms, court dwarfs were rather like the art-
ists who painted them: outsiders, yet with privileged access to power.21 In 
depicting a dwarf, in some sense artists depicted themselves. Dwarfs were 
especially prominent and numerous in the Spanish court, perhaps the most 
codified and ritualized of all European courts.22 Velázquez famously paired 
himself and court dwarfs in Las Meninas, and he painted portraits of court 
dwarfs, most memorably Don Sebastián de Morra, whose body is structured 
by squares and circles, abstract geometry defining and confining its form (see 
figure 1).23 Yet he must be read not only as an object but also as a subject 
with personal anxieties and burdens, whose intense and haunting gaze insists 
he can never be contained, defined, or known.
 There are very few instances in early modern literature or life when a 
dwarf speaks of his own experience. One of those fictive moments comes 
in Jonson’s Volpone when Nano describes himself as “little and wittie, / 
And euery thing, as it is little, is prettie.” Acknowledging that dwarfs were 
often compared to monkeys, he suggests that both are enjoyed “for pleasing 
Figure 1.  Don Sebastián de morra, c. 1643–44 (oil on canvas) by Diego rodríguez de Silva y velázquez (1599–
1660), Prado, madrid, Spain/The bridgeman art library 
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imitation / Of greater mens action, in a ridiculous fashion.” Dwarfs, more-
over, are inexpensive: “Beside, this feat body of mine doth not craue / Halfe 
the meat, drinke, and cloth, one of your bulkes will have.” Finally, he sets up 
the dichotomy of body and intellect: “Admit your fool’s face be the mother 
of laughter, / Yet, for his brain, it must always come after” (3.3.9–18).24 Jon-
son’s Nano concludes his collection of advantages by admitting that his com-
ical appearance will always be the first thing people notice, but at the same 
time he slyly suggests that his wit, nonetheless, will “come after.”
 A personal statement by an actual dwarf would not appear until 1754, 
when William Hay began his autobiographical essay with this declaration:
It is offensive for a Man to speak much of himself. . . . Bodily Deformity 
is visible to every Eye; but the Effects of it are known to very few; inti-
mately known to none but those, who feel them; and they generally are 
not inclined to reveal them.  .  .  .  I do not pretend to be so ingenious as 
Montaigne, but it is in my power to be as ingenuous. I may with the same 
Naivete remove the Veil from my mental as well as personal Imperfections; 
and expose them naked to the World. And when I have thus anatomized 
my self, I hope my Heart will be found sound and untainted, and my 
Intentions honest and sincere.25
Like Nano, Hay acknowledges the impact of his body on others. His pur-
pose, however, is far from comic. Hay speaks as one person to others, focus-
ing on the internal self that joins him to humanity rather than the external 
deformity that sets him apart. Yet he admits he had been “ashamed of my 
person” and experienced “Uneasiness in my younger days.”26
 Something of that anxiety is evident in Van Dyck’s portrait of Jeffrey 
Hudson with his mistress, Queen Henrietta Maria (see figure 2). The queen 
is flanked by a draped table holding her crown (her public life) and Hudson 
holding a monkey on a velvet leash (her private life). By placing her hand 
on the monkey, the queen adopts the conventional gesture of condescension, 
but by placing her hand on the monkey rather than on Hudson she protects 
him from social diminution. They share the pet. However, the rose-colored 
velvet leash binds the monkey to the dwarf, who wears a suit of the same 
rose velvet, so that both are in some sense her pets.27 By anxiously looking 
up at the queen, Hudson indicates that he cannot take her favor for granted. 
A dwarf ’s position at court depended entirely on the ruler, whose attitude 
might veer from respect to contempt, affection to condescension, intimacy 
to indifference. So, too, the artist was a figure of luxury, whose survival 
depended on his aesthetic labor and his patrons’ favor. The artist, like the 
Figure 2.  Sir anthony van Dyck, Queen henrietta maria with Sir Jeffrey hudson, 1633, Samuel h. 
kress Collection. image courtesy of the national gallery of art, Washington, DC
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court dwarf, existed on the border that marks the limits of power, and the 
only way to thrive on that border was to define and challenge it in art.
 Whether in portraits or in literature, the court dwarf could be read as a 
moral political text. The new-yeeres gift (1636), an elegant miniature book, 
was written for Jeffrey Hudson by “Microphilus” (Lover of little things).28 
A tiny engraving of Hudson adorns the book, with this epigraph: “Gaze on 
with wonder, and discerne with me / The abstract of the worlds Epitome.” 
The author begins in a mock-heroic vein, making every bad joke on size 
imaginable. The book, we are told, is “penned in short-hand” and proves that 
“Little Things are better then [sic] Great.” The text ranges from semantic and 
logical jokes about size to Brownian baroque: “Is not a Microcosme better 
than a Macrocosm, the little-world, Man, than the Great world, Earth? Nay 
Man the lesser world is lord OF the Greater.”29 If Jeffrey is the microcosm, 
he is also a figure of Europe: “We know there are foure parts of the World, 
and among them Europe the least; yet, in fertility of grounds, variety of 
people and kingdoms, and in the most flourishing wits of most learned men, 
it surpasses the Greatest.”30 The author describes the court dwarf as “natures 
humble pulpit,” a means to preach to “High-aspiring Mortals.”31 Hudson, he 
declares, serves as a model for king and subject. To the king, Hudson stands 
as a “theological” reminder: “O King, remember how thou art little.”32 To 
the subject, the dwarf acts as a “politicall” reminder that “those who desire 
to approach neere Princes ought not to be ambitious of any Greatnesse in 
themselves.”33
 Jeffrey Hudson frequently danced in the court masques that overtly 
marked the border between the state and its fictions, enacting the threat of 
disorder and the fantasy of order. The antimasque always featured figures 
of disorder: country bumpkins, fantastic animals, demons. Hudson’s dwarf 
body consigned him to disorderly roles in the antimasque rather than in 
the stately visions that conclude these regal fictions.34 Only in D’Avenant’s 
Salmacida Spolia, the last great Caroline masque (1640), did Jeffrey Hudson 
appear twice, first in the antimasque of disorder, then in the final scene as an 
attendant, seated at the feet of the king and queen as part of the royal vision 
of order.35 Perhaps the inclusion of the dwarf signifies the reconciliation of 
disorder and order in the court’s idealizing fiction of itself. Or, conversely, it 
could mean a disruption or corruption of that vision of order, signifying the 
risk that would culminate in civil war, the execution of Charles I, and the 
exile of the queen and her court, including Hudson himself.
 If the king had two bodies—the natural and the political—the dwarf 
mediated between them as a kind of “third term” and defined their differ-
ence. The king could contrast the dwarf ’s weakness to his own regal power, 
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and at the same time he could see the dwarf ’s body as a sign of his own 
natural weakness. Ato Quayson has persuasively argued that this capacity 
for different interpretations prevents the comforting narrative of redeeming 
disability and instead elicits “aesthetic nervousness,” a “subliminal unease” 
that makes meaning complex, uncertain, and questioning.36 By their license 
to mock and by their own transgressive bodies, court dwarfs challenged the 
dichotomy of the monarch’s being. Marjorie Garber developed the concept 
of the “third term” to explore how transvestites destabilize the common 
dichotomy of gender.37 As a “third term,” the dwarf did not simply partici-
pate in the system of meanings at court but challenged it. The “third term” 
puts in question both the one-to-one power relationship of monarch and 
subject and the very idea of oneness: of identity, self-sufficiency, and self-
knowledge. As a transgressive subject who claimed the identity that society 
often denied, the dwarf challenged the limits of a culture that at once privi-
leged and controlled identity. Ato Quayson again complicates this reading 
by arguing that the disabled body can be uninterpretable, a hermeneutic 
impasse that may define others but resist interpretation itself.38 That resis-
tance is inseparable from the dwarf ’s trauma of being. The dwarf always 
inhabits a Bakhtinian grotesque body, threatening, containable only in car-
nival or court.39 For the dwarf, the grotesque body is not a willed or chosen 
representation but ineluctable fact. The court served as a “contact zone” for 
dwarfs, seeming to convert to an asset the physical grotesquerie that gave 
them access.40 
 Living on the border twixt earnest and game, between silence and trans-
gressive speech, between human and animal, the dwarf marks the border 
between safety and danger, between power and vulnerability. Spenser’s 
dwarfs would have been read by his audience in relation to what they knew 
about the meaningfulness of court dwarfs as these various cultural and moral 
signs. We can read them as figures of a social and moral aesthetic that takes 
the measure of the poet as well as society. Each of the four dwarfs in Spens-
er’s Faerie Queene is at some point a narrator (like so many characters in the 
poem), and as narrators they provide a distinctive reflection on the author. 
The four dwarfs in Spenser’s Faerie Queene function as attendants and mes-
sengers, even a jailer, and all of them serve noble ladies. As Ronald Horton 
notes in the Spenser Encyclopedia, two serve virtuous ladies (Una and Flo-
rimell), while two serve wicked ladies (Poeana and Briana). These dwarfs 
have been read as an allegorical representation of reason, usually at its low-
est level of “common sense,” occasionally as “the flesh,” and once as “comic 
realism.”41 However, since the rest of The Faerie Queene has rewarded many 
different types of interpretation, any single reading offers only a partial 
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explanation of the dwarfs’ role and meaning. All four dwarfs are narrators, 
either in words or as signs. Together, they constitute a kind of meditation on 
narrative—as linkage and separation, record and promise, abbreviation and 
expansion, truth and deception—and on Spenser himself.42
 The four court dwarfs in The Faerie Queene are private companions to 
court ladies. Una’s dwarf appears early in book 1, lagging behind his lady, 
seeming “lasie” for “being euer last” (1.1.6). He is not a privileged ornament 
but a personal servant, “wearied” with carrying Una’s bag of “needments” 
(1.1.6). Later, serving Redcrosse, he carries the knight’s “needless” spear and 
armor “missing most at need” (1.1.11). Neither lazy nor weary, but “care-
full” and “wary,” the dwarf warns Redcrosse to avoid the Cave of Error and, 
later, the House of Pride. The dwarf ’s bond with Una, however, remains 
unbroken. When Redcrosse and the dwarf flee the Cave of Error together, 
leaving Una behind, she “Lookt for her knight, that far away was fled, / 
And for her Dwarfe, that wont to wait each houre; / Then gan she waile and 
weepe, to see that woefull stowre” (1.2.7). Her feelings for the dwarf are 
clearly reciprocated. When he brings Una the woeful news that Redcrosse 
has been defeated and imprisoned by Orgoglio, the dwarf is as devastated as 
she:
The messenger of so vnhappie newes
Would faine haue dyde: dead was his hart within,
Yet outwardly some little comfort shewes:
At last recouering hart, he does begin
To rub her temples, and to chaufe her chin,
And euery tender part does tosse and turne:
So hardly he the flitted life does win
Vnto her natiue prison to retourne. (1.7.21)
The physical and psychological bond between the dwarf and Una heightens 
the force of the narrative. Although he cannot initially show her much care, 
by trying to help her he brings his own “dead” heart back to life as well. The 
“needless” signs he carried in his hands (armor, spear) are less important than 
the much-needed wordless work of his hands, as he brings Una comfort and 
shares her grief.
 As a caring narrator who agrees to tell “the whole discourse” that led to 
her plight, the dwarf worries about the effect as well as the accuracy of his 
story. He counteracts the impact of his words by the intimacy of his touch. 
Ironically, the dwarf (who is imprisoned in his own body) is a kind of jailer 
who persuades Una’s soul, her “flitted life,” to return to her body, its “natiue 
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prison.” But as a jailer, the dwarf is an anti-Orgoglio, who acts sympatheti-
cally in the interest of his lady’s earthly life. He can be read as a sign of physi-
cal life and its value, as he cares for her being in this world.
 Later in the poem, the dwarf is the opposite of a jailer. In his most exten-
sive speech, he warns Redcrosse to flee the House of Pride, “For on a day 
his wary Dwarfe had spide, / Where in a dungeon deepe huge numbers lay / 
Of caytiue wretched thralls, that wayled night and day” (1.5.45). In a com-
plicated narrative move, Spenser presents as his own the dwarf ’s narrative 
of what he had seen and why Redcrosse must flee. These stanzas merge the 
narrator and Una’s dwarf, who by now is described as “his” dwarf, attend-
ing Redcrosse. The experience of Redcrosse tests and verifies the narrative of 
the dwarf. Fleeing the House of Pride by a back way, Redcrosse must climb 
over “A dunghill of dead carkases” (1.5.53). The dwarf told his tale to Red-
crosse, as Spenser tells the reader. But what may seem allegorical for the 
reader becomes for Redcrosse all too material, a “dreadful spectacle” of dead 
bodies.
 After Redcrosse is defeated by Orgoglio, the dwarf mournfully carries 
the knight’s “ruefull moniments of heauinesse”—“his forlorne weed, / His 
mightie armour, missing most at need; / His siluer shield now idle maist-
erlesse; / His poynant speare, that many made to bleed” (1.7.19). The nar-
rative of his thoughts endows each item with a poignant detail, a memory 
untold. As silent signs, they “tell his great distress”—that of Redcrosse and 
of the dwarf. For Una, no words are necessary. The dwarf and his burden are 
“the signes, that deadly tidings spake,” and “She fell to ground for sorrow-
full regret” (1.7.20). Although she reads the “signs” of Redcrosse’s armor, she 
nonetheless wants to know “the wofull Tragedie, the which these reliques sad 
present vnto mine eie” (1.7.24). The dwarf ’s condensed version nonetheless 
provides the “whole discourse”: a plain chronological abstract that gives the 
essence of each crisis. Una’s response shows her patience, sorrow, and love 
for Redcrosse (27). The dwarf leads her, and she follows “All as the Dwarfe 
the way to her assynd” (28). In the final line of canto 7, Una and Arthur 
both trust him: “So forth they went, the Dwarfe guiding them ever right” 
(1.7.52).
 The dwarf ’s actions and his narratives constitute links in the “Goodly 
golden chaine” that becomes a figure for human community and for the 
poem:
 O Goodly golden chaine, wherewith yfere
 The vertues linked are in louely wize:
 And noble minds of yore allyed were,
34 • 1: DWarF aeSTheTiCS in SPenSer’S FAerie Queene
 In braue poursuit of cheualrous emprise,
 That none did others safety despize,
 Nor aid enuy to him, in need that stands,
 But friendly each did others prayse deuize
 How to aduaunce with fauourable hands,
As this good Prince redeemed the Redcrosse knight from bands. (1.9.1)
The chain of concord emblemizes the linked virtues detailed in the poem, 
and the linked narratives of Una, Arthur, the dwarf, and Spenser himself. 
The chain of community, opposed to the “bands” that imprisoned Redcrosse, 
provides freedom rather than confinement. In that community the dwarf is 
an assistant: carrying whatever is needed, offering comfort and guidance, and 
telling the truth. Given these attributes, he is a figure of the reliable narra-
tor—perhaps of Spenser himself.
 Florimell’s dwarf, who seeks her throughout several books of the epic, 
can be read as a figure of the poet’s quest as well. Like Una’s dwarf, Flo-
rimell’s dwarf serves a virtuous but threatened lady. Unlike Una’s dwarf, he is 
first seen separated from her, searching fruitlessly for her. Arthur, in pursuit 
of his own “worthiest” love, meets the dwarf and hears his story:
He met a Dwarfe, that seemed terrifyde
With some late peril, which he hardly past,
Or other accident, which him aghast;
Of whom he asked, whence he lately came,
And whither now he trauelled so fast:
For sore he swat, and running through that same
Thicke forest, was bescratched, and both his feet nigh lame. (3.5.3)
Arthur believes him, if only because the dwarf ’s “bescratched” lame body 
physically confirms what he says. Only his loyalty and his story are strong. 
Although the dwarf and Arthur join forces for a time, Florimell is not the 
object of Arthur’s quest so he soon goes off on his own.
 Later, in book 5, Artegall will meet Florimell’s dwarf and force him to 
stop his pursuit in order to relate his “store” of “sundry newes . . . But chief-
ely of the fairest Florimell, / How she was found againe and spousde to 
Marinell.” (5.2.2). Only then is this dwarf named: 
For this was Dony, Florimels owne Dwarfe, 
Whom hauing lost (as ye haue heard whyleare) 
And finding in the way the scattred scarfe, 
The fortune of her life long time did feare. (5.2.3)
Sara van Den berg • 35
This passage provides another instance of Spenser merging with the dwarf 
narrator: Dony repeats what “ye” (we) have been told and gives us the out-
come. Dony speaks for and with Spenser.
 Dony is the only dwarf in the poem who has a name—perhaps derived 
from Donizello (squire or page), Adonio (a knight in the Orlando Furioso), 
or Donald (Gaelic for “ruler”). If the name derives from Adonio or Don-
ald, then Dony would be a mocking diminutive name. However, a mocking 
name would not suit his role, which is entirely positive. Reading the name 
as an affectionate rather than mocking nickname for Donald would suit the 
political allegory of Florimell as a figure of Ireland, who needs to be rescued 
by and for England.43 The most likely possibility seems to be that “Dony” 
derives from the Latin or French word for “gift,” because dwarfs were often 
presented to a lord or lady as a gift. Moreover, as a narrator, Dony gives Arte-
gall a gift, conveying to him the story we had already received from Spenser. 
In this case, our experience as readers validates the dwarf ’s narrative.
 The other two dwarfs in the poem—Poeana’s dwarf in book 4 and Bri-
ana’s dwarf in book 6—serve wicked ladies and are themselves deceptive or 
dangerous narrators. One is a jailer, the other a messenger. Each of them 
serves as a negative counterpoint to the first two dwarfs in narratives that 
Paul Suttie describes as ambivalent and “unsettling.”44 These are narrators 
who withhold rather than give, who deceive rather than tell the truth, who 
separate rather than join the knights and those they seek.
 In the tale of Poeana, Spenser explores the contest of love and friend-
ship. Poeana, the daughter of the giant Corflambo, is described as given 
“to vaine delight, / And eke too loose of life, and eke of love too light” 
(4.8.49). Her name, derived from the Greek for “pain,” suits her when we 
first see her, “complayning of her cruell Paramoure.” Her dwarf gets caught 
in the tangle of relationships that Reed Dasenbrock has termed the “dou-
bling and transference and acting out” of Petrarchan love in the narrative of 
book 4.45 Amyas, the Squire of Low Degree, was captured by Poeana, who 
was enthralled by him. His friend Placidas, pretending to be a prisoner of 
love, changes places with Amyas and kidnaps the dwarf. Dasenbrock, the 
only critic who even mentions this episode, is not sure what it means, but 
speculates that it may simply be “a gesture of independence” by Placidas. 
What is most visually striking is the confusion of Placidas and the dwarf. 
The Squire, we are told,
. . . came galloping as he would flie;
Bearing a little Dwarfe before his steed
That all the way full loud for aide did crie,
That seem’d his shrikes would rend the brasen skie. (4.8.38)
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Caught between Arthur and Corflambo, “Both Squire and dwarfe did 
tumble downe / Vnto the earth, and lay long while in senselesse swowne” 
(4.8.42). Only then does the dwarf ’s allegiance come clear, as he “right sorie 
seem’d and sad, / And howld aloud to see his Lord there slaine, / And rent 
his haire and scratcht his face for paine” (4.8.46). If his shrieks “rend” the 
sky, tearing apart the fabric of Nature, he tears his own hair, wounding his 
own body as a sign of his inner pain.
 Whatever sympathy we have for him is short-lived. The dwarf, we learn, 
served the lady Poeana as “her dearling base,” functioning as the jailer
To whom the keyes of euery prison dore
By her committed be, of speciall grace,
And at his will may whom he list restore,
And whom he list reserue, to be afflicted more. (4.8.54)
This dwarf serves not only as the lady’s confidant but as her erotic agent, 
the representation and representative of her desire. This makes explicit 
another common assumption that the court dwarf could be a figure of sexual 
license.46 He also has a limited but real power of his own, to “restore” pris-
oners to her favor or “reserue” them for continued affliction according to his 
own desire. The dwarf may be a figure of the poet in that both of them can 
reserve or release other characters at will. However, when Arthur compels 
him “To open vnto him the prison dore, / And forth to bring those thralls, 
which there he held” (4.9.8), the dwarf ’s voice is reduced to an impotent 
shriek. He has no other narrative power. The dwarf, moreover, does not share 
in the resolution of the story. Poeana’s name shifts to Paeana, derived from 
the Greek word for “joy,” when Arthur arranges her marriage to Placidus. 
She is last seen as a happily married woman, who has “reformd her waies, / 
That all men much admyrde her change, and spake her praise.”47 The dwarf, 
no longer by her side, has disappeared from the narrative.
 In book 6, the Legend of Courtesy, the narrator fears courtesy has become 
“nought but forgerie,” no longer gold but brass (6.Proem.5). Sir Calidore, 
the knight of courtesy, proves just as problematic. Critics debate whether 
he should be dismissed as “the glib epitome of false courtesy” or admired as 
“one of Spenser’s finest heroes.”48 James Nohrnberg sees Calidore as “a kind 
of poet of conduct, but he is also a hypocrite.”49 Sir Calidore, true ladies’ 
man, learns of Briana, who violates courtesy and hospitality. Her dwarf is 
implicated in that corruption. After Calidore slays her household (violating 
courtesy in the name of courtesy), she derisively labels him a “Cowherd” 
and sends her dwarf to bring back her lover, giving him “a ring of gould, / A 
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priuy token” (6.1.29). The dwarf travels all night and returns in the morn-
ing with Crudor’s answer, his “basenet” (part of his armor) “as a faithfull 
band” matching her ring (6.1.31). Calidore kills Crudor and converts Bri-
ana to virtue, but the dwarf disappears from the story. He is not redeemed 
into courtesy but remains forever a go-between, who facilitates disorder and 
discourtesy. He may carry a ring of gold, but his message is dross.
 The pairing of “Dames and Dwarfes” can bring together reader and nar-
rator in a caring bond or a prison of falsehood and self-serving violence: “For 
who can descry the cunning traine [of falsehood]?” (1.7.1). In an allegory 
as complex as Spenser’s Faerie Queene, the poet’s “aesthetic nervousness” is 
manifest in the radical linking of the authorial narrator to the dwarf narra-
tors. As we have seen, at times the narratives of Una’s dwarf and Florimell’s 
dwarf are indistinguishable from those of the poetic narrator. The actions 
of the last two dwarfs in The Faerie Queene are far less attractive. They serve 
vicious ladies and are corrupted in that service.50 They may thereby mir-
ror what has been described as Spenser’s increasing disillusionment with his 
epic project. It is also possible to consider Spenser not as disillusioned but 
as more complex and critical in his vision of court, poem, and self, offering 
narratives at once affirmative and ambivalent. As Paul Suttie argues, the later 
books of the poem increasingly admit that there is no “stable point” outside 
the narrative from which all ethical quests can be judged.51 Instead, the nar-
rator is always within his text, his interpretation interpreted through a read-
ing of other narrators in the poem.
 A disability perspective can offer new insight into Spenser’s narrator and, 
perhaps, into Spenser himself. Like the dwarfs, Spenser’s narrator was in ser-
vice, carrying the burden of “needments” for his characters. In the Proem 
to the Faerie Queene, Spenser even describes himself as a kind of dwarf, his 
art disabled: “Me, all too meane, the sacred Muse areeds / To blazon broad 
amongst her learned throng,” despite “my feeble eyne,” “my thoughts too 
humble and too vile,” and “mine afflicted stile” (1.7–8, 4.5–8). It is even 
tempting to read the opening words, “Lo I the man,” as a kind of punning 
demand that we attend to the low stature of the poet who dares to celebrate 
the “Great Lady of the greatest Isle.” In the Proem to book 6, the narrator’s 
steps are “weary,” his travels “tedious,” and his spirit “dulled.” By echoing the 
description of Una’s dwarf, Spenser distances himself from the dwarfs who 
served Poeana and Briana as jailer and go-between. Instead, he has proved 
himself careful and wary, able to guide us ever right, so that we too may be 
“rauisht with rare thoughts delight” (6.Proem.1).
 As an artist, the author marks the border, standing between art and life, 
between truth and fiction. Moreover, despite the risk of being confined by 
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the social and moral framework of narrative, the author—like the court 
dwarf—is ultimately free to play, to recreate himself, to create new fictions, 
to deceive new audiences. The dwarf as narrator provides what Harry Berger 
has termed “micro-events”52 of the self-interpretive activity that links authors 
and their audiences. The dwarfs in Spenser’s epic vanish as their stories end, 
even as the poet finally escapes from his fictions and cannot be contained 
by them. At the same time, in some sense even great writers are ultimately 
dwarfed by their own art. They are, finally, its servant.
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the abrupt and jarring proximity of desirability and so-called birth defects fascinated Aphra Behn and her circle. Dwarfs, giants, mute women, deaf women, disfigured women, and men and women with 
birthmarks, scars, and smallpox populate their writings and often take on 
central positions in the networks of sexuality and power circulating through-
out the plays, poems, and prose narratives that were popular during the Res-
toration. Two prose narratives posthumously attributed to Behn foreground 
this crucial linkage of sexuality and disability. In “The Unfortunate Bride: 
Or, The Blind Lady a Beauty” and “The Dumb Virgin: Or, The Force of 
Imagination,” Behn depicts women of extraordinary beauty that is contigu-
ous to their disabilities.1 Celesia in “The Unfortunate Bride” is “blind to all 
[her] riches, having been born without the use of sight, though in all other 
respects charming to a wonder,” and Maria in “The Dumb Virgin” is “the 
most beautiful daughter” despite being “naturally and unfortunately dumb,” 
the perfect counterpoint to her “distorted” and “bent” sister Belvideera.2 The 
women’s bodies engender desire despite and because of their failure to con-
form to standards of normalcy. Celesia falls in love with her cousin’s lover 
Frankwit and marries him after Belvira dies in a freak accident; Maria and 
Belvideera compete with each other for a mysterious man who rapes Maria 
before it is revealed that he is their long-lost brother. Desire culminates in 
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and on the bodies of the visually and vocally impaired heroines, the blind 
and mute rather than the able-bodied Belvira or the disfigured Belvideera.
 For Behn, desire circulates between able and disabled bodies in a way 
that draws attention to the seventeenth-century medical community’s 
broader sense that women’s bodies simply replicated male bodies in a defec-
tive, different form. During the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centu-
ries, the continuum of what we now label gender, sex, and sexuality hinged 
on the notion that “sexual difference should be constructed as defect,”3 a 
point not too far removed from Judith Butler’s critique of sex as a “regula-
tory ideal whose materialization is compelled.”4 Aristotelian and Galenic 
models of human sex organs layered gendered traits on women’s bodies, 
thereby organizing, regulating, and forcibly constructing the genitals. In On 
the Usefulness of Parts of the Body, Galen explains: “All the parts, then, that 
men have, women have too, the difference between them lying in only one 
thing . . . namely that in women the parts are within the body, whereas in 
men they are outside.”5 The womb was concealed, dark, duplicitous, con-
fusing, weak, and invisible—all words that became inscribed on the body in 
order to reify broader patterns or associations between women and dishon-
esty; “a woman’s anatomy is physically the imperfect inversion of a man’s.”6 
Felicity Nussbaum interprets medical depictions of women’s sex organs as 
fitting neatly into misogynistic structures because they identify “women’s 
flaws” as “natural and intrinsic to their sexual difference.”7 Behn’s literaliza-
tion of the relationship between defect and femaleness in “The Unfortunate 
Bride” and “The Dumb Virgin” draws attention to several interconnected 
components of the disabled female body in Restoration culture. Central to 
these texts is the question of who creates defect or disability. Does medical 
discourse make women into defective creatures, interpellating them into and 
as the identities prescribed by its language, or do physicians simply describe 
actual bodies?
 Judith Butler’s concept of corporeal signification offers a model for under-
standing the shifting relation between cultural scripts and embodiment. For 
Butler, the body is always beyond the boundary that demarcates its material 
surface. She explains in Bodies That Matter that bodies are “a kind of mate-
rialization governed by regulatory norms,” and she suggests that much effort 
has been put into the false naturalization of categories and qualities that “fix 
the site” of the body.8 The following analysis of “The Dumb Virgin” is based 
in part on Butler’s ideas about the materiality of the body and its refusal to 
be disciplined, for the women in this novel (the mother and her two disabled 
daughters) are produced by the discourses assigned to both their exterior sur-
faces and interior organs. Behn selects heroines whose defects and disabilities 
emily bOWleS • 45
simultaneously reinforce and undermine codes of gendered, sexualized, and 
corporeal correctness; she uses her disability narrative to satirize the social 
and scientific discourses that make some women more available and more 
desirable than others. Behn begins her critique of the discursive constitu-
tion of the sex-gender system with a hyperbolic, satiric invocation of the 
double-braided myths of seventeenth-century motherhood. She showcases 
her awareness of the limitations that her contemporaries’ understanding of 
gender, sex, and sexuality placed on women’s bodies via representation of the 
slippages between desirability and disability, and she crafts Belvideera and 
Maria as self-abnegations of their own forms. They are archetypes and exem-
plars of female sexuality because of the non-normative bodies that destroy 
their semantic and corporeal stylizations. The body morphologies that Behn 
sets up in “The Dumb Virgin” disrupt the systems that value and devalue 
them, but ultimately the female characters cannot exist outside of the lan-
guage, prejudices, and inscriptions that demarcate and define their bodies as 
other, as different.
the tremendous popularIty of Dorothy Leigh’s The Mothers Blessing 
(1616) and Elizabeth Jocelin’s The Mothers Legacie (1624) underscore the 
cultural value placed on motherhood during the seventeenth century. They 
also show how precarious a state motherhood was. The best mothers were 
often dead ones, as these posthumously published texts demonstrate. In most 
of Behn’s writings, mothers are dead (usually having died in childbirth), or 
they suffer abortive births. The mother in “The Dumb Virgin” died in child-
birth after having given birth first to Belvideera and subsequently to Maria. 
Yet her failure to take on a socially and medically sanctioned role as wife and 
mother is the central component of “The Dumb Virgin.”
 Advice books for women centered on matrimonial and maternal obli-
gations, and seventeenth-century women were encouraged to think of their 
identities as contingent to these social roles. The mother in “The Dumb Vir-
gin” is defined solely by her failed adherence to these expectations. She was 
“a beautiful and virtuous Lady, who had rendered [her husband Rinaldo] 
the happy Father of a Son” (341), but her desire for something beyond the 
scope of her domestic framework produces a series of corporeal failures that 
are replicated on and written onto her daughters’ bodies. In the second para-
graph of the narrative, “Rinaldo’s Lady” (the only name conferred on her 
in the text) “begg’d her Husbands [sic] permission to view” an “Island in 
the Adriatick Sea, about twenty leagues” from their home in Venice.9 The 
virtuous lady has transformed, in this interval, into a desiring creature; she 
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entreats her husband, “repeating her request” until he yields, “his love not 
permitting him the least shew of command” (341).
 As is often the case in her writing, Behn shows a subtler inversion of 
gender binaries in relation to power. The male lover refuses to command 
his desiring beloved. Behn often draws on the tension between male politi-
cal power and female sexual power. In Love-Letters between a Nobleman and 
His Sister (1684–87) and Oroonoko (1688), for instance, she shows women 
who transgress and attempt to acquire some degree of political agency only 
to take on singularly sexualized roles, and in her poem The Disappointment 
(1684), she develops a critique on the usual accordance of power and sexu-
ality in pastoral and premature ejaculation poetry by spotlighting a woman 
whose sexual desires go unmet because of her male lover’s impotence. By 
doing so, she wryly demonstrates that feminine sexual submissiveness is a 
falsely naturalized category. With Rinaldo’s Lady, Behn constructs a satiric 
representation of the model by which female desire must remain controlled 
in order to reproduce normalcy.10
 Behn alternates between aligning Rinaldo’s Lady with her male compan-
ion, “a faithful Servant call’d Gasper” (342), and setting her up as a foil to 
the male characters, different and defective in her feelings, her needs, and 
her mind. Behn implicates Gasper in upholding a private/public split that 
ultimately leads to the downfall of his private or domestic world.11 Yet she 
repeatedly invokes the cultural prescriptions that make this Rinaldo’s Lady’s 
fault. Rinaldo’s Lady realizes she has lost everything:
the heaviest load of misfortunes lay on Rinaldo’s Lady, besides the loss of 
her liberty, the danger of her honour, the separation from her dear Hus-
band, the care of her dear Infant wrought rueful distractions; she caught 
her Child in her arms, and with tears exorted thro fear and affection, she 
deplored the misfortune of her babe, the pretty Innocent smiling in the 
embraces of its Mother, shew’d that Innocence cou’d deride the persecu-
tion of fortune; at length she delivered the infant into the hands of Gasper, 
begging him to use all endeavours in its preservation, by owing it for his, 
when they fell into the hands of the enemy. (342)
Rinaldo’s Lady recognizes that her desire to transgress or exceed the bound-
aries prescribed to her of wife and mother—her desire to leave her domestic 
space—has broken down the fictions of conjugal and maternal identity; she 
delivers her child into Gasper’s hands (a word choice that suggests a rewrit-
ing of childbirth, redelivering her child so that he is reborn outside of her 
womb and her world).
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 Behn depicts Rinaldo’s Lady as having a feminine, defective mind,12 stat-
ing that “to a weak mind, that danger works still the strongest that’s most in 
view; but when the Pyrate, who by this time had fetch’d them within shot, 
began to Fire; she seem’d pleas’d that her Infant was out of that hazard, tho 
exposed to a greater” (343). Rinaldo’s Lady is impressionable, pliant, and 
(in Michel Foucault’s sense of the term) docile.13 Her “weak mind” can only 
ascertain its material and corporeal surroundings; it cannot project or think 
beyond that circumference, yet it is Rinaldo’s Lady’s yearning for more than 
this that produces, first, her desire to leave Venice and then her powerful 
imagination, which engenders her daughters’ disabled bodies.
 After she gives up her son, the force of her imagination impinges on 
what would have been understood as her obligation to maintain what Laura 
Gowing describes as the “ecosystem which determined their future child’s 
health.”14 Her pregnancy is predicated on extreme emotion, for she learns 
that Gasper died and her son was lost: “her grief at the recital of this tragick 
story, had almost transported her to madness” (343–44). The recital of the 
story is what spirals Rinaldo’s Lady toward madness, not an event, an action, 
or a body. In this way, Behn upholds the misogynistic system by which 
women are implicated in all fetal defects while critiquing the fact that this 
system contains and creates gender and power asymmetries. By repeating 
and reinscribing it, she also refuses and satirizes it. She shows that feminine 
defects of mind are written onto the bodies of children, a maneuver that 
replicates medical discourse while suggesting that women have a powerful 
ability to control what their bodies produce. The narratives that they believe 
are literally written onto the children contained in their womb (a metaphor 
that was popular with early modern booksellers and writers, many of whom 
compared publishing a book to giving birth). Belvideera and Maria embody 
Rinaldo’s Lady’s story—it is written on their bodies through their mother’s 
form.
 The storied nature of feminine defect is, in a sense, Rinaldo’s Lady’s fail-
ing but also her supposed natural state, which she imposes on her daughters 
by replicating, proliferating, and writing her defects onto their bodies. Belvi-
deera’s disfigurement is set up as the result of her imagination (so like a novel 
or a work of fiction and fancy): “upon its appearance their sorrows were 
redoubled, ’twas a Daughter, its limbs were distorted, its back bent, and tho 
the face was the freest from deformity, yet had it no beauty to recompense 
the dis-symmetry of the other parts” (344). Even though she is immediately 
called “a Daughter,” this initial description of Belvideera insistently degen-
ders her, which is true later in the plot when Belvideera’s distorted, bent, 
and deformed body confounds Dangerfield. He attempts to read her body 
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morphology at a masquerade but finds it does not correlate to any rules of 
embodiment that he has learned: “Sir, (said he) if you are a man, know that 
I am one, and will not bear impertinence; but, if you are a Lady, Madam, as I 
hope in Heavens you are not, I must inform you, that I am under a vow, not to 
converse with any Female tonight” (346).
 Belvideera’s birth literally produces Maria’s disability. This is true in Behn’s 
satiric invocation of medical discourse, for she attributes Maria’s muteness to 
Rinaldo’s Lady’s sadness:
the Mother grew very melancholy, rarely speaking, and not to be comforted 
by any diversion. She conceiv’d again, but no hopes of better fortune cou’d 
decrease her grief, which growing within her burden, eased her of both 
at once, for she died in Child-Birth, and left the most beautiful Daugh-
ter to the World that ever adorn’d Venice, but naturally and unfortunately 
dumb; which defect the learn’d attributed to the silence and melancholy of 
the Mother, as the deformity of the other was to the extravagance of her 
frights. (344)
The “learn’d,” Behn’s ironic tone here suggests, are not exactly subtle in their 
ways of thinking about the female mind or the female body. Here Behn 
clearly demarcates Rinaldo’s Lady’s mind, her pregnancies, and her daughters 
as the defamiliarized bodies of satire, and herself, a first-person but detached 
narrator, as a Menippean satirist bent on critiquing medical discourse in 
order to argue for the need for a new way of identifying difference.
the defectIve women are the consequences of the mother’s failure to fol-
low prescribed rules concerning the control of her imagination and her emo-
tions or—again borrowing from Gowing—her resistance to the perceptions 
about maternal responsibility that were designed to “control women’s bod-
ies and undermine women’s autonomy.”15 Rinaldo’s Lady felt too much for 
the loss of her son while pregnant with Belvideera, and she was too silent 
and melancholic during her third pregnancy. Along these lines, her identity 
as a mother functions as a part of a polymorphous body morphology. Her 
body is read by her husband/lover while simultaneously being read onto the 
body of her unborn child. The potential for women to engender disability 
begins with their sexuality and ends with maternity. As Gowing has sug-
gested, “physical disabilities” could be read as having “sexual implications”;16 
women’s bodies were thought capable of deforming or disabling men’s bodies 
through excessive, aggressive, or otherwise non-normative sexuality. At the 
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same time, their bodies were the cultural signs of biological difference. Behn’s 
fictions repeatedly yield up a sense of disjuncture between the apotheosis of 
motherhood and the socially proliferating reality that the female body was 
always already marked as defective and monstrous, as a faulty male body. The 
Galenic and Aristotelian medical discourses created women as close to mon-
sters, thereby designating them as abject and other—a necessary tactic for 
excluding women from equal treatment with men in nonbiological sectors, 
and one that was arbitrary, linguistic, and falsely naturalized.17
 Terming disabled bodies monstrous was typical during the seventeenth 
century, as the following excerpt from Jane Sharp’s The Midwives Book (1671) 
makes clear:
As for Monsters of all sorts to be formed in the womb all nations can bring 
some examples; Worms, Toades, Mice, Serpents, Gordonius saith, are com-
mon in Lumbardy, and so are those they call Soole kints in the Low Coun-
tries, which are certainly caused by the heat of their stones and menstrual 
blood to work upon in women that have had company with men; and 
these are sometimes alive with the infant, and when the Child is brought 
forth these stay behind, and the woman is sometimes thought to be with 
Child again; as I knew one there my self, which was after her childbirth 
delivered of two like Serpents, and both run away into the Burg wall as 
the women supposed, but it was at least three moneths after she was deliv-
ered of a Child, and they came forth without any loss of blood, for there 
was no after burden. Again in time of Copulation, Imagination ofttimes 
also produceth Monstrous births, when women look too much on strange 
objects.18
Sharp’s emphasis here on imagination is specifically the site and subject of 
Behn’s critique—she even gives “The Dumb Virgin” the subtitle “The Force 
of Imagination.” Imagination should produce fiction, not real bodies, Behn 
suggests. Yet midwives and physicians continue to set up female imagina-
tion as a crucial and detrimental component of sexual difference, as in this 
1740 tract on female sexuality, in which an anonymous physician explains, 
“That Excess of Love cannot be particularly ascribed to the same Heat, but 
to the Inconstancy of their Imagination, or rather to the Providence of 
Nature, that has made them to serve us for Playtoys after our more serious 
Occupations.”19
 Monstrosity was often literally assigned to sex organs. In The Mid-
wives Book, monstrosity is aligned with a body’s refusal to correspond to 
expectations:
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Amongst false conceptions all monstrous births may be reckoned, for a 
monster saith Aristotle is an error of nature failing of the end she works 
for, by some corrupted principle; sometimes this happens when the sex is 
imperfect, that you cannot know a boy from a girl; they call these Her-
maphrodites: there is but one kind of Women Hermaphrodites, when a 
thing like a Yard stands in the place of the Clitoris above the top of the 
genital, and bears out in the bottom of the share-bone; sometimes in boys 
there is seen a small privy part of the woman above the root of the Yard, 
and in girls a Yard is seen at the Lesk or in the Peritoneum. But three ways 
a boy may be of doubtful sex.20
Sharp’s construction of “monstrous births” as the result of female excesses 
(such as the imagination) or actions (looking at unpleasant objects) is not 
unique to her writing; she has consolidated much classical and current medi-
cal knowledge in The Midwives Book in order to make it accessible. As Caro-
line Bicks and Elaine Hobby have both argued, Sharp performs a unique 
and decidedly woman-oriented task when she publishes The Midwives Book 
by ensuring that knowledge of women’s bodies is available to them and to 
the male and female midwives who were responsible for their reproductive 
health. But she reports on and even reinscribes many of the biases com-
prising the system of medical knowledge that was available to her, thereby 
inscribing bodies with the limitations placed on them by discourse and rep-
licating the process of insisting on falsely naturalized binaries of monstrous 
and normal, of male and female.21
 As mentioned above, Belvideera’s deformity aligns her with monstrosity 
and, in Dangerfield’s reading of her, with androgyny or mixed-sex identity. 
At the same time, Belvideera and Maria uphold a complex system of sexual 
exchange in the narrative. Both women’s bodies fascinate Dangerfield, and 
his response to them becomes part of Behn’s larger and more systematic cri-
tique of the ways these women have been situated as other or different. First 
they are women, essentially reducible to the construction of the female body 
as an inversion of or defective variation on the male body. Sexual difference 
is their most essential categorical inversion, and the one that corresponds to 
the largest organizing binary. Then they are inversions of each other. One is 
externally “distorted,” the other “Beautiful”; one is witty, the other dumb. 
Their proximity to one another produces and exacerbates their sexual desir-
ability, for just as sexual difference within a heterosexual matrix demands 
difference, so too does the privileging beauty over wit or vice versa, for Dan-
gerfield vacillates between these women: “his love was divided between the 
beauty of one Lady, and wit of another, either of which he loved passionately, 
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yet nothing cou’d satisfy him, but the possibility of enjoying both” (349). 
Crucially Behn does not “unwittingly replicate . . . the idea of woman as a 
defect of nature”;22 instead she satirizes it and sets up an economy in which 
women are in fact more highly valued for their defects, until these defects 
are pushed to their most intense and dramatic point. Their bodies underline 
how female desirability is always underscored by a “continuum of female dis-
order and ‘normal’ feminine practice” rather than a disruption or divergence 
between the disordered and normal body.23
exIstIng outsIde of the spectrum of bodies understood as normal, Belvi-
deera and Maria develop beauties that expand their defects rather than cor-
rect them. After their mother’s death, Belvideera and Maria receive their 
father’s full support and attention: “their defects not lessening his inclina-
tion but stirring up his endeavours in supplying the defaults of Nature by 
the industry of Art” (344). This tension between nature and art, defaults 
and industry, function as the underlying pattern for the remainder of “The 
Dumb Virgin,” and Behn explores their relationship in order to heighten her 
readers’ awareness of how highly inscriptive “defaults of Nature” are, even 
when they are culturally set up as essential, unchangeable, and natural.
 Belvideera’s desire for intellectual mastery suggests an attempt to balance 
her corporeal defects with mental perfections:
The eldest called Belvideera, was indefatigably addicted to study, which 
she had improv’d so far, that by the sixteenth year of her age, she under-
stood all the European Languages, and cou’d speak most of ’em, but was 
particularly pleas’d with the English, which gave me the happiness of many 
hours conversation with her; and I may ingenuously declare, ’twas the most 
pleasant I ever enjoy’d, for besides a piercing wit, and depth of understand-
ing peculiar to herself, she delivered her sentiments with that easiness and 
grace of speech, that it charm’d all her hearers. (344)
Belvideera’s study results in a vast knowledge of languages and sociability, 
piercing wit, and charm. Her knowledge helps her enter into society rather 
than making her ostracized from it, in some ways making her character, like 
Angellica Bianca in The Rover, exhibit allegorical features of Behn’s ideas 
about female authorship.
 Translation was one of Behn’s most marketable and sociable of skills; 
her deft turns of phrase, her confidence, her originality, and her knowledge 
helped her become as key a player in male intellectual culture as she was in 
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the commercial world of the stage. Her facility with French and her engaging 
Latin paraphrases earned her the praise and friendship of John Dryden and 
Nahum Tate.24 In her translation of book 6 of Abraham Cowley’s Of Plants 
(1689),25 she sets out one of her most direct entreaties for fame and respect in 
a section set off with the phrase “The Translatress in her own Person speaks”:
I by a double right thy Bounties claim,
Both from my Sex, and in Apollo’s Name:
Let me with Sappho and Orinda be
Oh ever sacred Nymph, adorn’d by thee;
And give my Verses Immortality. (325)
Belvideera demonstrates a similarly acute power over language, but her 
unpublished, spoken discourse requires mediation in order to outlast her. 
Behn’s narrator, like her narrator in Oroonoko, must confer immortality on 
her.
 Maria’s voicelessness directly opposes Belvideera’s conversational skill 
and Behn’s published writing. Mute, Maria seems most clearly to conform 
to the expectations seventeenth-century society placed on beautiful, mar-
riageable women. She is docile and silent. However, her corporeally encoded 
and enforced silence leads her to learn or perhaps even create an alternate 
discourse:
she had improv’d her silent conversation with her Sister so far, that she was 
understood by her, as if she spoke, and I remember this Lady was the first 
I saw use the significative way of discourse by the Fingers; I dare not say 
’twas she invented it (tho it probably might have been an invention of these 
ingenious Sisters) but I am positive none before her ever brought it to that 
perfection. (“Dumb Virgin” 345)
Because she is unwilling to allow her disability to remove her from discourse, 
she develops a system for “silent conversation with her sister” that becomes 
crucial to their bond and to Belvideera’s ability to confer Maria’s meaning 
to outsiders. Because she is thought to know Maria’s otherwise unintelligible 
meanings, she has the power to represent her to others. She engineers Dan-
gerfield’s first interpretations of her, she applies meanings that she wants to 
the syntax of Maria’s body, and she gives Maria reasons to envy “her Sister 
the advantage of Speech” (348).
 The sisters complement each other on some very basic levels—they are 
the ugly and the beautiful, the witty conversationalist and the mute woman, 
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the mind and the body. Set in binaries, they prove inseparable. Dangerfield 
loves them both. Belvideera’s “Tongue claim’d an equal share in his heart with 
Maria’s eyes” (347). Their pathologies are subordinated to their perfections; 
their desirability comes from the traits that have been amplified because of 
their disabilities. The text reaches its climax when Maria’s body becomes the 
focus of Dangerfield’s gaze. He sees her in her nightgown and finds himself 
“like Venus caught in Vulcan’s net, but ’twas the Spectator, not she was cap-
tivated” (351). Vision becomes a destabilizing power, like Rinaldo’s Lady’s 
imagination. Dangerfield sees what he desires, and he rapes Maria. Here all 
of the points of Behn’s satire converge, for she brings together the traits most 
valued in women by patriarchal society (silence, beauty, passivity, and visual/
corporeal availability) under the male gaze. After her rape, Maria learns that 
Dangerfield is her brother. He kills himself, and Maria speaks: “the working 
force of her anguish racking at once all the passages of her breast, by a vio-
lent impulse broke the ligament that doubled in her tongue, and she burst 
out with this exclamation; Oh! Incest, Incest” (359). The word “force” refers 
to the subtitle of the text, “The Force of Imagination,” and Behn draws 
together the dead mother and her now-dead daughter with their shared bal-
ancing of this clause—Rinaldo’s Lady is Imagination; Maria, Force.
have female defect and difference produced this tragic end, or does Behn 
accord blame to the systems that codify and produce female bodies as defec-
tive? The medical discourses that invented Rinaldo’s Lady’s “Monstrous 
births” (for Behn does see these as invented rather than described by medi-
cal discourse) and the sociosexual discourses that valorize the compensatory 
fictions produced on Belvideera’s and Maria’s bodies are part of the same set 
of practices, and the narrative offers a way of understanding how much of 
disability, female sexuality, and femininity is a product of the imagination.
 Although Behn offers some real material details about the nature of dis-
ability, its causes, and its “correctability,” “The Dumb Virgin” is most instruc-
tive in its modification of and response to the marginalization of disabled, 
defective bodies. Belvideera’s physical deformity takes on some stereotypical 
features typical of Behn’s antiheroines, for she is presented as duplicitous and 
bent internally in ways that match her exterior form. At the same time, she 
takes on the highest level of intellectual perfection in the text. Maria’s beauty 
and her voicelessness, on the other hand, mark her as conforming to patterns 
of sexual value that she disrupts by learning sign language, engaging in con-
versation with her sister, and finally making herself unwittingly but corpore-
ally available to Dangerfield.
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 With the attention that she pays to the construction of disability by 
seventeenth-century texts, Behn gives readers a clear sense of how disability 
was constructed by doctors, midwives, and even aesthetic theorists during 
the period while simultaneously highlighting the gendering of defects. The 
very literal and specific attention Behn plays to disability in this narrative 
has larger implications for the study of her writing, for she experiments with 
narrative tactics, allegories of authorship, theories of translation, and charac-
terization that are contained in her more canonical works. Furthermore, her 
incorporation of medical discourse in these texts—especially Galenic theo-
ries and material about pregnancy and childbirth from books such as Sharp’s 
The Midwives Book—shows the dialogue that exists between her writing and 
documents about female biology and disability. Putting Behn’s writing into 
conversation with Sharp’s, as well as with other texts about the body and 
its reproduction, helps demonstrate the many sites of Behn’s satire and her 
attempt to reproduce through her fiction a space for the interrogation of dis-
courses that rendered women as other, different, and defective.
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Among the jokes in A Hundred Merry Tales (1526), often regarded as  one of the first native English jest books, was a story that described  an encounter between a courtier and a carter. In the paradoxical 
style made fashionable by Renaissance humanists, the courtier “in deri-
sion praised the carter’s back, legs, and other members of his body marvel-
lously,” meticulously ridiculing every aspect of the man’s deformed frame. 
After enduring this humiliation, the carter told the courtier that there was 
“another property” of his body that he had failed to notice. Looking “aside 
over his shoulder upon the courtier,” the carter told him, “Lo, Sir, this is my 
property, I have a wall eye [squint] in my head,” a sensory imperfection that 
in fact gave him a clear-eyed view of the character defects of others, “for I 
never look over my shoulder this wise but I lightly espy a knave.”1
 Humor provides an intriguing insight into representations of disabil-
ity in the early modern period. The treatment of disability as a source of 
laughter is one way in which scholars have demarcated attitudes toward 
disabled people in premodern societies from those of “enlightened” moder-
nity. Mockery of ugliness, disfigurement, or deformity is often taken as evi-
dence of the “unkindness” with which physical difference was treated in 
preindustrial societies.2 However, this kind of comic production has received 
relatively little analysis in its own right.3 Focusing on physical and sensory 
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deviations from the normative, this chapter uses a variety of prose jest books 
produced in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England to explore how dis-
ability humor shaped meanings of embodied difference. Although jokes have 
historically worked to denigrate disabled people by exaggerating their “other-
ness,” the ludicrous possibilities of joking situations gave humor the poten-
tial to interrogate conventional wisdom about bodily norms. In the early 
modern period, as we shall see, comic narratives might invoke disability in a 
variety of contexts, to explore issues around the causes of disability and the 
social experiences of disabled people, as well as to explore a wider range of 
concerns, including gender and authority.
 Existing scholarship paints a largely negative portrait of the treatment of 
disability in early modern popular culture. Since ancient times, deformity 
had occupied a central place in theories of laughter.4 Thomas Hoby’s 1561 
translation of Baldassare Castiglione’s Book of the Courtier explained that 
“laughing matters arise of . . . a certain deformitie or ill favourdnesse, because 
a man laugheth onlie at those matters that are disagreeing in themselves.”5 
In the seventeenth century, Thomas Hobbes famously extended this connec-
tion in his description of laughter as “sudden glory” caused “by the appre-
hension of some deformed thing in another by comparison whereof ” people 
“suddenly applaud themselves.”6 Although “deformity” was intended to be 
interpreted broadly, drawing on Aristotle’s definition of the “ugly” as an exag-
gerated version of the self, and referring as much to follies of character and 
vices as it did to physical anomaly, there can be no doubt that “deformed” 
or disabled bodies were ripe for comic exploitation. Deformity’s association 
with sin and corruption made the impaired body a powerful image in lam-
poons, satires, and defamatory verses, perhaps most famously those produced 
in the aftermath of the death of Robert Cecil in 1612, in which the former 
Lord Chancellor’s “crooked” back came to symbolize a range of faults, from 
political corruption to adultery.7 As a corollary, historians and literary schol-
ars have pointed to the ways in which the deaf, blind, “crippled,” aged, and 
“ugly” were routinely presented as figures of derision in the period’s popu-
lar culture. For example, in his study of mid-eighteenth-century jest books 
Simon Dickie argues that disabled people were “standing jokes  .  .  . almost 
automatic figures of fun”; running contrary to the humanitarian forces of 
the Enlightenment, which increasingly cast disabled people as objects of pity 
and sympathy. Laughter at such jokes may have served as a “safety valve,” as 
a means of discharging the fears of the able-bodied about physical degenera-
tion, while simultaneously asserting their superiority over the “otherness” of 
“deformed” and impaired people.8
 There can be no doubt that in the early modern period (as today) jests 
could be cruel toward disabled people. But this derisive treatment needs to 
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be examined more closely and put into context. Although Roger Lund has 
shown how certain nonstandard bodies, especially “crooked” forms, espe-
cially lent themselves to mockery in the eighteenth century thanks to their 
offense to aesthetic sensibilities, there has been little attempt to assess the 
similarities and differences in the comic portrayal of different types of physi-
cal and sensory disability in the early modern period as a whole.9 Conse-
quently, existing scholarship tends to view jokes involving disabled characters 
in a rather uniform way, as automatically raising the same kind of mock-
ing laughter. As Dickie suggests, a good deal may be learned by exploring 
the discursive strategies by which certain physical signs—a withered leg, a 
crooked back—were represented in a comic way.10 Furthermore, recent work 
on eighteenth-century humor regards cruel jokes at the expense of nonstan-
dard bodies as a remnant of older comic forms that survived the “civilizing 
process” of the Enlightenment.11
 Yet the portrayal of disability in jest books of the sixteenth and sev-
enteenth centuries—and its social and cultural context—remains relatively 
unexplored. Renaissance handbooks of “civility” were just as concerned with 
the propriety of laughing at physical difference as their Enlightenment coun-
terparts. Authors of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century guides to gentle-
manly conduct frequently condemned the incivility of jesting that mocked 
others in company or put them ill at ease.12 According to della Casa’s Galateo, 
“they that scoffe at any man, that is Deformed, ill shapen, leane, little, or a 
Dwarfe” were “unworthy to beare the name of an honest gentleman.”13 As 
the joke that began this chapter illustrates, the mockery of physical differ-
ence was not entirely unquestioned in jest books themselves. Ultimately in 
that story the tables are turned, the humble carter has the last laugh, using 
his visual impairment to deliver a killer line that stops his arrogant social 
superior in his tracks. The moral was clear: “By this tale a man may see 
that he that used to deride and mock other folks is sometimes himself more 
derided and mocked.”14 As this chapter will show, although jest books fre-
quently ignored warnings against using deformity or other forms of bodily 
anomaly as a pretext for laughter, it is by no means evident that all disabled 
figures were “automatic figures of fun.” Rather than exploring jests purely in 
terms of their function, the emphasis of this analysis is on the various ways 
in which authors tried to make disability or deformity funny, and what these 
narratives tell us about disability discourse in the early modern period.
 However, jest books present problems of interpretation. Repeating, 
adapting, and often plagiarizing material from other collections or foreign 
and historical sources, jest books are problematic sources for examining “atti-
tudes” toward disability in early modern England since it is often difficult 
to ascertain whose “attitudes” they were reflecting, or indeed how they were 
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read. Indeed, some of the common themes of this literature, such as the 
cruel gulling of blind people or the stereotype of the greedy or false disabled 
mendicant, have their antecedents in medieval ballads, farces, and fabliaux.15 
Late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century jest books ranged in style from 
relatively short biographical accounts of trickster figures printed in black let-
ter type to lengthier collections of jokes and epigrams that, judging from the 
sophistication of some of their allusions, may have envisioned an educated 
middling or elite audience.16 As Dickie concedes, the popularity of derisive 
treatments of the old, “deformed,” and disabled in eighteenth-century jest 
books may have been due to the fact that the comic world of the jest pro-
vided a license to laugh at subjects no longer deemed acceptable in polite 
society. The enjoyment of a comic story was different from taunting a “crip-
ple” or blind beggar in the street.17 Rather than viewing jests as straight-
forward reflections of societal “attitudes,” or of social practices concerning 
disability, it may be more helpful to see them as participants in a debate 
about different meanings of disability, as attempts to provide a framework 
through which to interpret bodily differences by exploring the ludicrous pos-
sibilities of the body’s excesses and deficits.
the body’s manifold opportunities for evoking laughter are well docu-
mented in Anthony Copley’s Wits, Fits and Fancies: Or, a Generall and Seri-
ous Collection of the Sententious Speeches, Answers, Jests and Behaviour of all 
Sortes of Estate, from the Throne to the Cottage (1614), which provides a use-
ful starting point for this discussion. The comedy of corporeality was repre-
sented by jests about “Face and Skarres,” beards, noses, extremes of bodily 
size and appearance, “of Fat and Grosse” and “of Leanes” and “of Talness and 
Littlenes,” of “blindness,” and also “crookedness and lameness.” Although 
“crookedness” and “lameness” might proceed from a variety of causes and 
have different effects, they were yoked together by the author of this and 
other jest books. They were categorized as markers of physical difference akin 
to other extremities of excess or deficit such as fatness, thinness, tallness, or 
shortness, rather than as “disabilities” that conferred a special identity on 
their bearer. First and foremost, the “crooked” or “lame” body provided an 
opportunity for authors of jests to prove their verbal creativity through the 
production of puns and word play.18 Contrasts between normative “straight” 
or “upright” bodies and deviant “crooked” ones were particularly common. 
In one jest, the Duke of Medina Celi, “having a crooked back’d lady to his 
wife,” asked a jester for his opinion on his “stately new hall at Madredejos,” 
to which he replied that it was indeed “a stately hall . . . and . . . tall, yet can-
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not .  .  . your Lady stand upright therein.” In another story, a “crookback’d 
plaintiff” at law asked the judge in his case to “see him right” (which also 
meant to straighten); the judge replied, “Wel may I heare you, but right I 
cannot doe ye.” In a variation on this theme, “One quarrelling with a lame 
man, threatned that he would set his foot straight ere he had don[e].” The 
“lame” man answered, “In so doing I will accompt you my friend” for restor-
ing his body to a normative state.19
 As a hybrid of the familiar and the strange, the disabled body was a fer-
tile topic for witty wordplay, extended metaphor, and comic resemblances. 
In Wits, Fits and Fancies, “One seeing a very misshapen and crooked per-
son in the streete said, that he had a Camell to his nurse.”20 Dwarfs were 
sometimes referred to as “apes,” and other deformed or crooked people as 
“monkeys.”21 Such analogies marked out deformity as stigma, a spoiled iden-
tity that threatened to contaminate the integrity of the species itself.22 The 
notion that a “crooked” body might be formed in the maternal nurturing 
of a human by a camel placed this reading of the nonstandard body in the 
context of species pollution, at a time when animal cross-breeding was a rec-
ognized phenomenon.23 In this way, “dwarfs” and the “crooked” seemed to 
question the status of humanity. Misshapen bodies also resembled the devil.24 
The Norfolk gentleman Sir Nicholas Le Strange recorded in his manuscript 
jest book a tale of a Cambridge “Scholler that had very deformed leggs and 
Feete,” who, when he revealed his feet to a shoemaker, caused the artisan to 
startle “as if the Divell had offerd him his cloven foote.”25
 This blurring of boundaries between human and animal, and the role 
of the supernatural, drew on ideas familiar from early modern accounts of 
monstrous births.26 However, other jests drew analogies between “crooked” 
or impaired bodies and mundane, everyday objects. A hunched back was 
likened to a person carrying a load; a blind eye was described as a shuttered 
window.27 The joke in which the straight lines of architecture were con-
trasted with the house’s “crooked” occupier who could not “stand upright” 
within it served to describe the “deformed” body as lacking in order, form, 
and symmetry, an “error” of creation or manufacture rather than a prodi-
gious wonder. In another example, “One seeing a man of excellent learning, 
crooked and deformed in body, said, Lord, what a poor Cottage doth yonder 
good wit inhabit.”28 By drawing a distinction between the man’s qualities of 
mind and the “deformed” body he “inhabited,” the jest presented a chal-
lenge to thinking about bodily anomaly that viewed deformity as an index 
of the mind. As Bacon pointed out in his essay “Of Deformity,” in spite of 
there being a natural “consent between the body and the mind,” “deformed” 
people might, “if they be of spirit,” prove to be “excellent persons,” as Aesop, 
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Socrates, and other historical notables proved.29 Thus, while some jests might 
exploit familiar connections between the “deformed” and the “monstrous,” 
others might use different analogies to suggest that such associations were 
not inevitable.
 While the treatment of the non-normative in jests shared common fea-
tures, different types of impairment were the occasion for different types of 
comic scenario. The ways in which deaf people might mishear others and 
provide inappropriate responses in conversation provided much amusement, 
particularly by showing the permeable boundaries between civility and rude-
ness. A Banquet of Jeasts (1630) described how a young gentleman had, in 
order to make his dinner companions “merry,” made a mock toast to his deaf 
“hostesse,” drinking to her “and all her friends,” namely, “the Bawdes and 
Whores in Turnebull Street,” to which the woman returned thanks, “I know 
you remember your Mother, your Aunt, and those good Gentlewomen your 
sisters.”30 Sir Nicholas Le Strange recorded several variations on this theme, 
perhaps with the aim of using them to delight guests at his own table. In 
one, which he attributed to his father, Thomas Getting had “dranke to an 
old woman here one Christmas, and instead of a Drinking salutation, sayd, 
kisse mine arse Besse,” to which she “being very Deafe, and suspecting no 
ill, answered, I thanke you hartily Thomas; and Dorothy too I pray (which 
was Thomas Getting’s wife).” In another (supplied by his mother), Sir Henry 
Sidney was said to have toasted an old, deaf woman with the phrase “Ile be 
your bedfellow this night,” to which she replied, “I thanke your good Wor-
shipp, with all my Hart, Sir you know what’s good for an old Woman.”31
 The bawdiness of these jokes, and their focus on the impairments of 
elderly, deaf women in particular, show ways in which jests might employ 
disability to reinforce the dominant misogyny of early modern humor. The 
sexuality of elderly and disabled individuals was considered transgressive, 
and laughter at jokes of this kind may have served to restore normative val-
ues that classified desire as the prerogative of the young and physically whole. 
In jests about sex, marriage, and cuckoldry hierarchies of disablement were 
mapped onto hierarchies of domestic authority, in the process revealing how 
the meanings of impairment might be distinctly gendered.32 It was a famil-
iar adage that a deaf husband, unable to hear his wife’s scolding, and a blind 
wife, unable to see her husband’s faults, made for a “peaceable life in mar-
riage.”33 Other disabilities were presented as assisting in women’s subjection. 
A young gentleman being asked “what he meant to marry so deafe a Gentle-
woman” replied, “Because I hop’d she was also dumbe.”34
 Yet, while it was suggested (albeit ironically) that deaf men might enjoy 
relatively peaceful marriages, in many cases physical or sensory disability 
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was seen to compromise men’s authority. In the domestic economy of early 
modern England men’s disability might lead to a renegotiation of household 
roles and division of labor, giving their wives greater responsibility in the 
running of homes and businesses, and in controlling resources.35 According 
to Lindsey Row-Heyveld, the perception of disability as “effeminizing” grew 
in the late sixteenth century as pre-Reformation notions of disability as a 
spiritually ennobling condition, and the spiritual practice whereby the dis-
abled poor might sell prayers or affirmations of salvation, were swept away 
by religious reformers and harsher regimes of social welfare that cast many 
disabled people as passive objects of charity.36 Patriarchal authority rested 
on a fundamental assumption of able-bodiedness. As Alexandra Shepard 
has shown, men in early modern England did not benefit equally from the 
“patriarchal dividend,” and cuckold jokes regularly underscored male anxi-
eties about the ways in which their authority might be diminished through 
their own bodily shortcomings or deficits by casting wronged husbands as 
infirm or disabled.37 Sexual impotence, a common cause of wifely infidel-
ity in early modern cuckold jokes, was itself described as a physical impair-
ment or “defect,” a handicap that compromised men’s ability to control their 
wives.38 The stereotypical victim of cuckolding, the elderly man married to 
a young woman, had his horning “justified” by reference to his physical 
infirmities.
 For example, the seventeenth-century ballad The Cuckold’s Calamity, Or 
the Old Usurer Plunder’d out of his Gold by His Young Wife, has the husband 
lament, “Oh! She took me for my gold, tho’ I’m goughty, lame and old.”39 
The susceptibility of blind husbands to cuckolding was a theme found in 
medieval texts such as Chaucer’s Merchant’s Tale, and early modern jests simi-
larly reflected on the dangers of visual impairment to men’s sexual honor.40 
Wits, Fits and Fancies related a tale of “an honest man that had but one eie 
and a queane to his wife” who was in bed with a “knave” one evening when 
he returned home. Hearing her husband’s voice, the woman hid her lover 
and bade her husband enter the bedchamber, telling him that she had had a 
dream in which his sight had been restored. In order to see whether it was 
true, she placed her hand over his “seeing eie,” asking him whether he could 
“discern any thing with the other,” providing the cover that allowed her lover 
to escape.41
 The juxtaposition of different types of impairment was another com-
mon theme in jest books.42 This was partly a reflection of the incongruity 
that many early modern jests used to achieve their comic effect: if disabled 
characters might be considered objects of mockery in their own right, then 
the yoking together of “opposite” types of bodily difference such as blind-
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ness and lameness, or people of small stature with the exceedingly tall, might 
enhance the comic spectacle. But juxtaposition also emphasized the incom-
pleteness of disabled bodies that prevented disabled characters from being 
fully accepted as persons in their own right. In jest books and other writings 
the contrast between sensory and physical disabilities provides a means of 
exploring the qualities of mind and body. William Basse’s Helpe to Discourse 
(1619), which mixed jests with questions and answers on more serious top-
ics, used a story about a blind man and a “cripple” to answer the questions 
of whether the soul or the body “have the greater hand in sinne, and why for 
the sinne of the one they should be together jointly punished.” The owner of 
an orchard, it related, had two keepers, “one of the which is lame, and the 
other blinde.” The “cripple” spotted some golden apples hanging on a tree 
and desired for himself, but not being able to take them, lacking “legges to 
beare him to them,” he asked his blind companion for help. Having estab-
lished that the blind man “would not sticke [i.e., hesitate] to pull the apples 
if [he] had but  .  .  .  eyes to see them,” they hatched a scheme to take the 
fruit. Riding on the blind man’s shoulders, the “cripple” was able to snatch 
the apples, which the two men ate. Upon discovery of the theft, the mas-
ter of the orchard “punisheth both with one equall punishment as they had 
both deserved.” Thus the story gave the example that the “wise Governour 
exempt neither body nor soule, because they both lend their furtherance 
to sinne.”43 The incompleteness and physical or sensory deficits of the two 
men provided serviceable metaphors for the body and soul and for show-
ing their interdependence. Aphra Behn similarly made the contrast between 
physical and sensory disability central to her novel The Dumb Virgin (1700), 
which focused on the rivalry between two disabled sisters—the witty yet 
“deformed” Belvideera and the beautiful yet mute Maria—for the handsome 
suitor Dangerfield. Whereas the young women’s contrasting disabilities gave 
Behn the opportunity to compare the appeal of the qualities of mind against 
the beauties of the body, the plot’s tragic and sensational denouement in 
which Maria gives in to the sexual advances of Dangerfield only to discover 
that he is her long-lost brother, followed by the deaths of all but Belvideera 
who is left a miserable recluse, sent out a message once again of the danger-
ous desires of disabled people.44
 The juxtaposition of disabled characters in jest books might have taken 
further inspiration from the alliances between paupers of all kinds—includ-
ing disabled beggars—that occurred in early modern England. The mutual 
dependence of blind and physically disabled beggars was noted elsewhere in 
early modern English culture and society. In 1706, for example, indigent 
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companions Henry Banford, “a Blind Man,” and William Jones, “a Lame 
Man,” were indicted at the Old Bailey for highway robbery.45 Jest books were 
interested in the stresses of daily life, and they contributed to a growing body 
of writing in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries concerning 
encounters with the disabled poor. Although begging was not the sole lens 
through which authors of jest books approached disability, the mendicancy 
of the blind and “crippled,” and interactions between beggars and “respect-
able” pedestrians, provided a context for the discussion of disability in this 
literature. If authors of conduct literature questioned the “scornful” treat-
ment of the unfortunate in jests, concerns about the veracity of impair-
ments displayed by disabled beggars—which in turn raised questions about 
the “truth” of all bodily infirmities—appeared to justify some of the cruelest 
humor at the expense of the impaired. Suspicions about the disabled poor 
had been present in the Middle Ages, but, according to Row-Heyveld, con-
cerns about imposture intensified during the Reformation. The declining 
belief in the holiness of poverty and allied notion of disability as a spiritually 
ennobling condition, which we discussed earlier, together with the exposure 
of sham disabled mendicants in cony-catching pamphlets, and Tudor wel-
fare legislation that criminalized those “sturdy beggars” who shunned work, 
served to focus attention on the criminality and imposture of the disabled 
poor.46
 In The Booke of Bulls (1636), two men “passing the street in a serious dis-
course” are interrupted by a “dumb man” who “begg’d of them after his mute 
manner.” Furious at this interruption, one of the men threatened to “kick 
him” to send him on his way. “O fie,” said his companion, “will you kicke 
a dumbe man? Is hee dumb, repli’d he, why did he not tell me so then?”47 
Oxford Jests (1671) related how “one losing one of his arms in the Wars” 
was refused alms by a passerby who said, “I’ll give you nothing, you are no 
Gentleman, you cannot shew your arms.”48 Demanding that the dumb beg-
gar speak or the maimed soldier “shew arms” reflected a pervasive suspicion 
about the truth of impairment and the honesty of the disabled poor. The 
cruelty of these jokes also reflected the violence (threatened or real) used by 
the authorities to unmask or punish fraudulent disabled beggars. In Shake-
speare’s 2 Henry VI, the feigned lameness of the pilgrim at St. Albans, who 
appears before the king in act 2, scene 1, is revealed when he runs away 
to escape the beadle’s whip. The powers invested in the authorities, such 
as magistrates and the officers of London’s Bridewell, to physically search 
those who were believed to be counterfeiting disabilities or concealing other 
bodily secrets, together with the whipping that was prescribed as punishment 
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for vagrants in successive poor law statutes from the late fifteenth century 
onward, meant that the threat of violence or forced exposure was a constant 
risk for the disabled poor of early modern England.49
 But if anxieties about begging and imposture appeared to justify the cruel 
streak of early modern humor that seems indicative of a “Hobbesian” desire 
to denigrate the weakness of disabled people, it is also clear that writers used 
the abject position of disability or deformity to challenge conventional rela-
tionships of power or authority. Disabled bodies, like the “grotesque body” 
Bakhtin described in his study of Rabelais, were an unruly presence on the 
pages of jest books—as on the streets of early modern London—serving to 
challenge the orderly standards of the increasingly idealized “classical body” 
by highlighting the vulnerable corporeality of everyone.50 Similarly, Naomi 
Baker has shown that the ugly or deformed body in its “insistent and uncon-
trolled corporeality” presented a threat to emerging early modern forms of 
identity predicated on self-regulation and transcendence of the body.51 Afore-
mentioned jests in which the civilities of the dining table were mocked by 
the exploitation of the impediments of deaf guests were one way in which 
disability might provide a vehicle for satirizing these developing social con-
ventions. Beyond this, the disorderliness of the disabled body, its inability 
to play by the rules or to follow the script of “normal” expectations, gave 
impaired characters in jest books the opportunity to challenge authority and 
turn the tables on those who would mock the afflicted. 
 For example, the inability of blind people to read others by their deport-
ment or through cultural trappings of status such as dress gave them oppor-
tunities, in the world of the jest, to speak truth to power. One jest repeated 
in seventeenth-century collections concerned a group of courtiers crossing 
the New Bridge in Paris where they “espied a blind Man with the balls of his 
eyes so faire that they suspected hee was a counterfeit.” In order to prove this, 
a duke “being basely borne” told the company he would prove the imposture 
since “if hee can see hee must needs know mee, he daily sitting here, and I 
daily passing by, and being a man of eminency.” The nobleman then went 
up to the beggar “and pulled him by the nose, whereat the beggar roar’d out, 
and call’d him bastardly rogue.” Thus, said the duke, “he sees perfectly, he 
could never have known mee so well else,” but in fact “the man indeed was 
blind, and this onely a vicious speech often in his mouth.”52 While placing 
the encounter in the context of familiar concerns about imposture—which 
appeared to justify the tweaking of the man’s nose—the aptness of the beg-
gar’s swearing meant that it is the pretensions of the elite that end up being 
exposed in their true colors. Ultimately the counterfeit is the duke who lacks 
noble blood by birth, rather than the disabled beggar.
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 Another example of this kind of humor in which disability mocked the 
pretensions of those in authority is recorded by Le Strange in an anecdote 
concerning a “lame fellow at Ipswich” who, being demanded by Bishop Mat-
thew Wren “Why he did not bow at the name of Jesus,” replied, “Why my 
Lord, [ . . . ] one knee does bowe but the other will not.” Being asked why 
not, the man replied, “why because ’tis stiffe and lame.”53 The simple inabil-
ity of the “lame” body to do what it was commanded encapsulated the dif-
ficulties facing Wren in enforcing Laudian church reforms in the Diocese of 
Norwich during the mid-1630s.54 Elsewhere, those who inquired too imper-
tinently into the causes of disability, who patronized the afflicted or acted 
with incivility toward them, were given short shrift. For instance, in a jest 
that appeared in Tales and Quick Answers (c. 1535) a man who refused to 
kiss a maid on the grounds that her nose was too long is told by the woman, 
who “waxing shamefast and angry in her mind (for with his scoff he a little 
touched her),” that he may kiss her where “I have nary a nose” (i.e., her 
buttocks).55 The jest registered the feelings of the victims of such cruel and 
unchivalrous behavior and, in the woman’s sharp-witted repartee, showed 
how a well-judged response might provide a means by which those with 
nonstandard bodies might revenge themselves on their abusers, in the pro-
cess restoring their self-worth. In a similar example, a “tall personable man 
offered to accompany a dwarfe in the streete, saying that the people would 
the less gaze and wonder at his miserable littlenesse,” to which the “dwarf ” 
answered in riposte, “Rather they will wonder at my folly, to see me leade 
an Asse along by me, and not ride.”56 By the eighteenth century, the “merry 
cripple” was becoming a more notable feature of jest books and other writ-
ings on disability, as stoical good humor, smart repartee, and the ability to 
be “merry” about one’s own disabilities or deformities, became accepted as 
an important means of coping with the stigma of physical difference and for 
making disabled people acceptable to nondisabled society.57
Jokes about the “crippled,” blind, deaf, and “crooked” were a regular fea-
ture of jest books of the early modern period. Work on eighteenth-century 
jest books suggests that this material was ubiquitous, but it is just as impor-
tant to put this kind of humor into its context, too. In the sixteenth and sev-
enteenth centuries, jests that specifically dealt with impairment, or involved 
disabled characters, amounted to a small proportion of the total number of 
jests in this period. Indeed, some well-known late sixteenth- and early sev-
enteenth-century collections contained no jokes at all about disability. It was 
not until later in the seventeenth century when jest books became length-
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ier and published in greater volume that jests involving disabled characters 
became a common feature of this literature. For example, the 1630 edition 
of Archie Armstrong’s A Banquet of Jeasts contained only one jest concerning 
what we might recognize as a “disability”—the joke about the deaf hostess 
discussed earlier—although it did contain four jests about large or missing 
noses.58 The expanded version of the text published in 1660, however, con-
tained five jests about physical or sensory impairments.59 Pressure to include 
more material may have led to an increase of jests concerning anomalous 
bodies. Furthermore, the “anti-civility” of Restoration rakes and libertines 
may have led to an increased interest in more “cruel” jokes at the expense 
of the unfortunate.60 The “frolicks” of the Earl of Rochester and his cronies 
included violent and humiliating treatment of disabled people—a form of 
wit satirized in Thomas Otway’s play Friendship in Fashion (1678) in which 
the rake Malagene seeks to demonstrate that he is a man of “parts” by boast-
ing of how in one of his “merry witty fits,” he had taunted a lame beg-
gar who asked him for assistance by tripping up “both his wooden Legs.”61 
However, even in the later seventeenth century only a small proportion of 
jest book material was concerned overtly with disability or deformity. Only 
fifteen of the 583 jests in William Hicks’s Oxford Jests (1671) concerned 
deformity, “crippled” or maimed bodies, sensory impairments, and speech 
defects.62 As such, the notion that disabled characters were “standing jokes” 
in early modern jest books needs careful qualification.63
 Nevertheless, for scholars seeking to uncover the meanings of disability 
in premodern society, jest books provide important material that provides 
insight into discourses of disability in Renaissance England. Jokes did not 
simply mock disabled characters; instead, the exaggerated, topsy-turvy world 
of the jest provided license for authors of jests to reflect on the nature of 
disability as stigma (via anxieties about pollution of the species), the rela-
tionship between qualities of the mind and the “defects” of the body, social 
concerns about the dangers of the disabled poor, and the gendered iden-
tity of disabled people, especially men. While a short essay such as this is 
unable to do justice to the full variety of these jests, several important themes 
emerge. There can be no doubt that there was a strong element of exploi-
tation in early modern jest books in which the deformed body might pro-
vide an opportunity for the nondisabled to triumph over the “otherness” of 
impaired individuals. Disabled characters in jest books had the veracity of 
their afflictions challenged or mocked, were subjected to violence whether 
threatened or actually inflicted, or provided vehicles for the nondisabled to 
prove their verbal dexterity via ingenious word play and extended metaphors 
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that highlighted their nonhuman attributes or appearances, subjecting them 
to what Tom Shakespeare describes as a “normalizing verbal barrage.”64 Mate-
rial from jest books provides reinforcement for Row-Heyveld’s argument that 
representations of disability were becoming increasingly negative in England 
after the Reformation, as changes in religious practice and social welfare 
combined to devalue disabled persons, intensifying fears of imposture and 
criminality while simultaneously representing disabled men in particular as 
“impotent” and effeminized.
 However, paying closer attention to the structure of this material allows 
us to shed light on the multiple meanings of impairment in this period. 
Although “deformed” bodies might be described in grotesque terms, jests 
did not merely view disability through the lens of the monstrous or the 
exotic. References to impairment being a punishment from God, or of out-
ward deformity being a reflection of inner moral failings—made popular 
by Shakespeare’s portrayal of Richard III or ballads concerning “monstrous” 
births—were not often made explicit in this material. Authors of this mate-
rial were more concerned, like others of the time, with the question of 
whether impairment was real or faked, rather than its spiritual dimensions. 
Moreover, whereas jests provided an outlet for exploring anxieties raised by 
encounters with the disabled poor on the streets of the early modern city, 
disabled characters were sometimes given the opportunity to fight back and 
turn the tables on those who sought to denigrate them. Disabled characters 
were not only victims but also trickster figures who challenged the status 
quo, and the unruliness of the disabled body might provide a powerful tool 
for satirizing social conventions.65 Disability humor, like the experience of 
disability itself, resists straightforward categorization.
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in their 1980 study of revenge tragedy conventions, Charles A. Hallett and Elaine S. Hallett argue that madness is “the central symbol that binds all of the motifs [of revenge tragedy] together.”1 At the same time, however, 
the Halletts identify madness as “perhaps the most misunderstood revenge 
tragedy convention.”2 They take issue with many scholars’ literal approach to 
early modern madness, specifically the then-popular habit of drawing paral-
lels between descriptions of distraction and contemporary phobias or psy-
choses. Attempting to diagnose fictional characters four hundred years after 
the fact, the Halletts insist, limits interpretative possibilities. While the Hal-
letts’ specific assertion here is accurate, in the years since their study, scholar-
ship investigating the complexities of early modern madness has broadened 
the scope of “literal” interpretation. Research by Michael MacDonald, Carol 
Thomas Neely, and Ken Jackson, among others, has proven that understand-
ing madness as a real condition experienced by real people, with specific 
medical and cultural valences, can illuminate a wide variety of early modern 
texts.3
 For all the great strides that have taken place in the study of madness in 
the past thirty years, few scholars have situated early modern mental impair-
ment within the context of disability,4 and, especially strangely, in spite of 
the fact that it was emerging as a distinct legal and social category in the 
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unfolding English Reformation.5 Neither have scholars reconsidered the role 
of mental and intellectual disabilities within the tradition of revenge tragedy; 
three decades later, the Halletts’ assertion that madness is the most important 
and least understood convention of revenge tragedy still holds true.6 
 Madness is often underexamined and undertheorized in studies of revenge 
tragedy because critics have frequently regarded it as a simplistic narrative 
necessity. As Fredson Bowers asserts, “For there to be any play at all, the 
revenger must delay,” and madness, real or feigned, delivers that delay.7 Mad-
ness provides an exceptionally convenient dramatic deferral since it facilitates 
the bloody conclusion it simultaneously puts off. Avengers such as Hieron-
imo, Hamlet, and Antonio adopt disability as a disguise so they might safely 
observe the villains they hope eventually to punish. Nevertheless, because 
their feigned distraction blurs into real derangement, these avengers poten-
tially jeopardize their concluding revenge by means of the madness they take 
on to complete it, turning what looks like an instrument of action into an 
instrument of deferral. It is a slick dramatic maneuver, and the seemingly 
self-explanatory justification for the inclusion of madness and foolishness in 
revenge tragedies has often precluded further investigation.
 But madness and foolishness are more than just vehicles for dramatic 
delay. An analysis of plays such as The Spanish Tragedy, Titus Andronicus, 
Hamlet, and Antonio’s Revenge makes clear that mental and intellectual dis-
abilities played a critical role in making the morally ambiguous revenge tra-
dition palatable for early modern audiences. These disabilities weave together 
a number of the central thematic occupations of revenge tragedy, and, in so 
doing, present a paradoxical version of revenge that allowed audiences simul-
taneously to indulge in and condemn the bloody actions of the drama. Men-
tal and intellectual disabilities also serve a similar narrative function. Through 
the inclusion and eventual elimination of disability, mad avengers are pro-
tected from the guilt of the violence they enact, while mad villains’ guilt is 
affirmed and the violent ends they meet justified. Disability provides revenge 
tragedy with something of a literary loophole, facilitating the consumption 
of its ethically compromised but emotionally cathartic plot for audiences 
trained to condemn but hungry for vigilante justice.
Disability as a thematic Instrument
Examining the cultural construction of madness in early modern England 
reveals a number of attributes that made it a valuable thematic instrument in 
revenge tragedy. To begin with, medicine regularly granted mental and intel-
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lectual disabilities performative qualities. Medical authorities, for instance, 
believed madness could be caused by simply pretending to be mad and 
could be cured by similarly theatrical means.8 Widely circulated case stud-
ies reported doctors operating more like stage managers than physicians, 
using elaborately theatrical machinations to cure their “brain-sick” patients 
by gulling them into simply believing they were cured.9 Revenge tragedies 
seize on the possibilities of this connection between madness and theatri-
cality, featuring characters whose mental impairments entertain audiences 
and whose conditions blur the lines between real and feigned impairments. 
These plays also employ theatrical “cures” to end the avenger’s madness: the 
play-within-a-play that is a frequent feature of revenge tragedy either affirms 
the guilt of the villain or, more often, facilitates the violence that frees the 
avenger from his maddening pain of injustice.
 In addition to being theatrically resonant, early modern constructions 
of madness carried contradictory cultural associations shared by revenge 
tragedies; for example, madness reinforced the familial connections it also 
severed. Not only were family members usually the primary caregivers for 
persons with disabilities, especially those labeled “mad” or “foolish,” but an 
individual’s capacity to acknowledge and abide by familial ties was one of the 
primary factors in assessing his or her mental fitness. The failure to recognize 
a family member—or even the failure to recognize the authority of a fam-
ily member—could lead to a label of “witlessness” or “insensibility.”10 This 
contradiction made the presence of mental impairment in revenge tragedy 
particularly apt, since the central conflict of the drama often hinges on an 
avenger’s clash of familial obligations: in order to earn bloody justice for one 
family member, Hamlet, for instance, has to kill another. Mental and intel-
lectual disabilities throw into relief both the avenger’s shattering of familial 
bonds and his absolute commitment to those relationships.
 The conflicts of duty highlighted by madness’s familial connections are 
further teased out in its contradictory religious associations. In early modern 
England, the image of the fool could not be easily divorced from its nega-
tive sacred connections: the opening words of Psalm 52—“The fool hath 
said in his heart, ‘There is no God’”—and the accompanying illustrations in 
psalters cemented the link between the person with mental impairments and 
the atheist.11 Renaissance humanists, who associated reason with the divine, 
literalized this allegorical treatment of mental disability by characterizing the 
loss of reason as a break with God.12 Paradoxically, mental impairments were 
also believed to facilitate an intimate connection with God; “holy fools,” 
who lacked a fixation on earthly things, were thought of as uniquely Christ-
like. Erasmus plays up this contradiction of associations in The Praise of Folly 
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when he has his Folly, previously depicted as the source of vice, declare her-
self the only true wisdom, since salvation is itself a type of divine madness.13 
These conflicting connections made persons with mental and intellectual 
impairments difficult to interpret in early modern England, and, therefore, 
especially rich parallels for avenging counterfeiters who walked that same 
difficult line between defying God and doing God’s will. In John Marston’s 
Antonio’s Revenge, for example, Antonio’s prolonged performance as a fool 
reinforces the play’s fixation on divine censure versus divine consent since 
it mirrors the way Antonio repeatedly figures his act of personal retribution 
as an act of judgment ordained by God—in spite of his (and his audience’s) 
awareness of the biblical injunctions against revenge.
 The questions of guilt and innocence raised by the religious contradic-
tions of madness find earthly counterparts in links between madness, revenge 
tragedy, and violence. One of the qualities frequently used to identify (or 
at least qualify) early modern mental disabilities, especially those catego-
rized as “madness” or “lunacy,” was the threat an individual posed to the 
peace. As Peter Rushton points out, mental disabilities often went unla-
beled during the English Renaissance until the danger of physical harm was 
evident.14 Claudius alludes to this potential for violence when discussing 
Hamlet’s madness—“I like him not, nor stands it safe with us / To let his 
madness range” (3.3.1–2)—a potential that Hamlet fulfills in the murder of 
Polonius.15
 Although madness and lunacy threatened physical danger, paradoxically, 
they also resisted the responsibility for that violence. One of the most popular 
euphemisms for mental and intellectual disabilities in early modern England 
was “innocent,” a term that implied both a purity that would not enter-
tain the possibility of violence and a lack of responsibility for any potential 
harm that might occur.16 Revenge tragedies fixate on this duality, exploring 
the simultaneous guilt and innocence of the avenger, who must engage in 
unlawful violence in order to restore justice. In this way, having the avenger 
take on or be overtaken by madness increases the dramatic expectation of 
violence—and the ethical conundrum—inherent in revenge tragedies. Mad-
ness heightens the question of “Will he or won’t he take revenge?” by trans-
forming it into “Will he be too innocent to commit the required vengeance 
or will he be so guiltily enraged that he would be unable to stop himself 
from killing even if he wanted to?” Rather than serving simply as a some-
what unlikely diversion for the avenger, disability becomes a vital part of the 
anticipatory deferment of violence and its ethical complications.
 The simultaneous visibility and invisibility of mental disabilities com-
pounded the paradox of mad avengers’ guilt and innocence. Unlike other 
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impairments whose representations on the stage were almost entirely con-
tingent on costuming, mental disabilities were invisible. At the same time, 
mental disabilities were also granted visual cues, which developed over the 
centuries into nearly emblematic forms: madmen wore very few clothes or 
none at all; had either wild, unkempt hair or were entirely bald; and tradi-
tionally carried a weapon, usually a club.17 Fools wore striped or checked 
robes or cloaks, usually in green or yellow (the well-known “fool’s mot-
ley”), with a belled or tasseled cap and also brandished a weaponlike item, 
although fools’ accessories were distinctly nonthreatening.18 This contrast of 
eye-catching costume and invisible impairment not only made for effective 
theater through its playful, layered substitutions, but also lent itself par-
ticularly well to revenge tragedies that were obsessed with uncovering the 
unseen.
 The conundrum of madness’s in/visibility is just one iteration of the 
revenge tradition’s larger preoccupation with testing the scope of knowledge. 
Revenge has as much to do with revelation as it does with justice, and ques-
tions of epistemology, like those raised by the absence and presence of men-
tal disabilities’ visual signals, recur throughout the plays. When Hieronimo 
discovers the body of his murdered son in The Spanish Tragedy, he fears that 
Horatio’s death shall pass both unrevenged and unrevealed. Yet the proof 
of guilt needed to reveal and revenge his son’s murder proves strangely dif-
ficult for Hieronimo to acquire. A letter written in blood from an eyewit-
ness is not enough; Hieronimo needs the duration of the play to confirm 
the identities of Horatio’s murderers for himself. And he is not alone. The 
Ghost tells Hamlet of Claudius’s crime, but Hamlet still needs to stage The 
Murder of Gonzago to confirm his supernatural sources. Titus Andronicus 
cannot act upon his desire for revenge until his mutilated daughter can find 
a way to communicate the names of her attackers without the use of tongue 
or hands. The disguise of disability, then, is often how avengers finally estab-
lish the proof of guilt that frees them to become vigilantes, even as it reso-
nates with the epistemological uncertainty central to revenge tragedies. It 
allows avengers the time and the freedom to confirm the guilt of the villain 
while avoiding suspicion themselves. Simultaneously, putting on disability 
further complicates the issue of discernment raised by revenge tragedies since 
the very presence of madness undermines avengers’ ability to serve as accu-
rate and just judges. Because feigned madness so often perfectly resembles—
and even bleeds into—the real thing, avengers compromise their claim to 
authority and blur the line between a righteous execution of justice and a 
maddened frenzy when they pretend disability. Mental impairment, then, 
undercuts the very certainty it is employed to secure.
78 • 4: anTiC DiSPOSiTiOnS
 Mental and intellectual disabilities assist these plays in negotiating the 
difficult ethical conundrum they stage. Critics have long debated how early 
modern audiences responded to the technically unlawful yet potentially satis-
fying actions of revenge tragedy. Did they see those raging avengers as agents 
of evil, as Lily B. Campbell and others have argued?19 Or did audiences look 
past their Christian context to read avengers as heroic exacters of a neces-
sary blood payment, as Fredson Bowers and his adherents have contended?20 
The answer may be that madness allowed playwrights and audiences the 
best of both worlds: they could indulge in revenge while condemning it, 
too, since mental impairments paradoxically heralded a break with family 
and religion, a tendency toward violence, a sense of perpetual indistinction 
and invisibility, and a failure of judgment—even as they also affirmed strong 
relationships with God and family, resisted violence, were easily identifiable, 
and facilitated reasonable judgment. Thanks to the construction of madness 
during this period, avengers could be always guilty and innocent, punishable 
and praiseworthy.
Disability as a narrative Instrument
Just as mental and intellectual disabilities aided avengers in their efforts to 
interpret the guilt of their enemies, so these disabilities are themselves evi-
dence to be interpreted. As disability scholarship has proven, the nonstan-
dard body in literature is never allowed to be simply a fact but always serves 
as a sign of some deeper meaning that requires interpretation. This was par-
ticularly true in the early modern era, where disability could be read theo-
logically, as a sign of God’s wrath or as a wonder that indicated the powers of 
nature; physiognomically, as a physical indicator of spiritual corruption, or, 
in reverse, as a nearly sacramental outward sign of inward graces; or humor-
ally, as the corporeal result of “excess” or “lack,” both physical and moral. 
Disability was also often linked to the social problems that plagued Eng-
land during the Tudor-Stuart period, specifically the rapid urbanization and 
vagrancy that spiked in the late sixteenth century. Disability invited interpre-
tation, and the madness and foolishness found in revenge tragedies were no 
exception. Not only do characters (and audience members) have to decipher 
if a character is genuinely disabled, but they also have to determine what 
that disability means.
 Scholars have engaged similar questions about what mental and intel-
lectual disabilities are and what they signify within the context of revenge 
tragedy. Charles and Elaine Hallett, for instance, posit that madness was 
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both the symptom and the symbol of emotional excess, implicitly condemn-
ing rage, grief, lust, despair, and other strong emotions while acknowledging 
the disruptive effects of psychological trauma and moral chaos. The Halletts 
also suggest that madmen and fools are used to provide a counterpoint to 
the “sanity” of normal conduct: “the extravagant behavior of the true lunatic 
was a natural symbol for that ordinary everyday madness to which all men 
are subject.”21 Other critics, such as Barbara J. Baines, suggest that mad-
ness serves as a foil, not to the behavior of sane characters and playgoers 
but to the image of Stoic acceptance so often presented as an ideal response 
to trauma in revenge tragedies.22 Because the body was such an important 
political metaphor in early modern England, scholars such as Alan Thiher 
argue that madness is a symbol of governmental instability, particularly in 
revenge tragedies where the crux of the drama rests on the loss of a legitimate 
recourse to justice.23 The “dislocation in consciousness” that Jonathan Dol-
limore asserts is frequently showcased in revenge tragedies can be the result 
of “a dislocation in the world,”24 but, as Anne Duprat demonstrates, early 
modern mental disabilities were also granted the power to reorder the world, 
creating rich alternate versions of reality.25
 While these are insightful observations on the presence and purpose of 
madness and foolishness in revenge tragedy, these disabilities also served a 
very specific narrative function: which characters succumb to madness and 
which do not guide responses to vigilante justice enacted in these plays. 
When the revenger is mad, his madness facilitates a nominal approval of his 
actions; when the tyrant is mad, his madness verifies the necessity of ven-
geance enacted against him. Disability in such cases is indeed a sign to be 
interpreted, and deciphering its meanings provided audiences with helpful 
navigation through the complicated ethics of the revenge tragedy.
 David T. Mitchell and Sharon L. Snyder have theorized the role of dis-
ability in Western literature, identifying a pattern they call “narrative pros-
thesis” by which the nonstandard body acts “as a crutch upon which literary 
narratives lean for their representational power, disruptive potentiality, and 
analytical insight.”26 Mitchell and Snyder outline the fourfold structure of 
this narrative contrivance: (1) A marked physical difference is introduced 
to the reader. (2) The narrative accounts for the inclusion of this difference 
by recounting its origins. (3) This marked difference is brought from the 
periphery of the narrative to the central focus of its concerns. (4) There is an 
effort to rehabilitate or eliminate this difference, thus resolving the central 
narrative conflict in a purgation of the social body or a redefinition of essen-
tial states of being.27 As Mitchell and Snyder have asserted, the nonstandard 
body functions in narrative art as the metaphorical embodiment of various 
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types of social and individual aberrance, a phenomenon they call “the mate-
riality of metaphor.”28 Just what metaphor the specific disability embodies 
often determines the fate of the character and the outcome of the story; that 
outcome, however, is usually limited to either eliminating the disability or 
eliminating the character with the disability (the so-called cure or kill princi-
ple). The deterministic metaphorical power of disability is decidedly evident 
in revenge tragedies, where the multiplicity of meanings assigned to early 
modern madness directs the narrative and, especially, the audience’s ethical 
interpretations of that narrative.
 When the avenger experiences madness, the narrative prosthesis of dis-
ability provides audience members with an interpretive strategy that allows 
them to elide the ethical problems raised by the actions of revenge. Many 
avengers—Hieronimo, Titus Andronicus, Hamlet, and Antonio, specifi-
cally—initially engage in madness as a ruse. The fraud allows them to avoid 
the suspicions of the very men they are observing and plotting against. As 
Hieronimo explains in The Spanish Tragedy:
Thus therefore will I rest me in unrest,
Dissembling quiet in unquietness,
Not seeming that I know their villainies,
That my simplicity may make them think
That ignorantly I will let all slip.29 (3.13.29–34)
Enacting his machinations in the “rest” provided by the disguise of mental 
“unrest,” Hieronimo and other avengers participate in the classical tradition 
of putting on madness to overthrow tyranny. Junius Brutus famously feigned 
madness in order to take down the evil Tarquin, and, as we are reminded in 
Antonio’s Revenge, even Machiavelli suggested that, when seeking out one’s 
enemies, “He is not wise that strives not to seem fool” (4.1.25).30 Of course, 
their control over their costume quickly disintegrates, and it becomes diffi-
cult for the avengers and others to determine their genuine mental condi-
tion. Titus Andronicus, for instance, comes so close to genuine madness that 
he never officially sets out to feign it. His nemesis Tamora simply mistakes 
his behavior for derangement, and he takes deadly advantage of her error. In 
this way, these dramas swiftly move through the first three phases of narra-
tive prosthesis, introducing the disability as an initially peripheral issue, giv-
ing it a justifying origin, and then centralizing it as the fraudulent disability 
bleeds into reality.
 In these plays, the avenger’s madness motivates the plot and leads to its 
inevitable conclusion, but, paradoxically, madness is a pointedly inadequate 
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justification for the actions of the plot and the machinations of the char-
acters. Charles and Elaine Hallett assert that madness is crucial to revenge 
tragedy’s bloody finale because it grants the avenger a potentially delusional 
but necessary sense of divine approval for his violent actions.31 This assess-
ment of madness in revenge tragedy comports with Mitchell and Snyder’s 
assessment of the role of disability in narrative art, wherein “the inherent 
vulnerability and variability of bodies serves literary narratives as a metonym 
for that which refuses to conform to the mind’s desire for order and ration-
ality.”32 This statement is particularly true of mental disabilities, which, in 
revenge tragedies, become laden with symbolic meanings. Yet, at the same 
time, while madness is used to justify the actions of the avenger (to himself 
and to the audience of the play, as well) and to symbolize the social deviance 
the avenger has experienced and will cause, madness is also an insufficient 
explanation: revenge narratives destabilize early modern cultural assertions 
about the fixity of earthly and divine authority, but they do so by relying on 
the deterministic nature of disability. By depending on the fixity of disabil-
ity to reveal the instability of order and lawfulness, revenge tragedies vividly 
illustrate Mitchell and Snyder’s assertion that in prosthetic narratives “dis-
ability may provide an explanation for the origins of a character’s identity, 
but its deployment usually proves either too programmatic or unerringly 
‘deep’ and mysterious. . . . Their disabilities surface to explain everything or 
nothing.”33 Avengers who show up the artificiality of unchanging justice and 
authority through the predestined actions of their madness enact a similarly 
circular logic.
 The conclusions of these dramas highlight their lack of explanation, since 
the resolutions of revenge tragedies rely on the motivation of madness; yet 
madness is often surprisingly absent from these scenes. By the time each 
avenger finally wreaks his revenge, he appears to have discarded the lunacy 
that he demonstrated earlier in the play. In the case of avengers such as 
Hieronimo and Hamlet, it is unclear whether they simply choose to abandon 
the pretense of madness—suggesting that they had control of it all along, 
however much their actions might belie that—or whether they were some-
how cured of their condition, although no cure is ever identified. The obvi-
ous answer appears to be that they are cured by engaging in the final act of 
cathartic violence, which is contradictory, if, in fact, their madness facilitates 
their willingness to participate in that violence in the first place.
 The ultimate fate of these avengers affirms the circular explanation of the 
prosthetic narrative, comporting with Mitchell and Snyder’s assessment that 
disability explains “everything or nothing”—or, in the case of the revenge 
tragedy, everything and nothing. Instead of being cured or killed, protago-
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nists of revenge dramas appear to be cured and killed: they enter into the 
final bloodbath free of their mental impairment and then they die in the 
attack that they instigate.34 Both their curing and killing seem necessary to 
the narrative and ethical resolutions of these dramas. Avengers must be cured 
because, even if we agree that their madness motivates their violence, their 
lack of sanity would obliterate the scrim of justice that covers their brutal-
ity; similarly, they must be killed in order to punish them appropriately for 
their transgression of the law and return the narrative to a state of equilib-
rium. With these two conditions in place, the protagonists can be honored 
after their death in spite of their disability and unlawful actions—or, rather, 
because of their disability and unlawful actions. At the end of The Span-
ish Tragedy, the spectral Don Andrea promises to “lead Hieronimo where 
Orpheus play, / Adding sweet pleasures to eternal days” (4.5.23–24). Titus 
Andronicus is exonerated by his nation and honored by his remaining fam-
ily members, who cover his mangled body with kisses. Hamlet, of course, 
is carried from the scene of his carnage by four captains, “like a soldier” 
(5.2.398); the “flights of angels” (5.2.362) Horatio invokes suggest that in 
his disability-free death he is not only “most royal” (400), as Fortinbras sug-
gests, but also most Christian.35 Valorizing the avengers after they have com-
pleted their revenge also guides the reactions of the audience members who 
have been presented with a complex moral task in deciphering these dramas. 
The application and elimination of madness allows spectators the transgres-
sive pleasure of vigilante justice while exempting them from the moral quan-
dary the violent and violating actions of the protagonist provoke.
 Avengers, however, are not the only characters in revenge tragedy to 
experience mental disability. In a number of revenge tragedies, the object 
of revenge—the villain—succumbs to madness while the avenger remains 
sane. In Cyril Tourneur’s The Atheist’s Tragedy, the evil D’Amville loses his 
reason as he begins to lose his power and descends into madness by the end 
of the drama. The Tyrant in The Second Maiden’s Tragedy is driven to distrac-
tion by his grief over the Lady’s suicide. Lycanthropy plagues Ferdinand, 
the evil twin brother of the wronged Duchess in John Webster’s The Duch-
ess of Malfi. The mental disabilities experienced by villains, like those expe-
rienced by avengers, are metaphorically loaded. However, villains’ madness 
signifies differently from avengers’ madness. For villains, their disability is a 
direct result of their crime; madness is a physical manifestation of their guilt. 
D’Amville goes mad because of the loss of his sons, whose deaths derive from 
his murderous power plays; the Tyrant loses his reason because the Lady, 
whom he ruthlessly pursued, killed herself rather than be possessed by him; 
and Ferdinand’s distraction sets in immediately upon seeing the bodies of his 
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sister and her children, whose murders he himself had ordered. The point-
edly motivated madness of these villains demonstrates Mitchell and Snyder’s 
theory of the materiality of metaphor, wherein deviance from a physical 
norm embodies social and/or individual deviance. As in the other revenge 
tragedies, madness provides a circular explanation for the actions of these 
tyrants: because villains are driven mad by guilt, their disability proves that 
they are guilty.
 Plays where the villain becomes mad also follow the model of narrative 
prosthesis by first introducing the disability, then attributing it to a specific 
origin (namely, the evil perpetrated by these villains), before bringing it to 
the center of the narrative concerns and, finally, eliminating it. Again, dis-
ability helps elide the ethical difficulty of revenge. Villains’ madness both 
facilitates and justifies the concluding violence, eliminating both the villain 
and his disability. This elimination neatly resolves the dramatic conflicts of 
the drama while protecting the hero (and, in turn, the spectators of the play) 
from responsibility for the otherwise ethically compromised ending. In his 
distraction, D’Amville kills himself, thus sparing the hero any possible taint 
of guilt associated with taking revenge himself in The Atheist’s Tragedy. In 
The Second Maiden’s Tragedy, the Tyrant’s deranged obsession with the Lady’s 
corpse leads the avenger to paint her dead body with poison; the Tyrant’s 
necrophilia does the rest. Ferdinand in The Duchess of Malfi dies when he 
attacks his evil brother, the Cardinal, and the henchman-turned-avenger, 
Bosola, mortally wounding them both and allowing the play to reach its 
appropriate conclusion without tainting the purer heroes by forcing them 
into violence. The materializing of metaphor in these dramas means that 
villains’ madness testifies to the rightness of revenge, since it proves their 
guilt by embodying their social and moral aberrations, while also providing 
for the elimination of those villains and their physical/social aberrance. Vil-
lains’ madness makes revenge both appropriate and convenient. Uniquely, 
the madness experienced by villains also eliminates the guilt of revenge, since 
the tyrants in these plays bring about their own violent ends, either directly 
or indirectly. In these cases, madness serves as a prophylactic to protect the 
would-be avengers from the ethical mire of the bloody conclusion and to 
protect the audience members as well, since their presence authorizes the 
actions on stage.
 Some revenge tragedies, it is important to recognize, do not feature mad-
ness at all. In plays such as Christopher Marlowe’s The Jew of Malta, Thomas 
Middleton’s The Revenger’s Tragedy, and John Ford’s ’Tis Pity She’s a Whore 
there is no apparent mental or intellectual disability, or at least none that is 
clearly articulated. Without the presence of madness in the drama, the eth-
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ics of revenge become even more ambivalent and difficult for audiences to 
negotiate. In The Revenger’s Tragedy, after finally completing his seemingly 
justified and hard-won vengeance, Vindice publicly confesses to revenge and 
is therefore immediately shipped off to a “speedy execution” (5.3.123). His 
justification for his bizarre actions demonstrates that Vindice has not lost 
his reason but is, in fact, so reasonable he recognizes the way his quest for 
revenge has eliminated any moral superiority he might have once claimed: 
“’Tis time to die,” he insists, “when we are ourselves our foes” (5.3.130). This 
unreasonable reason is also enacted by Giovanni in ’Tis Pity She’s a Whore, 
who rationalizes incest. His vengeance on his sister/lover and her husband is, 
like Vindice’s, strangely self-defeating: he kills the one person whom he truly 
loved and then proceeds to take on a whole roomful of his enemies single-
handedly, leaving little possibility for an outcome that does not include his 
death. Barabas, the titular Jew of Malta, meets a more straightforward end—
he falls into a cauldron of boiling liquid after finally being apprehended by 
some of the many people he has harmed—but his position as a Machia-
vellian protagonist makes his death distinctly problematic. Like Giovanni, 
Barabas’s revenge is motivated as much by his own evil actions as those done 
to him, and his attempt to restore his version of justice makes things more 
unjust than ever. In the revenge tragedies that feature madness, disability 
mediates and/or clarifies the actions of the protagonist; in dramas without 
madness, the protagonists tend to acknowledge the evil of their own actions, 
complicating the dramatic pleasure and ethical equilibrium of their resolu-
tions and making it difficult even to group these plays within the revenge 
tradition.
 Through a complex network of thematic and narrative connections, mad-
ness helped playwrights and audiences both indulge in and shield themselves 
from the dangerous pleasure of revenge tragedy. Capitalizing on the many 
contradictions of mental and intellectual disabilities in the early modern 
era, authors could stage avengers who were always both guilty and innocent. 
Taking this overdetermination of disability even further, madness could be 
employed to approve the violent actions of some characters and, simulta-
neously, to condemn the violent actions of others. Mental and intellectual 
disabilities could show the audience who to honor as a hero and who to 
castigate as a villain, however similar their behavior. Madness is, indeed, the 
central symbol that binds all the motifs of revenge tragedy together—but 
it is more than just a symbol. It is the empty center on which the project 
of the revenge tragedy turns: it can justify the avenger even as it signals his 
deviance; it can motivate, condemn, and eliminate tyrants; it can free audi-
ences to revel in and revile the play’s bloody actions. Revenge may be a dish 
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best served cold, but it is madness that allows audiences of revenge tragedy 
to have that dish and eat it, too.
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in The Rule of Metaphor, Paul Ricoeur explores the philosophical and lin-guistic significance of metaphors that lose their status as metaphors by means of “lexicalization,” a process by means of which “dead metaphors 
are no longer metaphors, but instead are associated with literal meaning.”1 
Without directly referencing Ricoeur, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson 
address the issue of dead metaphors and arrive at the opposite conclusion: 
“Expressions like wasting time, attacking positions, going our separate ways, 
etc., are reflections of systematic metaphorical concepts that structure our 
actions and thoughts. They are ‘alive’ in the most fundamental sense: they are 
metaphors we live by.”2 Pervasive as they are, such lexicalized metaphors can 
provide insight into the conceptual frameworks underlying a given culture’s 
language and thought, including ideas about bodies and bodily differences. 
Lexicalized metaphors that associate sight with knowledge and blindness 
with ignorance,3 for example, or standing erect with moral and intellectual 
merit and slouching or sitting with sloth4 indicate a negative social valuation 
of physically impaired persons so ingrained that such metaphors have hard-
ened for English speakers into “literal” expressions.
 Judith Anderson, weighing in on the dead-metaphor question in regard 
to early modern England, argues that the multilingual educational system 
of the Renaissance would mean that many people, aware of etymological 
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roots of words, would be able to recognize a word or expression’s genesis in 
metaphor.5 Further, Katharine Eisaman Maus points out that early modern 
belief in Galenic (i.e., humors-based) theories of the human body means 
that it is difficult to know, in encountering expressions that we read as dead 
metaphors (e.g., references to “hot-headedness” for an angry, “choleric” per-
son), “when we are dealing with metaphor and when with a bare statement 
of fact.”6 Michael Schoenfeldt echoes this conclusion, noting that “by urging 
a particularly organic account of inwardness and individuality, Galenic medi-
cal theory gave poets a language of inner emotion whose vehicles were also 
tenors, whose language of desire was composed of the very stuff of being.”7 
Despite present-day difficulties in assessing the “liveliness” to early modern 
readers of metaphors that have since become formulaic, the elaboration of 
metaphor into allegory certainly serves to enhance a reader’s awareness of 
metaphor as metaphor. One can breathe new life into a dead metaphor by 
extending it into an allegory, giving it characters and plot.
 In this essay, I discuss the ways that Edmund Spenser revivifies dead met-
aphors of physical impairment, creating impaired allegorical figures that lead 
readers to his intended moral judgments by calling on his audience’s shared 
biases and preconceptions related to bodily differences. Spenser sometimes 
uses impairment allegorically to elicit an intellectual response, using the 
image of physical or bodily privation to signal a moral incapacity essential 
to the plot of the allegory, as in the case of Corceca and Abessa. More often, 
however, Spenser’s allegories of physical impairment aim to create emo-
tional rather than intellectual reactions from the reader—specifically, emo-
tions related to disgust and rejection—to lead readers to the desired moral 
interpretations.
 In this manner, Spenser “imports” the full weight of social stigmatiza-
tion of bodily differences in early modern England into the text in order to 
convey moral meanings that have nothing to do with physical impairment. 
Spenser takes for granted that his readers share stigmatizing ideas about and 
rejecting emotional attitudes toward physical impairment; transferring these 
ideas and attitudes allegorically from representations of impaired bodies to 
abstract ideas serves as an efficient means of conveying meaning, because 
preexisting cultural biases perform some of the work. The social model of 
disability posits a dichotomy between “impairment,” defined as “a problem 
in body function or structure,” and “disability,” defined with reference to the 
social process that turns impairment, understood as neutral, into a socially 
stigmatized and undesirable state; “disability” thus reflects “an interaction 
between features of a person’s body and features of the society in which he 
or she lives.”8 Thus, Spenser often creates impaired allegorical figures, taking 
90 • 5: DiSabling allegOrieS in SPenSer’S FAerie Queene
for granted that his readers will perform the work of “disabling” those fig-
ures, and they must do so in order to glean the correct interpretation of the 
allegory.
cognitive Metaphor theory and allegory
In conceptualizing metaphor as a figure of thought, the cognitive metaphor 
theory developed over the past three decades (and its extension to allegory) 
represents a break with earlier theories of metaphor that understood it as 
a figure of language only. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson define meta-
phor as involving the mapping of ideas and images from one conceptual 
domain (the “source domain”) onto another (the “target domain”). Although 
this definition differs substantially from earlier twentieth-century theories of 
metaphor, Lakoff and Johnson’s definition fits strikingly well with that put 
forth by George Puttenham in The Art of English Poesy (1589) when he asks, 
drawing upon the etymological background of the term, “for what else is 
your Metaphor but an inversion of sense by transport.”9 But what is trans-
ported? Although the number of possible source domains is as limitless as the 
number of possible target domains, metaphor has a tendency to describe the 
abstract in terms of the concrete. Research from the present moment finds 
much metaphorical meaning transported from the domain of the human 
body to other conceptual domains, and this was true as well during the early 
modern period.
 Metaphors of the body enable one to “conceptualize the nonphysical in 
terms of the physical.”10 The importance of body metaphors is borne out by 
Zoltán Kövecses’s study of the most common source domains of metaphors; 
he places “The Human Body” and “Health and Illness” first and second, 
respectively, in his list of the thirteen most common source domains.11 To the 
extent that two people experience similar bodily actions, the body as source 
domain can help in sharing understandings of more abstract concepts, as 
noted by numerous scholars addressing the significance of embodied action 
to metaphorical mental structures. In a discussion of metaphors that draw 
on physical orientation, Lakoff and Johnson argue that a spatial orientation 
as source domain depends upon “the fact that we have bodies of the sort we 
have and that they function as they do in our physical environment.”12 Simi-
larly, Mark Johnson follows an analysis of embodied understandings of con-
tainment, force, and balance with the summary statement that “certain 
abstract inference patterns are the result of metaphorical projections of image 
schemata .  .  . which arise in our bodily experience” (note that I follow the 
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usage of cognitive metaphor theorists in using small caps to notate cognitive 
metaphors and concepts).13
 But of course these experiences, assumed to be universal, depend on the 
experience of unimpaired bodies, as Amy Vidali points out in her critique of 
Lakoff and Johnson’s analysis of the knowing is seeing metaphor.14 George 
Lakoff and Mark Turner acknowledge the nonuniversality of the experiences 
underlying conceptual metaphors in general (though the example they pro-
vide refers to sexual experience, not embodied ways of being in the world), 
noting that “Metaphors may be grounded not only in recurrent direct expe-
rience but also in knowledge.  .  .  .  basic metaphors vary in the degree to 
which they have a grounding in experience or cohere with commonplace 
knowledge.”15 Implicitly, Lakoff and Turner here acknowledge that a cul-
ture’s collection of conceptual metaphors is created by the majority. Recent 
experiments by Daniel Casasanto suggest, though, that even when a minor-
ity group (in his study, left-handed people) follows the linguistic norms of 
a culture by, for example, using linguistic formulae that associate right with 
good and left with bad, their embodied experience can actually override this 
linguistic cultural blueprint. His experiments showed that “Right-handers 
were more likely than left-handers to associate right with positive ideas and 
left with negative ideas. Left-handers were more likely than right-handers to 
associate left with positive ideas and right with negative ideas.”16 He proposes 
that
Good Is Right and Good Is Left mental metaphors are created in right- 
and left-handers, respectively, via correlational learning . . . over a lifetime 
of lopsided perceptuomotor experience. People come to implicitly associ-
ate good things more strongly with the side of space they can interact with 
more fluently (their dominant side) and bad things with the side of space 
they interact with less fluently (their nondominant side).17
Casasanto’s research certainly offers suggestive possibilities for considering 
the distinctive qualities of physically impaired people’s body-based con-
ceptual apparatuses and how their experiences of metaphors derived from 
embodied action might differ as well.
 Such research reminds us of the need to be attentive to the role of sub-
jectivity in the creation and use of metaphors. Just as embodied experience 
can affect a person’s ways of conceptualizing abstract ideas through meta-
phor, the imagined subject position of the receiver of a metaphoric message 
also contributes to the meaning of the metaphor. In the case of metaphors 
and allegories presented within a literary text, the author signals the expected 
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subject position of the person encountering a metaphor: for metaphors based 
on bodily experience, the reader will be expected either to identify with the 
metaphoric representation or else to see it as Other.
 Between the two types of early modern English impairment-based meta-
phors that I will discuss in this essay, the most important distinction arises 
from the way the reader conceives the meaning, whether it be primarily 
through intellection or primarily through emotion. The frequency in The 
Faerie Queene of metaphors that invite an emotional reaction of disgust for 
and rejection of the impaired body illustrates David Mitchell and Sharon 
Snyder’s observation that “disability as a narrative device—an artistic pros-
thesis  .  .  .  reveals the pervasive dependency of artistic, cultural, and phil-
osophical discourses upon the powerful alterity assigned to people with 
disabilities.”18 Many of Spenser’s metaphoric representations of physical 
impairment assume that the reader will imaginatively reject as Other the 
body described; by importing into the reader’s experience of the text preex-
isting cultural biases regarding impairment, these disabling metaphors exem-
plify Mitchell and Snyder’s “narrative prosthesis,” in that they allow Spenser 
to convey meaning with less work. They also illustrate the importance of 
emotion in the creation of metaphors or allegories; Spenser seems acutely 
aware of the emotional reactions his early modern readers are likely to expe-
rience in response to descriptions of physically impaired bodies, responses 
not entirely different from those identified by present-day theorists of the 
abject. Bill Hughes, for example, calls attention to the emotional responses 
of fear and disgust that result from the abjection of disability: “The role of 
fear  .  .  .  is hugely underplayed in personal tragedy theory. So [too] is the 
role of disgust, a mediating emotion in the relations between disabled and 
nondisabled people that is in need of considerable development.”19 Spenser 
expects readers to transfer the fear and disgust activated by his disabling 
descriptions of impaired bodies to abstractions such as, for example, “wrath-
fulness” and “divisiveness.”
 We can see evidence of Spenser’s goal of eliciting emotional responses 
from his readers to the personifications that inhabit Faeryland in his curi-
ous departures from traditional emblematic representations of such figures 
as Occasion and Ate. Spenser chooses to make them hideous and physically 
impaired, presumably in order to call on predictable responses of disgust in 
his readers. In doing so, he exemplifies some of the methods of meaning-
making that distinguish allegory from metaphor. Peter Crisp argues that the 
essential difference between the two is that allegory does not refer directly 
to the target domain; instead, all the language refers to the source domain: 
“Allegory brings the metaphorical source domain to life in a way that no 
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other form of metaphorical language can. Its peculiar imaginative excite-
ment  .  .  .  resides in the fact that a metaphorical source domain is given 
its own, strange and fantastic, fictional life, instead of just being mapped 
straight onto a target domain.”20 One way to help readers draw the correct 
target-domain inferences from the strange, fantastic fictional world devel-
oped out of the source domain is to elicit powerful emotional responses to 
guide their own analyses. Certainly, as Mark Turner notes, “One of the most 
basic of the personification metaphors is an abstract property is a person 
whose salient characteristic is that property.”21 However, to make 
the personification compelling, an emotional reaction is desirable: “the way 
we feel about the appearance and character of the personification must cor-
respond to the way we feel about the event.”22 Spenser illustrates these ideas, 
teaching his readers how to “fashion a gentleman or noble person in virtuous 
and gentle discipline” in part by holding up un-gentle, ig-noble personifica-
tions and inviting his readers to judge and reject them.23
Impairment-Based allegories of Bodily Difference
Although recent theorists have analyzed the philosophical and political prob-
lems with the dichotomy between “impairment” and “disability” described 
earlier,24 I find the dichotomy useful for identifying two qualitatively dif-
ferent kinds of allegory based on bodily difference. In what I call “impair-
ment-based allegories,” an allegorical figure’s physical inability to perform 
some task leads to an intellectual interpretation of the allegorical situation, 
whereas in “disability-based allegories,” the allegorical figure’s bodily differ-
ences elicit a rejecting emotional reaction from the reader, and the reader’s 
emotions guide the interpretation of the allegory. All of the allegorical figures 
I will discuss here depend upon an implied acceptance of the metaphor a 
moral state is a physical state, and all of them take for granted that an 
impaired body is less valuable than an unimpaired body, but there are nev-
ertheless important qualitative differences between allegories based on the 
intellect versus the emotions as the source of meaning-making.
 A well-known example of impairment-based allegory appears in Every-
man, where Good Deeds’s inability to walk plays a significant part in the 
plot. Good Deeds lies on the ground, “sore bound” by the sins of Everyman, 
so that she “cannot stir.”25 Her mobility impairment makes it impossible for 
her to attend Everyman on his journey to Death, despite her twice-expressed 
willingness: “I would full fain” (498) and “fain would I help you, and I were 
able” (515). Because other allegorical figures have falsely indicated willing-
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ness to accompany Everyman, the impairment is necessary to convince the 
audience that her repeated expressions of desire to help are not lies. She tells 
him, “I cannot stand, verily” and “on my feet I may not go” (498, 518). 
Throughout the play, Good Deeds is presented as a wholly positive charac-
ter; her impairment prevents her from helping as much as she would like to, 
but she is always unambiguously good. The author here expects the audience 
to apprehend the meaning through intellection; the concept of privation is 
assumed to be connected with impairment in the audience member’s mind, 
and transferring the idea of privation to the abstraction “good deeds” leads 
to the intended allegorical meaning: Everyman’s spiritual heedlessness means 
that his good deeds are insufficient to help him achieve a good death.
 Another example of impairment-based allegory, which will be relevant 
to the next section’s discussion of Spenser’s allegorical treatment of Ate, 
appears in Andrea Alciato’s early sixteenth-century emblem representation 
of Ate, the goddess of discord. The emblem “Remedia in arduo, mala in 
prono esse” depicts Ate in flight, her wings making her even more capable 
of bodily movement than the average person, while the Litae, representa-
tives of prayers and thus of goodness, chase after her despite their physical 
impairments:
Once Jupiter had cast Ate down from the heavenly abode, what an evil 
bane thereafter assailed poor man! Ate flies out fleet of foot with fast-beat-
ing wing and leaves nothing untouched by mishap. So Jove’s daughters, the 
Litae, accompany her as she goes, to mend whatever ill she has brought 
about. But they are slow-footed, poor of sight and weary with age, and so 
they restore nothing until later, after long passage of time.26
The illustration shows two of the three Litae using canes to support them in 
their pursuit of Ate. The process of allegorical meaning-making here again 
proceeds through an intellectual process of transfer of ideas, in the same 
manner as the example of Good Deeds in Everyman: the desire of the Litae 
to do good is inhibited by a physical impairment, again illustrating the meta-
phoric concept a moral state is a physical state.
 These two examples, Everyman from the late fifteenth century and Alci-
ato from the early to mid-sixteenth century, invite the audience to map 
meanings from the impaired body onto the moral and theological domain 
primarily through a transfer of ideas rather than through a transfer of 
emotional reactions. Similarly, in The Faerie Queene Spenser creates in the 
Corceca and Abessa episode an allegory based on bodily difference in which 
the reader’s meaning-making depends upon intellect rather than emotion. 
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In this episode, physical impairments represent the lack of spiritual under-
standing that Spenser sees as typical of the Roman Catholic believer. The 
brief episode of Una’s encounter with the blind Corceca (literally, “blind 
heart”), her deaf and mute daughter Abessa (presumably derived from Latin 
abesse, “absence of being”; reminiscent of “abbess” or “abbey”), and Kirkrap-
ine (“plunderer of churches”) serves as a clear allegorical indictment of 
Catholicism. Abessa’s and Corceca’s impairments are allegorically significant. 
Corceca, thrice referred to as “blind” (1.3.12.3, 1.3.18.3, 1.3.22.2), sits “in 
eternall night” (1.3.12.4), and her daughter Abessa “could not heare, nor 
speake, nor vnderstand” (1.3.11.4);27 allegorically, Corceca’s physical blind-
ness maps metaphorically to a spiritual state of unthinking superstition, as 
becomes clear from references to the 900 paternosters and 2,700 aves she 
says daily, to her use of sackcloth and ashes, and to her regular fasting prac-
tice. Despite this impressive array of spiritual practices, however, upon the 
arrival of Una at the cottage, Corceca “for feare her beads .  .  . did forget” 
(1.3.14.5). Abessa meets Una and the lion by a well, and her inability to 
hear or speak renders her unteachable, in contrast to the Samaritan woman 
at the well described in the Gospel of John (John 4:3–42). Although the 
Samaritan woman at first reacts with confusion to the statements of Jesus, 
she eventually understands, believes, and evangelizes, whereas Abessa never 
overcomes her initial fear at meeting Una and the lion.28 Abessa’s impair-
ments are understood by Spenser and his contemporary audience as making 
it impossible for her to learn and understand the truth. Darryl J. Gless con-
nects Abessa with “various New Testament figures whose sensory deficiencies 
declare their need for the grace that roots out sin and enables perception 
of spiritual truth. Yet Christ heals these biblical figures,”29 whereas Abessa’s 
and Corceca’s encounter with true faith in the form of Una leaves them 
unchanged.
 The impairments of Corceca and Abessa are more germane to the alle-
gorical plot than are the impairments of Occasion and Ate, but these are by 
no means positive characters. Spenser includes unattractive characterizing 
details for Corceca and Abessa, in line with the emphasis on eliciting from 
the reader an emotional reaction that matches the negativity of the allegori-
cal idea. Notably, however, the impairments themselves are not treated with 
disgust. Instead, we are invited to judge Abessa harshly because of her sexual 
and financial dealings with Kirkrapine, who
whoredome vsd [with her], that few did know,
And fed her fatt with feast of offerings,
And plenty, which in all the land did grow;
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Ne spared he to giue her gold and rings:
And now he to her brought part of his stolen things. (1.3.18.5–9)
As for Corceca, she transforms from a superstitious but mild-mannered old 
woman into a railing hag when she pursues Una away from her house, where 
the Lion has slain Kirkrapine. Mother and daughter accost Una and begin 
to “loudly bray, / with hollow houling, and lamenting cry, / Shamefully at 
her rayling all the way” (1.3.23.1–3).30 Criticizing a young female allegori-
cal figure for “whoredome” is as unsurprising as attaching a negative evalu-
ation to an older female allegorical figure by connecting her with the many 
hag-figures who people Faeryland, but here at least physical impairment does 
not figure prominently in the negative emotional value Spenser attaches to 
these figures.
Disabling allegories of Bodily Difference
Whereas the examples discussed in the previous section illustrate impair-
ment-based allegories, some allegories are “disabling” in the sense that, as 
the social model of disability posits, they focus on eliciting emotional reac-
tions to the disabled body based on social stigma and disgust. Spenser, with 
his reliance on emotional effects on the reader to convey allegorical meaning 
efficiently, creates a number of disabling allegories. I will consider here his 
personifications of Occasion and Ate; in both cases, Spenser’s figures differ 
from contemporary emblems of the same abstractions in representing them 
as having physical impairments. These departures from emblem-book treat-
ments of Occasion and Ate support my contention that Spenser consciously 
aims to elicit feelings of disgust and stigmatizing reactions in readers; I argue 
that Spenser’s efforts to engage his readers’ emotions to convey his allegorical 
meaning exemplify Philip Sidney’s ideas about the ability of poetry to move 
readers to virtue.
 I focus here primarily on Spenser’s use of disgust to encourage readers to 
turn away not simply the intellect but also the will from the vices portrayed 
in the allegorical figures of Occasion and Ate. Much scholarly work on 
early modern emotions has focused on melancholy and sadness, presumably 
because the period’s intense interest in and textual representations of melan-
choly make it a more knowable topic for transhistorical emotional analysis.31 
Analyses of Spenser’s ideas about emotion have tended to follow this gen-
eral emphasis on melancholy, but he certainly provides nuanced explorations 
of a multitude of emotions and affective states. Both Douglas Trevor and 
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Christopher Tilmouth see Spenser as endorsing the importance of reason in 
reining in strong emotions.32 Trevor argues that although Spenser lauds “sad-
ness” as a positive emotional state, he sees humoral psychology’s ideas about 
melancholy as enabling people to shirk spiritual responsibility for emotional 
self-indulgence. Similarly, Tilmouth finds in Spenser a “psychomachic” view 
of the human soul, in which reason should be victorious over passion. Yet, 
perhaps in line with Trevor’s discovery of positive “sadness” in Spenserian 
characters such as Redcrosse, Jennifer Vaught argues that Spenser presents 
men’s weeping as a source of strength for Redcrosse and for the emotional 
male figures in book 6, the Legend of Courtesy.33
 Yet these analyses, which focus on the sorrowful emotional experiences 
and expressions of allegorical figures within Spenser’s epic, do not address 
the issue of Spenser’s understanding of the role of emotion in conveying alle-
gorical meaning or, more generally, in leading readers to virtue. Although, as 
Tilmouth argues, many Renaissance humanists did endorse a Stoic-inspired 
quelling of all affect, other ideas on emotion also influenced the discourse 
on emotion and thought. As Richard Strier points out, “insofar as self-con-
sciously ‘Renaissance’ figures defined themselves as committed to rhetoric 
over against ‘mere’ philosophy or logic, they were committed to stressing the 
importance of the emotional and affective in life.”34 The rhetorician’s empha-
sis on the importance of the emotional appeal in persuasion serves as secular 
support for the value of emotional experience, but religious ideas supported 
this as well, as Strier notes and as Gail Kern Paster develops in her discus-
sion of Bishop Edward Reynolds’s Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of 
the Soule of Man (1640), in which Reynolds compares Christ’s emotions to 
human emotions in order to argue, in Paster’s analysis, that “it is human sin-
fulness that makes immoderate passions an instrument of self-harm . . . not 
the passions themselves.”35 Spenser himself seems to argue for the impor-
tance of emotions in the episode at the Castle of Alma, when Arthur and 
Guyon meet the bevy of female personifications of passions in the heart, and 
each chooses the one who represents his own emotional makeup. Michael 
Schoenfeldt argues that “this strange . . . encounter involves a wary affirma-
tion of emotion in the well-regulated moral life. Where temperance could 
sometimes be imagined to entail the rejection of passion entirely, Spenser 
here situates the passions at the heart of his temperate self, as spurs to the 
very virtue he depicts rather than as forces opposing it.”36
 In The Defense of Poesy, Philip Sidney’s claims regarding poetry’s ability 
to teach virtue rest on the importance of emotional responses to the situa-
tions depicted by the poet, with depictions of virtue leading to emotional 
attraction and those of vice leading to rejection, so that readers learn virtue 
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“ere themselves be aware, as if they took a medicine of cherries.”37 In line 
with Sidney’s prescriptions, when creating allegorical representations of vir-
tue, Spenser aims to make them attractive to the reader; for the same reason, 
he emphasizes the unattractive qualities of allegorical representations of vice, 
and one way of creating an unattractive personification and thus eliciting a 
rejecting emotional response in his reader is to give a personification a physi-
cal impairment. In creating Occasion, Spenser both alludes to and departs 
from the emblematic tradition for this personification; in line with tradition, 
he gives her a long forelock and makes the back of her head bald, but unlike 
emblematic depictions of Occasion, Spenser’s is ugly, old, and physically 
impaired:
And him behind, a wicked Hag did stalke,
In ragged robes, and filthy disaray,
Her other leg was lame, that she no’te walke,
But on a staffe her feeble steps did stay;
Her lockes, that loathly were and hoarie gray,
Grew all afore, and loosly hong vnrold,
But all behinde was bald, and worne away,
That none thereof could euer taken hold,
And eke her face ill fauourd, full of wrinckles old. (2.4.4)
The iconographic detail of the forelock makes her identity clear to a knowl-
edgeable reader, whereas the references to poverty, physical impairment, and 
her ugliness from age clarify Spenser’s intention to make Occasion a sym-
bol of vice rather than an opportunity for good. Sheila Cavanagh’s feminist 
analysis of the hags in The Faerie Queene could fruitfully be extended to 
account for the impairment markers of many of the hags: “The poem’s insis-
tence upon marking the sex and gender of these creatures allows a thread 
of misogyny to weave through denunciations of their behavior. In fact, it is 
often difficult to distinguish slurs against individual hags or witches from 
those against women in general.”38 Just as the references to her clothing, hair, 
and face elicit a disgust reaction by activating stereotypes of old women that 
the audience already held, the references to her limp and the staff she uses 
to walk transfer to this personification the social stigma that Spenser can 
expect his contemporary readers already to associate with impaired bodies. 
Spenser creates an even more unpleasant association with Occasion’s impair-
ment by connecting it with her violence in instigating Furor to harm Phaon: 
“Somtimes she raught him stones, wherwith to smite, / Sometimes her staffe, 
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though it her one leg were, / Withouten which she could not goe vpright” 
(2.4.5.5–7).
 Scholars have noted the difference between Spenser’s Occasion and the 
emblem tradition on which he draws for the iconographic detail of the fore-
lock and bald occiput. James McManaway summarizes the typical details 
that identify Occasion in emblem books: “the figure of a young, vigorous 
woman with winged feet (or standing on fortune’s wheel or on a ball and 
a dolphin). Her head is bald save for a long forelock, and in her hand she 
usually holds a razor.”39 Both McManaway and Manning and Fowler have 
attempted to explain Spenser’s divergences from the traditional iconography 
of Occasion by finding other emblematic sources that, combined with details 
from emblem representations of Occasion, might add up to Spenser’s Occa-
sion. McManaway argues for Spenser’s use of iconographic details from Dis-
cord and Envy, and Manning and Fowler add to this argument the assertion 
that Spenser draws as well on emblem representations of Penitence.40
 It seems to me that these analyses underestimate the complexity of Spens-
er’s inventing imagination, tying him to emblems as though these were his 
only source of inspiration for personifications. Surely, Spenser owes a huge 
debt to the emblem tradition, but a principal concern in his creation of 
these personifications is the importance of signaling not only intellectually, 
not only visually (ekphrastically, that is), but emotionally as well, the allegori-
cal meaning of the personifications. Paul Alpers, commenting on Spenser’s 
allegorical method in this episode, hints at this idea in his suggestion that 
Spenser, in creating the episode, began with an image, not a verbal formula. 
Alpers argues that emblem creation begins by translating words into images, 
and he provides emblem examples of physically impaired women (including 
Alciato’s “Remedia in arduo,” discussed earlier) to arrive at an interpretation 
in line with my distinction between impairment and disability in metaphor: 
“The lameness of these personifications is a metaphor for the slowness with 
which . . . prayers and punishment take effect. But the lameness of Spenser’s 
hag . . . has no conceptual equivalent, and we therefore cannot assume that 
the formula ‘Occasion is lame’ produced this part of Spenser’s description.”41 
Alpers posits that Spenser, instead of beginning with some verbal formula 
such as this, began instead with the image of “an allegorical hag who pro-
voked wrath” and added details and iconographic signifiers from there.42 I 
am less concerned with the genesis of Spenser’s creativity than with its out-
comes, especially the ways that readers come to understand the intended alle-
gorical meanings. But to add to Alpers’s emphasis on the allegorical function 
of the image, as opposed to the idea, I would call attention to the reader’s 
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emotional response as another important part of Spenser’s goals for this fig-
ure. Words such as “filthy,” “feeble,” and “loathly” do more than create an 
image—they also elicit negative emotions.
 Like Occasion, Ate is one of Spenser’s many “allegorical hags,” and her 
representation is designed in part to illustrate an idea, but the process of 
meaning-making for this figure is not solely intellectual but emotional as 
well. Ate symbolizes discord and division among people, and Spenser rep-
resents this allegorically by giving her a discordant and divided body—her 
“monstrous shape” makes it clear that she “was borne of hellish brood” 
(4.1.26.7, 9):
And as her eares so eke her feet were odde,
And much vnlike, th’one long, the other short,
And both misplast; that when th’one forward yode,
The other backe retired, and contrarie trode. (4.1.28.6–9)
This allegorical personification differs significantly from Alciato’s “Remedia 
in arduo.” A woman who walks forward and backward at the same time 
would seem unable to wreak as much mischief as Alciato’s flying Ate, and 
yet both Alciato and Spenser use physical impairment to make connections 
between source and target domains. However, whereas Alciato’s connection 
is logical, Spenser’s is emotional. The description includes numerous exam-
ples of words that convey not just an image but also a negative emotion: 
Ate’s “squinted eyes contrarie wayes intended” (4.1.27.2); she has a “loathly 
mouth, vnmeete a mouth to bee” (4.1.27.3); and she hears with “matchlesse 
eares deformed and distort” (4.1.28.2). Spenser repeatedly uses this kind 
of emotional “argument” based on disgust reactions to personifications to 
lead his readers to the correct moral judgment of the allegorical situation at 
hand. I have discussed here the examples of Ate and Occasion because the 
fact that Spenser diverges from established emblem conventions provides evi-
dence that Spenser was conscious of the meaning-making effects he hoped to 
achieve by creating physically impaired allegorical figures that his audience 
would read through the lens of disabling social stigma.
 Emotional impact plays an important role in creating an effective per-
sonification, and for personifications in The Faerie Queene meant to repre-
sent moral failings, Spenser relies to a great extent on the emotion of disgust. 
William Ian Miller defends disgust as an emotion, noting that although it 
does have a “more ‘embodied’ feel than other emotions,” it fits the defini-
tion of an emotion: “Emotions are feelings linked to ways of talking about 
those feelings, to social and cultural paradigms that make sense of those feel-
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ings by giving us a basis for knowing when they are properly felt and prop-
erly displayed. Emotions, even the most visceral, are richly social, cultural, 
and linguistic phenomena.”43 The details that Spenser uses to elicit disgust 
reactions from readers to his personifications of Occasion and Ate of course 
are not limited to their physical impairments—Cavanagh ably demonstrates 
the misogynist ideas and imagery that contribute to these figures, and one 
could easily make an argument about the ageism underlying Spenser’s depic-
tions of hags as well. These overdetermined sources of disgust reactions pro-
vide signposts regarding both the emotional and ideological responses of 
early modern English people to categories of people understood as Other. 
Miller notes the wide-ranging, indiscriminate nature of such disgust, which 
“judges ugliness and deformity to be moral offenses” and “knows no distinc-
tion between the moral and the aesthetic, collapsing failures in both into an 
undifferentiated revulsion.”44 For Spenser, to describe a category of people 
by his culture understood to be ugly—the disabled, the old, the poor—is 
automatically to create a moral revulsion to the allegorical situation. Georgia 
Brown notes the significance of disgust in bringing together the physical and 
the ideological in this way: “Since disgust grounds the moral and political 
in sensory and emotional impulse, it embodies ideology, in the dual sense of 
expressing a particular ideology, and in the sense of giving ideology a mate-
rial existence.”45 Spenser can count on the reader’s revulsion in response to 
the disgusting, frail bodies he presents in so many of his allegorical personifi-
cations; he thus calls on the ideology of the Other’s body in order to further 
his own, moral ideological agenda.
I have aImed to demonstrate two ideas in this essay. First, I argue in favor of 
finding and analyzing the distinctions among metaphors and allegories that 
use physical difference and impairment as source domain. Given the preva-
lence of the body as source domain for metaphors,46 it is unrealistic to police 
the output of new metaphors and quite simply impossible to do so for the 
early modern period. It seems more fruitful to turn attention to the ques-
tion of how these metaphors mean, and I have here metaphorically extended 
the distinction between impairment and disability to address the question 
of whether a metaphor or allegory derives its meaning solely from the map-
ping of a specific impairment onto another situation or whether the mean-
ing derives as well from the stigmatizing emotional response associated with 
that impairment by the culture in which the metaphor or allegory originates.
 My second point pertains specifically to Spenser’s allegorical practice with 
personifications, which frequently rely a great deal on emotional impact to 
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convey allegorical meaning. For this reason, these allegories based on physi-
cal difference are disabling metaphors, metaphors that serve to increase the 
audience’s sense of the Other-ness of, and hence the necessity of rejecting, 
those with bodily differences. It is important to note, however, that Spenser 
does not single out physical impairment as the sole marker of Other-ness in 
his allegory; rather, stigmatizing disability is quite consistent with Spenser’s 
use of disgusting details associated with other categories of people—women, 
the Irish, the lower classes, to name a few—to quickly elicit the necessary 
rejecting emotional response to clarify the negative valence to be attached to 
the allegorical figure. With this allegorical method, Spenser puts into practice 
the ideas of literary theorists such as Sidney, who argued for the supremacy 
of poetry—with its greater power than philosophy to move and its greater 
freedom than history to celebrate virtue—in spurring readers to virtue. His 
un-self-conscious reliance on preexisting cultural biases against unprivileged 
groups, such as disabled people, allows Spenser to import a whole system 
of emotional reactions to human difference into the moral world of Faery-
land, leading, he hopes, to greater virtue in his ideal reader even as he reifies 
inequality and bias in his epic poem.
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W hile scholarship has often attended to the metaphor of blindness in early modern literature, little attention has been devoted to instances in which literary texts present us with representations 
of individuals who are actually blind.1 Disability theorists David T. Mitch-
ell and Sharon L. Snyder argue that metaphors of disability, like blindness, 
within narrative are used to give a “tangible body” to abstract ideas.2 But 
what are we to make of instances of “real” visual impairment, after hav-
ing been so long conditioned to think of blindness less as a disability than 
a metaphor? What is the purpose of these blind characters on the stage and 
on the page? What can we learn from the textual specifics of their disabled 
bodies and of their use of adaptive language and technology? What does the 
spectacle of visual impairment mean for sighted (and for blind) readers or 
audiences?
 As a metaphor, blindness—along with paralysis, limited mobility, cog-
nitive difference, and other disabilities—is generally presented in negative 
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ways.3 In their book Narrative Prosthesis, Mitchell and Snyder explain this 
pattern: “while literature often relies on disability’s transgressive potential, 
disabled people have been sequestered, excluded, exploited, and obliterated 
on the very basis of which their literary representation exists.”4 And yet, in 
select textual instances where blindness is presented as a physical condition, 
the metaphorical trappings of visual impairment are reduced in a way that 
makes evident other, more material early modern concerns about disability. 
Rather than normalizing or erasing the presence of blind characters on the 
stage or page, these instances reveal early modern interest and investment in 
medical knowledge and in the lived experiences of the blind.
 Using examples of blind and blinded characters in sources that include 
Shakespeare’s 2 Henry VI and the anonymous sixteenth-century play Jacob 
and Esau, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century scientific texts, and cheap-print 
ballads and broadsides, this essay explores how examining these representa-
tions of blindness on the stage and in print (and, alongside them, represen-
tations of the adaptive technologies used by early modern blind individuals) 
can unsettle the relationship between seeing and knowing, disability and 
agency, blindness as metaphor and as experiential. While it is unlikely that 
any of the blind characters were played by blind actors, I hope to show that 
physically blind characters, as opposed to metaphorically blind characteriza-
tions, had some of the same kinds of impacts as contemporary disabled per-
formance artists who often use their own bodies on stage or in visual media 
as a way of “challenging both tired narrative conventions and aesthetic prac-
tices.”5 Further, by focusing on blindness as a real and embodied historical 
experience, these representations disrupt theoretical ideas of performativity, 
since, as Carrie Sandahl and Philip Auslander put it, “the notion that dis-
ability is a kind of performance is to people with disabilities not a theoretical 
abstraction, but lived experience.”6 If everyday life can be experienced as per-
formance for people with visible disabilities, then early modern representa-
tions of disability on stage and in cheap print have the potential not only to 
displace metaphorical uses of disability with performances of actual disability 
but also to offer, through those performances, a glimpse at the everyday, lived 
“performance” of the early modern blind.
 While perhaps the most attention to any moment of blindness in early 
modern drama has focused on Gloucester’s blinding in King Lear, early mod-
ern attitudes toward blindness are more explicitly demonstrated in a strange 
(hundred-line) subplot of Shakespeare’s less-discussed The First Part of the 
Contention (2 Henry VI).7 In this subplot, the soon-to-be-overthrown King 
Henry is interrupted in his hunting by reports of a miracle at Saint Albans. 
This miracle, that one Simon Simpcox, born blind, has miraculously recov-
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ered his vision, is especially exciting to Henry, who immediately redirects his 
hunting party to see the supposed wonder.8 When he hears that “a blind man 
at Saint Alban’s shrine / Within this half-hour hath received his sight— / A 
man that ne’er saw in his life before now” (2.1.66–68), the king exclaims, 
“God be praised, that to believing souls / Gives light in darkness, comfort 
in despair!” (69–70). Though King Henry is willing to accept Simpcox’s 
“miracle” based on his and his wife’s testimonies, telling Simpcox that “God’s 
goodness hath been great to thee” (86), his advisor and Protector, Glouces-
ter is far more critical of Simpcox’s recovery to sightedness. This attitude was 
realistic, informed by the medieval and early modern problem of beggars 
who feigned disabilities such as blindness.9
 More than serving as a mere digression, then, Simpcox and his faked 
blindness provide Shakespeare with an opportunity to stage the scientific 
process through which this deception was famously uncovered. Though 
Simpcox’s story of having been born blind has already been announced by 
the messenger (“ne’er saw in his life before”), confirmed by the king (“hast 
thou been long blind and now restored?”), and sworn by Simpcox and his 
wife (“Born blind, an’t please your grace”; “Ay, indeed was he.”), Glouces-
ter repeats the question: “How long hast thou been blind?” (99). The play’s 
intense focus on the fact that Simpcox claims to have been blind from birth 
makes him the perfect subject of scientific and philosophical inquiry. Geor-
gina Kleege explains that “the hypothetical blind man” in philosophy “is 
always assumed to be both totally and congenitally blind,” even though 
“real blindness, today as in the past, rarely fits this profile.”10 In emphasiz-
ing, through repetition, the fact that Simpcox is “born blind,” Shakespeare 
allows for a performance of an important thought experiment in under-
standing blindness, conducted by Gloucester for the benefit of the audience 
at large.
 This scientific spectacle takes place through an interrogation of Simp-
cox’s story, his history, and his blindness. Curious over the fact that Simpcox 
is lame from a fall from a tree, Gloucester asks how he managed to climb 
it, if he was blind from birth. Unsatisfied with Simpcox’s (lewd) answers, 
Gloucester launches into a rapid-fire volley of questions, designed to under-
mine the “subtle knave” (105). The speed and focus of Gloucester’s investi-
gation is striking, as is the dissonance between this dialogue and the rest of 
the scene, act, and play:
Glou: Let me see thine eyes: wink now, and open them.
 In my opinion thou seest not well.
Simp: Yes, master, clear as day, I thank God and Saint Alban.
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Gloucester: Sayst thou me so? And what colour is this cloak of?
Simp: Red, master, red as blood. . . .
Glou: And what colour’s my gown?
Simp: Black, sir, coal-black as jet. . . .
Glou: Tell me, sirrah, what’s my name?
Simp: Alas, master, I know not.
Glou: What’s his name?
Simp: I know not. . . .
Glou: What is thine own name?
Simp: Simon Simpcox, an it please you, master.
Gloucester: Then, Simon, sit thou there the lying’st knave
 In Christendom. If thou hadst been born blind
 Thou mightst as well have known our names as thus
 To name the several colours we do wear.
 Sight may distinguish colours, but suddenly
 To nominate them all—it is impossible.
 Saint Alban here hath done a miracle. (107–35)
Gloucester’s examination of Simpcox, and his verdict against the man, is 
based on two major tests: the ability to recognize, differentiate between, 
and name colors; and the ability to recognize, sort, and identify people. As 
Gloucester sums up in his conclusions, this test is based upon the scientific 
or philosophical notion that “Sight may distinguish colours, but suddenly / 
To nominate them all—it is impossible.” In this way, Gloucester outthinks 
Simpcox and proves that he is a fraud. But the scene renders visible some 
of the early modern stereotypes about vision loss, as well as some optical 
theories about the role that vision plays in determining color and identify-
ing people.11
 The scene of Simpcox’s interrogation is enabled by the fact that Simpcox 
is posing as Kleege’s “hypothetical blind man” so often used in philosophy: 
“He is the patient subject of endless thought experiments where the experi-
ence of the world through four senses can be compared to the experience of 
the world through five.”12 The Simpcox interlude, presented as it is as a pure 
thought experiment about the experience of blindness, requires Shakespeare 
to explore blindness on a physical and medical level.13 The fact, for instance, 
that Gloucester is so interested in color reflects scientific interest in the ways 
that the eye could process, understand, and also misunderstand color. In his 
1608 scientific text, The Vanitie of the Eie, George Hakewill discusses how 
the eye itself can offer false reports to the seer.14 He likens the eye’s trouble 
in discerning certain colors to our difficulty in seeing perspective:
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Colours, in which reason by conclusions drawn out of her principles often 
checks & controules this sense for false reporting; for instance we need go 
no farther than those colours which appear in the rainbow, or on a doves 
neck by the reflection of the sunne’s beames, those night-chasms & gapings 
in the firmament  .  .  . These things all men knowe, and the greatest part 
acknowledge, to be errors of the eie, Though the learned only, search into 
and find out the causes of it.15
 Hakewill understands the eye as an unreliable informant to the mind and 
understanding; even in cases of full sightedness, where the eye is functioning 
at its best, it can present confusing misinformation to the seer. At the same 
time, though, even as Hakewill enumerates the many untrustworthy quali-
ties of ocular vision, he pushes for a single human understanding of sight 
when he asserts that “all men knowe” when they are being fooled by their 
eyes. This inconstancy between Hakewill’s main point (that eyes are false 
informants prone to error) and his weak conclusion (that there is a universal 
agreement about which sight is authentic and which is fraudulent) reveals 
his hope that scientific inquiry can “search into and find the causes” of opti-
cal illusion, mis-sight, and, ultimately, visual impairments and idiosyncrasies. 
Indeed, by admitting the huge variety of visual misunderstandings that can 
happen in a sighted context, Hakewill reveals that full sightedness is unstable 
and that blindness and visual impairment, rather than being major variations 
from the norm, are actually the farthest points on a spectrum of inconsistent 
and unreliable sight.
 Both Hakewill and Shakespeare approach their discussions of the nature 
of vision through the problem of misinterpreted visual data. In this man-
ner, scientific analysis and dramatic representation are grounded in a shared 
interest in the working of the eye, and in interrogating the limits of vision 
and sight.16 Though Simpcox was never actually blind, the evidence through 
which Gloucester reveals that he is faking simultaneously renders all vision 
and sightedness unfamiliar—Gloucester’s questions reflect an early modern 
wonder at how it is that anyone can tell the difference between colors, or 
how any color can be a definitive thing, since even functioning eyes can 
deceive us (as Hakewill points out). Hakewill’s casting of vision in this dubi-
ous light, according to Stuart Clark, is “the best example of the demolition 
of Renaissance optimism about vision.”17 In proving that Simpcox can see, 
Gloucester disrupts the audiences’ intuitive sight, drawing attention to the 
act of looking and seeing, and potentially casting doubt on the efficacy of all 
sightedness. In this way, Simpcox’s trial breaks down some of the seemingly 
clear distinction between able and disabled bodies; though the surface of the 
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plot proves that Simpcox can see, and that his blindness was a false miracle, 
the mechanism for revealing this fraud causes more doubt than clarity.18 Like 
Hakewill’s Vanitie of the Eie, Shakespeare’s The First Part of the Contention 
reveals that the idea of a pat universal visual ability is a false construction.19
 In addition to exploring theoretical and philosophical aspects of vision 
and blindness, Gloucester’s interrogation of Simpcox also offers a moment to 
consider early modern ideas about the experience of blindness. As a person 
claiming to be blind from birth, Simpcox says that he dreamed of regaining 
his sight but reports having led a rowdy, tree-climbing life. His blindness is 
not meant to reflect on his personality but rather to have been a disability 
that he lived with until the miracle. As a fraudulent blind person, Simp-
cox’s choice to be cured of his “blindness” hinges upon a fascination the 
sighted have with imagining what blindness, or living with a disability more 
broadly, is like. The overrepetition of the word “blind” and focus on Simp-
cox’s ostensibly congenital blindness reveals this fascination with difference; 
Gloucester’s questions, then, reflect early modern questions about the way 
that blind people might experience the world. In this way, though Simpcox 
is not blind, the staged representation of his blindness, and the exploration 
of the nature of blindness through the device of uncovering the false miracle, 
reveals an interest in examining what blindness is all about. Unexpectedly, in 
trying to understand Simpcox’s blindness, Gloucester reveals how sightedness 
is subjective and unstable; if all eyes are false informants, then all sight is as 
subject to doubt as Simpcox’s. Finally, through staging a public performance 
of scientific inquiry into Simpcox’s blindness, the play encourages audiences 
or readers to stare at the blind and, in so doing, to use the spectacle of visual 
impairment as a means through which to evaluate the limits of disability 
together with the possibility of adaptive strategies and possibilities.20 Even 
though Simpcox is revealed to be sighted, and even though we learn that he 
was never technically blind, we also get to watch him embody the position 
of disabled individual and, from that space, challenge and undermine a king, 
an advisor, and an entire system of scientific evaluation for visual function. 
In the end, our pleasure in staring at Simpcox is predicated on the idea that 
the truest workings of his sight are ultimately unknowable.
If the Simpcox interlude allows the audience to observe an actor perform-
ing blindness, and to think through what the experience of blindness might 
be, those issues are explored in a more material and sustained manner in 
the anonymous sixteenth-century Old Testament play The Historie of Jacob 
and Esau.21 Though the play generally follows the parameters of the biblical 
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story of Jacob and Esau, the anonymous author devotes great detail to the 
strategies that blind Isaac uses to maneuver in the world; the author even 
invents a boy character, Mido, who serves as a guide and narrator of events 
for Isaac. Perhaps because the story hinges on Isaac’s blindness, and his sub-
sequent inability to differentiate between his sons, the author takes pains 
to show how Isaac uses and refuses assistance. In this way, the play ulti-
mately becomes as much about the limits or possibilities of perception for a 
blind person—or about the failure of Isaac’s adaptive systems—as it is about 
Rebecca and Jacob’s deceit.
 In adapting the story of Jacob and Esau, the play’s author creates an 
original character called “Mido, the ladde that leadeth blind Isaac.” When 
we first see Isaac on stage, he is calling for Mido to lead him. The dialogue 
shows us how Isaac uses Mido as a guide who helps him navigate in the 
world; in their first appearance, Mido instructs Isaac to “lay your hande on 
my shoulder, and come on this way” (284). In staging a blind character, the 
author finds it necessary to represent his adaptive or assistive navigation sys-
tem as well.22 In fact, the idea of leading or guiding the blind, an idea not 
rooted in the biblical source, becomes a central concern of the play. This 
addition is refreshingly direct and based in material realities. While Isaac’s 
blindness certainly represents anxieties about life with a disability—after all, 
his blindness causes him to make a tremendous and weighty error—the play 
also focuses on what his disability means in a more pragmatic way. The pri-
mary focus on the mechanics of adaptation, rather than or in addition to 
the emotional and metaphoric trappings of Isaac’s blindness, offers a frank 
analysis of disability that resists becoming purely didactic or representational.
 When Mido considers the possibility that he may become blind when 
he is old, he asks, “How shall I grope the way, or who shall leade me then?” 
(329); he is worried not about making life-changing decisions like Isaac’s but 
about getting around. The play certainly exploits the metaphorical potential 
of Isaac’s need for leadership: when Rebecca takes over the job of leading 
Isaac, she says, “it is my office as long as I am by. / And I would all wives, 
as the worlde this day is, / Woulde unto their husbands likewise do their 
office” (467–69). Here the distinction between metaphor and representation 
is especially clear since Rebecca will metaphorically lead Isaac toward giving 
Esau the birthright, even as she literally fulfills her job as a physical guide. 
And when Isaac is about to be fooled by Jacob, Mido observes that “Jacob 
leadeth Isaac” (1307).
 But even as Jacob and Esau plays with the metaphor of leading blind 
Isaac, it also presents, again and again, the blind man navigating the stage 
with the help of his boy guide. The play thus differentiates between Isaac’s 
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ability to be misled and the fact of his blindness. We observe that Isaac can 
adapt to being blind with the right kind of assistance; he has a much harder 
time dealing with metaphoric blindness. In fact, including adaptive technol-
ogy in the world of the play is one way that the author plays up the disjunc-
ture between blindness as a disability and a metaphor.23
 When Mido is Isaac’s guide, he provides more than just navigational aid. 
He frequently narrates or describes situations for his blind master. So, for 
instance, he helps Isaac spy on Rebecca by reporting to Isaac, “Yonder she is 
speaking; whatever she doth say: / By holding up his hands, it seemeth she 
doth pray” (394–95). Though this observation obviously promotes the plot 
development, it also provides a glimpse at the assistive purpose of a real guide 
to the blind; Mido provides not only basic facts (where Rebecca is) but also 
visual detail that carries implications for Isaac’s understanding of the situa-
tion.24 At one point, Isaac tells Mido that he can do nothing without Mido’s 
help. But rather than making Isaac seem helpless, the author’s inclusion of 
a devoted and trained guide for Isaac actually demonstrates the efficacy of 
assistance for a person who is blind. In fact, Isaac starts being blind only in 
the metaphoric way—not understanding what he’s doing or who he’s bless-
ing—after he sends Mido out of the room. In the end, it is Mido who reveals 
Rebecca and Jacob’s plot to Isaac, and who helps him navigate as he attempts 
to repair the situation. By adding Mido’s character to the play, the author 
hints at a pragmatic alternative to the biblical story of paternal deception: 
an option in which Isaac, though blind, has the resources and assistance to 
avoid deception. Indeed, though Mido is presented as silly and boyish when 
he is “off duty” in the play, he also performs his work for Isaac with appar-
ent honesty and transparency. Even as the audience understands that Mido 
might at any point accidentally or intentionally mislead Isaac, the play pres-
ents the possibility that access to good, responsible, adaptive assistance can 
work. In fact, when the technology of Mido-as-guide is working, the focus is 
redirected away from the boy and toward Isaac and his actions and decisions.
 In Jacob and Esau, Isaac deals with the kind of total blindness that Simp-
cox was feigning in 2 Henry VI. His blindness is depicted as very real and, 
in many ways, limiting. Isaac explains, for example, that “Saving that what 
so ever God doth is all right, / No small griefe it were for a man to lacke 
his sight” (301–2). Part of the spectacle of this play would have been the 
uncomfortable pleasures of watching the blind man negotiate the stage and 
story of the play. Mido himself draws attention to the impulse to stare at dif-
ference, and to the distinct specificity of blindness as an embodied disability. 
As Rosemarie Garland-Thomson explains it, “When we do see the usually 
concealed sight of disability writ boldly on others, we stare in disbelief and 
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uneasy identification.”25 In Jacob and Esau, the audience is already uneasily 
identified with Isaac, watching helplessly and with dramatic (and biblical) 
irony as he heads unknowingly toward giving the mistaken birthright to 
Esau from the start of the play. And yet, the author also uses the character of 
Mido to showcase the kind of uneasy identification with disability that Gar-
land-Thomson suggests. At several points in the play, Mido imitates Isaac’s 
movement and reports, “I have done so ere now both by day and by night / 
As I see you grope the way, and have hitte it right” (332–33). Interestingly, 
Rebecca chides Mido for these impressions, accusing him of “couterfaiting” 
(337) his blind master, an accusation that predicts the kind of false miracle 
scene depicted by Shakespeare in 2 Henry VI.26
 At the same time as the play encourages its audience to stare at Isaac’s 
non-normative negotiations (reemphasizing the non-normative ways that 
Isaac moves and gropes), and even as it showcases his major blindness-based 
error (blessing the wrong son), it also stages blindness as a disability that can 
be managed and, with adaptation, successfully negotiated. Further, it main-
tains the audience’s uneasy identification with Isaac and his blindness; at one 
point, Isaac tells Mido: “For who so to old age whill here live and endure, / 
Must of force abide all such defautes of nature” (326–27). In his scientific 
treatise, Hakewill marvels at the vulnerability of the eye, which he claims 
is “subject to far more diseases from within, and casualties from without, 
than any other member,” in part because of the complexity of its “diverse 
pieces,” each of which can be diseased; plus “to these internal diseases we 
joine those externall accidents, offensive to it, winde, dust, bruses sometime 
to the dimunation, and sometime to the deprivation, and not seldome to 
the total losse and perishing of the sight.”27 Hakewill’s description supports 
Isaac’s claim that anyone who could live long enough would likely outlive his 
sensitive eyes. Like Gloucester’s examination of Simpcox’s visual experiences, 
Isaac’s candid assessment of visual vulnerability exposes the blurry boundar-
ies of visual disability; not only are eyes false informants that show us sights 
our minds recognize as misleading, but eyes are also always already in the 
process of failing, either gradually or entirely. Rather than functioning as the 
norm, sightedness is exposed in Jacob and Esau to be inconsistent and transi-
tory, while blindness and visual impairment become the general expectation.
 Writing about blindness in the medieval period, Edward Wheatley con-
firms that “varying degrees of visual impairments must have been so wide-
spread as to be unremarkable, especially before the Italian invention of 
eyeglasses for the nearsighted in the 1280s and for farsightedness in about 
1450.”28 At the same time, this idea resonates with the disability studies 
model in which the term “able-bodied” is replaced by “temporarily able-
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bodied,” acknowledging that even with medical advances, we are still all 
likely to experience disability as we age.29 In both early modern and contem-
porary contexts, then, the experience of watching Isaac negotiate his disabil-
ity is perhaps instructive as well as voyeuristic. For the audience who stares 
at Isaac’s negotiations of the stage (as represented, perhaps, through Mido’s 
mimicry of Isaac’s way of walking), the experience of uneasy identification 
with a blind man is rendered even more powerful by the gradual realiza-
tion that his disability is neither unique nor avoidable. Instead, the audience 
acclimates to Isaac’s blindness and learns that sightedness is unstable and 
incomplete.
some of the most explicit sources for an investigation into the material 
realities of early modern blindness and the public reception of assistive tech-
nologies are evident in cheap-print texts such as ballads, which, because of 
their short form, huge proliferation, and broad popular circulation, often 
capture thematic elements, such as ideas about disability, that are less trans-
parently addressed by more formal print and performance cultures.30 I now 
turn, therefore, to two seventeenth-century ballads from the Pepys collec-
tion, each with an unexpected take on blindness.31 In these ballads, even 
more than in Jacob and Esau, blindness is taken as a medical or physical 
reality that informs, but does not necessarily define, the characters that are 
blind. Further, the woodcut images that accompany the texts fill in missing 
information about adaptive tools for the blind while simultaneously pro-
viding the reader with an uninterrupted look—an opportunity to stare—at 
a blind person in action. These ballads, then, while certainly not accurate 
reports on actual, lived experiences of blind individuals, can perhaps take 
us one step further from metaphorical blindness toward a consideration of 
how real people might have negotiated loss of sight. The ballads would have 
been read and heard by able-bodied and disabled audiences alike: for blind 
audience members, these blind characters provide models of adaptive living 
and potential messages of solidarity and unity; for sighted audience mem-
bers, blindness ballads enable an empathetic and experiential connection 
with blindness.
 The woodcut for “The rarest Ballad that ever was seen, / Of the blind 
beggar’s Daughter of Bednal-Green” offers an image of a blind man navigat-
ing with perhaps the most complete suite of adaptive technologies that I’ve 
found thus far.32 More autonomous that Isaac could be when he relied on 
Mido, here the blind beggar’s tools include a bell, a dog, and a long cane.33 
The woodcut suggests, even before we read the ballad, that this blind beggar 
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has many resources at his disposal. For this reason, though the ballad ini-
tially highlights the man’s deficits, the visual evidence of his autonomy and 
adaptation undercuts this message and instead demands that the beggar be 
recognized and admired for his obvious capacity and agency. The woodcut 
emphasizes the beggar’s blindness but also emphasizes his mobility and cen-
trality in his own story, thus resisting the idea that his agency is dependent 
upon sight.
 Over the course of the ballad, the beggar’s young and beautiful daughter, 
Bessee, decides to leave Bednal-Green because none of her suitors will marry 
“a Beggar his heir.” In a new town, she gathers a collection of suitors, all beg-
ging to marry her. She then reveals her family origins:
My father quoth she, is plain to be seen,
The silly blind begger of Bednal-green,
That daily goes begging for charity, . . .
He always is led with a dog and a bell. . . .
One by one, each of Bessee’s suitors turns her down when they hear who 
her father is; readers are encouraged to empathize with unmarriageable Bes-
see, and, by extension, with her father the blind beggar, whose disability and 
status make her undesirable. Later, when Bessee meets a knight who is will-
ing to marry her, a merchant suitor challenges the marriage at the beggar’s 
doorstep. In defense of his daughter, the blind beggar speaks up and offers 
a financial challenge to Bessee’s enemy: “Rail not against my child at mine 
own door, / Though she be not deckt with Welbet and Pearl, / Yet I will 
drop Angels with thee for my Girl.” It is an incredible scene, in which the 
beggar miraculously and inexplicable produces three times as much gold as 
the rich man who has insulted his daughter. Though blind, he defends his 
own, reveals remarkable resources, and even seems able to count coins with-
out impediment: “Then there’s (quoth the begger) for pretty Bessee, / With 
that an Angel he cast on the ground, / And dropped in Angels full three 
thousand pound.”
 Here, the beggar provides his daughter’s dowry in a showy display of 
wealth, literally showering her and her suitor in gold coins such that “So 
as the place whereas he did sit, / With gold was covered every whit.” If his 
patriarchal and masculine powers have been undermined elsewhere in the 
ballad, here he aggressively competes with the suitor, ultimately humiliat-
ing him by outpacing him in the tossing of coins. The scene is a triumphant 
one for the beggar, and for audience members identifying with him. But it is 
also the turning point in the ballad where the already hyperbolic tale moves 
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toward pure fantasy. In terms of the beggar’s disability, though the beggar is 
literally blind, he suffers from none of the metaphorical weaknesses generally 
attached to blindness. As his woodcut suggests, he is savvy, forward thinking, 
and totally in control despite (or because of?) his physical disability, adaptive 
tools, and apparent class status; so much so, in fact, that he causes jealousy 
and admiration: 
The Gentleman all that this treasure had seene, 
Admired the begger of Bednal-green. 
And those that were her suitors before, 
Their flesh for very anger they tore.
Here, the beggar is not even described as blind anymore, and his other char-
acteristics seem more important. For a mixed reading and listening audi-
ence that included working-class and disabled individuals, this ballad offers a 
moment of identification and validation as the beggar impresses and outdoes 
the very gentlemen who dishonored his family.
 Though the ballad reduces references to the beggar’s blindness as his 
power and control increases, the author does not include disability in the 
list of ways that the beggar is not who he seems: though the beggar seems 
poor, he is revealed to be rich; though he seems without social capital, he is 
revealed to be gentry; though he seems to be emasculated, he is revealed to 
be a powerful patriarch; conversely, the beggar not only seems but is blind, 
all the way to the end of the ballad. The woodcut image of the beggar navi-
gating with his dog and his bell, then, can equally represent the seemingly 
disenfranchised beggar of the start of the ballad or the victorious hero of the 
ballad’s conclusion. The signifiers of blindness are as much a mark of accom-
plishment as weakness, since both beggar and beggar-hero are equally blind. 
By resisting the potential of curing the beggar’s blindness as part of the bal-
lad’s pat, fairy-tale ending, the author prevents a neat conclusion that the 
beggar has somehow “overcome” disability. Instead, his blindness proves to 
be among his only core identity qualities and, as such, is presented as part of 
his victory.34
 The ballad closes with Bessee’s wedding to her knight at which her father 
is first notably absent (she excuses him by saying that he is too “base” to 
attend), then present as a singer, and, finally, he reveals himself through his 
song to be a noble who, blinded in battle, has lived for forty years as a beg-
gar. The ballad’s conclusion resolves the mystery of the beggar’s heaps of 
gold (and the tension of the beggar’s daughter so quickly becoming a lady) 
by revealing his class background. While this ending may seem like a cheat, 
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the text resists an entirely conventional conclusion by leaving the noble man 
as blind as the beggar: the beggar never stops being blind, nor does he seem 
to regret his blindness. His song ends on a triumphant note: “Full forty long 
winters thus have I been. / A silly blind Begger of Bednal-green.” To the end, 
the beggar names his own blindness as part of his identity, and that blind-
ness is meant only as a description of his inability to see. Though blind, the 
beggar is noble; though blind, he is honorable; though blind, he can see his 
daughter’s beauty and worth.35
 Blindness represented with adaptive technologies, as in the case of Isaac 
with Mido or the beggar-turned-noble with his dog, stick, and bell, is taken 
to perhaps its furthest extreme in a ballad called “The Scoulding Wife, or, 
The Poor Man’s Lamentation of his Bad Market in His Chusing Him a 
Wife,”36 in which the long cane is used as a weapon. This ballad, which Pepys 
included in his category on “Marriage,” describes an unhappy domestic scene 
in which a jealous wife attacks her husband’s former sweetheart after the hus-
band gives the sweetheart an “innocent” kiss. After this brutal fight between 
women, the ballad takes a dark turn when the husband, tired of his wife’s 
constant scolding, replaces her medicinal eyedrops with “a liquor .  .  .  ’twas 
Henben and steep’t in Whay.” When the husband treats his wife with the 
switched eye drops, “she Curst and Swore, well she might, / For never since 
that day she got her sight.” Thus, the ballad gives us a backstory for the wife’s 
blindness, which was caused by her husband’s malicious intent. The ballad 
likewise claims that, through becoming blind, the wife is transformed from 
a scold to an obedient spouse. The husband explains:
And I provided a dog and a Bell,
To carry her about, from place to place:
Then she cries Husband, I hope all is well:
But before it was Togue, add Cuckold to thy Face.
The blessed be Heaven, and Mercury strong,
They made a change in my Wifs Tongue;
For it is a medicine, both certain and sure,
To bee cured of a Scold, but I’le say no more.
 On the surface, the conclusion of this ballad is deeply disturbing, simul-
taneously misogynistic and ableist in its implications that the wife deserved 
to be blinded because she was a scold and that her condition of blindness 
would lead to a submissive personality. In the text of the ballad, as narrated 
by the seemingly triumphant husband, the wife is given a guide dog and 
bell and then expected to serve as an example for other scolding wives.37 The 
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“I’le say no more” at the end of the ballad seems a nod to an audience of 
henpecked husbands who, the narrator hopes, may try the “certain and sure” 
medicine of blinding their own wives. And yet, the woodcut that accompa-
nies the ballad undermines all of these messages, providing sighted readers 
of the ballad with a visual anecdote to the text.
 In this remarkable image, the cuckolded husband, horned, kneels and 
cowers before a wife, who is poised to strike him. But, while the image osten-
sibly shows the wife before blindness has cured her of her bad behavior, the 
weapon she raises against her husband looks suspiciously like one we have 
come across before: the guidance cane used by early modern blind individu-
als. If we take the weapon to be this cane, a marker of blindness and an adap-
tive tool that helps blind people move autonomously through the world, 
then the woodcut serves as a postscript to the ballad: the blind wife’s revenge 
against her husband. Since the cane’s threat is exclusively visual, it is inacces-
sible to fully blind ballad audiences; nevertheless, it is a powerful reminder 
to sighted readers that blindness is neither a successful disciplinary tool nor 
a sign of weakness. The cane’s double use as adaptive and defensive provides 
a model (albeit a violent one) for empowerment for a blind woman and also 
functions as a threat to those who might attack or abuse her.
 The early modern period marked a moment where visuality and the abil-
ity to see were becoming increasingly important and central to cultural pro-
duction, in part because of the proliferation and dissemination of images 
and texts meant to be seen. In his 1616 Mikrokosmographia, Helkiah Crooke 
declared that, amongst all of the senses, “sight is the principall. . . . For those 
who either by Nature or by Accident are blinde do account themselves therin 
miserable.”38 And yet, the texts and images discussed here, through their 
serious consideration of the ways that a character might use human, ani-
mal, and material tools to adapt to being blind in a visual world, begin to 
reframe early modern disability as less about limitation and more about strat-
egy. Indeed, the more that a text dismantles the correlation between the use 
of blindness as metaphor and the loss of power for a blind person, the less 
blindness has to mean something else. The more deeply we can find evidence 
of the experience of blindness itself, moving away from the idea of blind-
ness as a tragic punishment and toward blindness as a biological fact, the 
more clearly blindness becomes one of many characteristics that contribute 
to selfhood and identity. The fraudulent blind man who could climb trees, 
the biblical father who used a guide, the blind beggar-hero of a single ballad, 
and the revolutionary image of a raised cane are hardly enough to suggest 
that blindness was ever considered an asset in early modern representation. 
But these representations do serve to complicate the discourse and meanings 
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of early modern blindness and to suggest that, by reducing the “trappings 
of metaphor” and attending to disability and the adaptive tools that come 
with it, we might perceive a fuller picture than mere metaphor can provide.39 
This fuller picture suggests that the experience of staring at disability, on the 
stage or in a woodcut, may be less about didactic messages and more about 
the invitation for identification and instruction. In their discussion of the 
often-fraught relationship between literary analysis (or, more broadly, the 
humanities) and disability studies, Mitchell and Snyder claim that “while 
the representational portraits we investigate [through literary analysis and 
historicism] often prove unsatisfactory, they allow us to viscerally encounter 
disability in a way that we could not otherwise.”40 Indeed, these representa-
tions of physically blind persons in plays and cheap print allow an encounter, 
however flawed, with early modern attitudes toward, and lived experiences 
of, blindness.
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in the opening of Jonson’s Volpone, the title character describes how he applies “ointment for [his] eyes” and impersonates symptoms and ail-ments as a form of manipulation: “Now, my feigned cough, my phthisic, 
and my gout, / My apoplexy, palsy, and catarrhs  .  .  .  this is my posture” 
(1.2.124–26).1 While this description works as a comical instance of meta-
theatricality on the Renaissance stage, it simultaneously works as a perfor-
mance of disability drag—a term introduced by Tobin Siebers to indicate 
instances in which an able-bodied person performs as a person with a dis-
ability.2 The use of disability drag in Volpone is particularly notable, how-
ever, for this layered, metatheatrical deployment of imposture: unlike an 
able-bodied actor who performs as a character with a legitimate disability,3 
the suffering body’s credibility in this early modern play works reciprocally 
with the character’s staging of able-bodiedness.4 Volpone’s lack of legitimate 
disability at the play’s outset—alongside the overt performance of an ailing 
body—undercuts the perception of disability as a material and lived bodily 
condition.
 Volpone’s metatheatrical staging of disability drag brings issues of corpo-
reality or bodily deceit to the forefront. His bodily imposture makes prob-
lematic Jonson’s representation of the disabled body: a disconnect surfaces 
between his character’s decision to appear ailing on stage while simultane-
C h a P T e r  7
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“there is no suff’ring due”
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ously choosing to acknowledge his able-bodiedness to the audience, and 
this disconnect poses a problem regarding the legitimacy of disabled bodies 
in early modern culture. More specifically, a fracture develops between the 
actor’s bodily performance, which is an intentional fiction, and the real or 
lived body, as the stage fiction can lead to the perception that the lived body 
and its apparent disabilities, too, are unreal. Interpreting Volpone’s metathe-
atrical representations of disability drag on the early modern stage thus calls 
for return to a question raised by Ato Quayson: “What happens to our inter-
pretation when we examine the status of disability within a representational 
system in which the discomfort of disability is not accounted for? ”5 Quayson’s 
question resonates in Volpone because the play positions “discomfort” as a 
satirical performance of stereotypes related to disability—stereotypes that do 
not address the physical or mental suffering that may accompany a bodily 
condition. Moreover, the staged mimicry of discomfort in Volpone offers a 
metadramatic representation of comedy as “another site for disabled body 
viewing” that “hinge[s] upon narrow ideas about unacceptable bodies that 
encourage freak-show like titillation.”6 In Volpone, the suitors who experi-
ence the “freak-show like titillation” brought about by Volpone’s “unaccept-
able” body are in fact victims of a con artist. Volpone’s false and exaggerated 
coughs, paired with his token “sick dress,” thus allow the play to become a 
metaspectacle, a mimetic image of the outwardly unnatural construction of 
discomfort or pain and its observation by other characters on stage as well as 
the audience.
 Much of my reading of Volpone, particularly in social or cultural contexts, 
is indebted to Mark Breitenberg’s Anxious Masculinity in Early Modern Eng-
land 7 and Gail Kern Paster’s work in Humoring the Body and The Body Embar-
rassed,8 as these texts focus on the material fluidity of early modern selves. 
But while both critics engage the staging or fashioning of bodies (through 
humoral and gendered perspectives), the metatheatrical performance of the 
disabled body—along with its social and physical resonances—deserves fur-
ther investigation. Representations of false disability in the dramatic sphere, 
after all, can expound on contemporary attitudes toward offstage interpreta-
tions of disability as imposture. Jonson’s depiction of the body in Volpone 
satirizes the credibility of disability; Volpone’s body sends one message to the 
characters on stage and another to the audiences who recognize the metathe-
atricality of that same body’s performance.
 In addition to questions of material corporeality and bodily construc-
tion that come about with Volpone’s metatheatrical use of disability drag, I 
focus on this play for its insight into how wealth and social status affect the 
credibility of the drag performance. The imposture of disability in Volpone, 
laUren COker • 125
alongside its references to the containment of syphilitics near the drama’s 
conclusion, accentuates the manipulation—through bodily deceit and dis-
guise—of social practices or institutions intended for the ailing poor dur-
ing the early modern period while also highlighting attempts to contain or 
control those disabled bodies. Volpone, exposed for feigning illness among 
people who desire to see his “sick dress,” portrays physical impairments as 
performances negatively spurred by greed and manipulation, and his treat-
ment of disability as performance influences early modern social structures 
that contain poor pox sufferers within hospitals for the Incurabili. And, 
again, although the metatheatricality of this play reinforces social models of 
disability, its deployment of disability drag calls into question the embodied 
nature and, at times, painful bodily experience of disability that can, in real-
ity, affect people of all social strata.
Social Stigma and Dismantling Disability Drag
Volpone is a fictional representation of disability drag; he is also a figure 
of wealth. Performances of disability imposture were not limited to the 
early modern stage, and responses toward those of lower social standing 
who engaged in disability drag often involved physical and visual objecti-
fication.9 Exposure of the drag performance rendered the impostor’s body 
a spectacle and became another tool for denying the physically embodied 
nature of disability (and disease) while perpetuating the notion that it was 
largely performative. French surgeon Ambroise Paré’s On Monsters and Mar-
vels, for example, recalls a beggar feigning illness.10 In “The Imposture of a 
Woman Beggar Who Pretended to Have a Canker on Her Breast,” Paré’s 
brother spies a begging woman with “a great amount of foul matter” flow-
ing out onto a cloth in front of her breast. The brother then describes the 
beggar as “plump,” and he claims her face has a “good lively color,” which 
seems to indicate sound health. Thinking the beggar is an impostor, Paré’s 
brother physically uncovers the woman’s breast and finds a “sponge soaked 
and imbued with animal blood and with milk” that is “conducted through 
fake holes” in an “ulcerated canker.” He then knows for “sure that the canker 
is artificial.”11 The brother’s visually charged assessment of the beggar’s body 
resembles an invasive and penetrating medical gaze,12 but it strays in the 
undoing of an impostor’s symptoms, thereby reversing a diagnosis of cancer 
into health—and a bodily condition into an artificiality.
 The beggar presents herself as “hideous” and laden with “foul matter,” 
but she does not present herself (and, by extension, her breasts) as prepared 
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to be “uncovered” as a medical patient seeking a diagnosis or treatment 
might.13 Paré’s beggar, as an object of social derision and skepticism, puts 
an image of illness on display by means of her disguised body—and though 
not in a theater, she engages in acting, and in spectacle, through her dress 
and performance. However, insofar as she does not intentionally situate her 
naked breasts as observable objects, this account deviates from the theatrical 
in its physical undoing of costume and construct. The brother separates the 
beggar’s plumpness and color from her other observable bodily symptoms, 
taking it upon himself to expose her feigned illness and disguise. Because 
the brother has “[taken] some warm water and [has] fomented the breast, 
having moistened it,” and later has “found the teat healthy and whole and 
in as good condition as the other,”14 he crosses the border between passive 
observer (akin to an early modern audience member) and physically invasive 
violator. The safe distance of “theatricality” collapses in his exposure of, and 
attendance to, her healthy breast.  The beggar’s disability drag is violently 
dismantled.
 Although bodily exposure can lead to anxiety for spectators, the unveil-
ing of the beggar’s healthy breast arguably makes onlookers and the sur-
geon less anxious, as exposing a drag performance confirms the idea that 
pain, illness, and disability (particularly among someone of a lower class) 
are constructed tools for self-promotion and, further, evidence of a lack of 
moral character. Moreover, exposing disability as performance helps secure 
the viewer’s own sense of health; in this case, the beggar’s ailment no longer 
reminds one of his or her own physical vulnerability. As such, the beggar’s 
undoing confirms Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s sense that starers perceive 
disability with “fascinated disbelief ”;15 rather than validating an illness or an 
onlooker’s perceived susceptibility to a bodily condition that may result in 
pain or discomfort, the female beggar’s exposure fosters the incredibility of 
her illness while simultaneously validating her low social status and subse-
quent punishment. Her disability drag, in turn, is “providing an exaggerated 
exhibition of people with disabilities but questioning both the existence and 
permanence of disability.”16 At the same time, the perception that her disease 
lacks materiality is bound up with the perception that her performance puts 
a strain on the larger social body.
 More specifically, the construction and exposure of disability as perfor-
mance in “The Imposture of a Woman Beggar” places observers in a posi-
tion of power and promotes the containment and isolation of marginalized 
figures after situating them on visual display. Paré concludes the narrative 
about the beggar by indicating that his brother “condemned the slut to get 
the whip,” prior to banishing her from the country.17 Here, the abject beggar 
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who feigns disability becomes even more abject: she is cast out of the coun-
try’s boundaries due to the surgeon’s exposure of her able body. This social 
domination over those of abject classes—particularly among persons with a 
disability, real or impersonated—reflects vexed attitudes toward beggars dur-
ing the early modern era. As William Carroll explains, “Of the genuinely 
poor, diseased, and destitute there was little dispute: it was a Christian duty 
to give them relief ”; nevertheless, many “were united at least in their percep-
tion that the wandering poor were a real social and spiritual problem and 
that the existing system had not contained them.”18 The cultural preoccupa-
tion with beggarly infiltration and the focus on helping only the genuinely 
poor and ailing adds yet another dimension to Paré’s depictions of the beg-
gar (and, arguably, of other marginalized persons): the performance and con-
struction—and subsequent deconstruction—of the beggar and her cancerous 
disguise demands that those in positions of power decide and determine 
the fate of disabled individuals (even those feigning disability) primarily by 
visual dissection.19 The dismantling of the beggar’s drag evidences how the 
disabled poor are made objects of derision, skepticism, and intrusive specta-
cle, while other more wealthy impostors—such as the fictional Volpone—are 
allowed, at least initially, to maintain agency and control over their disguises 
and dis/abilities.
undressing Volpone’s “Sick Dress”
Instances of disability drag in Volpone are manifested not by beggars and 
other socially abject characters but rather by the upper echelons of early 
seventeenth-century society, and this reversal demonstrates social hypocrisy 
toward the affluent impostor as opposed to the abject impostor. Volpone, 
a wealthy character in disability drag, is perceived unconditionally by his 
fellow onstage onlookers as embodying both legitimate and wholly mate-
rial disability. Yet this perception, as we will see, does not extend to offstage 
audiences who cannot—for their insider status—witness his disabled body as 
a corporeal truth; in Volpone’s metatheatrical construction of his sick guise, 
early modern viewers continue to perceive his disability as lacking mate-
riality. More precisely, bodily materiality—or, to recall Quayson, the dis-
comfort of disability—is not merely disregarded or undermined in Jonson’s 
play; rather, the onstage viewers who believe Volpone is in pain are scath-
ingly labeled, as the character Mosca puts it, “harpies” (1.2.123). Their initial 
belief in Volpone’s material discomfort counters Elaine Scarry’s notion that 
pain fosters disbelief; though sufferers are certain of it, she explains, others 
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remain in doubt of that person’s experience.20 While Scarry’s assertion might 
illuminate the surgeon’s undoing of the female beggar’s costume in “The 
Imposture of a Woman Beggar,” Volpone’s suitors trouble her claim, for they 
desire to see the character in “sick dress” and wholeheartedly believe that he 
is “turning carcass” (1.2.90). Volpone’s performance of ailments makes him 
a spectacle of bodily suffering that suitor-spectators such as Corbaccio and 
Voltore pay to stare at in fascinated belief. And because Volpone is described 
in the Argument’s opening line as wealthy and as one who “feigns sick” (1) 
as a means of gaining wealth and gifts from various potential heirs, an inten-
tional hypocrisy emerges in which Jonson employs a disability drag most 
often considered characteristic of the early modern poor and desperate to 
the wealthy and privileged.
 In this employment, Jonson creates an important distinction between 
Paré’s beggar and Volpone. In Paré, the beggar’s dismantled drag permits 
viewers to distance themselves from an often anxiety-inducing disabled body 
that supposedly has the potential to become a drain on social wealth. Here, 
instead, Volpone explicitly recounts his scheme to “delude” (1.2.123), by 
pretending to approach death:
This draws new clients daily to my house,
Women and men of every sex and age,
That bring me presents. . . .
With the hope that when I die . . .
it shall then return
Tenfold upon them. (1.1.76–81)
Volpone, from the outset, frames his ostensibly disabled body as a com-
modity, a symbol not of the depletion of wealth or status but of its possi-
bility. As such, Volpone’s drag performance fosters indulgence, belief, and 
even celebration of his (illegitimate) pain. Volpone’s elaborate description 
of his costume, or “sick dress,” and performance of “Uh! [coughing] uh! uh! 
uh! O” (1.2.124–29) offer a comparable theatricality and demonstration of 
disability as the female beggar’s. Yet his social position does not undermine 
but rather legitimates his “disability” when he encounters those who would 
attempt to believe, observe, or diagnose his condition: Volpone’s potential 
heirs express assurance and excitement over his seemingly impending death 
and distribution of wealth, and as Mosca lists Volpone’s symptoms to Cor-
baccio while observing Volpone in costume, Corbaccio exclaims “good” five 
times (1.4.42–48).
 While Corbaccio identifies with the representation of bodily discomfort 
in Volpone’s “Uh! [coughing] uh! uh! uh! O,” the same cough-laden excla-
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mation prevents the audience from identifying with or understanding this 
pain. Instead, the performance becomes for them a mere imitation of what 
Paster calls an unintentional “bodily event.”21 The theatricality of Volpone’s 
discomfort satirizes an individual’s attempts to master the ailing body since 
Volpone is actually in control while his body appears to be suffering and 
uncontrollable.22 Moreover, Volpone’s falsely ailing body remains on display, 
but, unlike Paré’s beggar, no one attempts to undo his costume or guise; 
Volpone eventually strips his disguise autonomously (5.12.83). During these 
scenes of observation and excitement surrounding Volpone’s outwardly dying 
body, audiences likely recognize the metatheatricality: an able-bodied actor 
plays an able-bodied Volpone who feigns turning “carcass.” Disability is, yet 
again, rendered wholly performative.
 Further, the implications of disability drag as an imitation of a body 
approaching death in Volpone would have a particular discursive resonance 
with early modern audiences given alternative definitions of “carcass” circu-
lating at the time. The Oxford English Dictionary  glosses “carcass” in its spiri-
tual contexts as “anything from which the ‘life,’ ‘soul,’ or essence is gone.”23 
Based on this characterization, Volpone-as-carcass becomes both a physical 
shell and a spiritual vacuum: Volpone’s “essence is gone.” And even though 
I read much of Volpone’s disability drag performance in terms of the char-
acter’s dialogue and actions within the play itself, this fundamental notion 
of a lack in essence matters especially in the context of Volpone’s overarch-
ing performance and its place in a cyclical, repetitive Renaissance theater 
characterized by actors’ consecutive performances.24 The comedy, first per-
formed by the King’s Majesty’s Servants, starred Renaissance actor Richard 
Burbage as Volpone.25 Burbage’s performances in other play cycles (such as 
Shakespeare’s Othello) as an able-bodied person, but also his repeat perform-
ances as the able-bodied Volpone who feigns illness, complicate the nuances 
of his staged imposture. The recurrence of disability drag performances by 
either the same actor in an uninterrupted period or a different actor rein-
forces the perception of deception, construction, and performativity of the 
material body—and echoes Volpone’s self-description as “carcass.” Volpone, 
already void of “life” or “essence,” cannot suffer; the character, embodied by 
the well-known able-bodied actor playing him, is a construct, too, and this 
construction renders any potential suffering on his part strictly performative 
as well.
 Whereas Volpone’s credibility amidst other characters arguably does little 
to undermine the negative treatments of socially abject characters in the play, 
his lack of credibility amidst early modern audiences—both in his charac-
ter’s performance of sick dress and in his player as a known, able-bodied per-
son—does much to undermine positive and credible treatments of socially 
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powerful yet morally corrupt characters. In other words, Volpone, in spite 
of his wealth and status, is through his greed and performance of illness 
nothing more than an impostor and an upper-class rendering of the beg-
gar figure. The Avocatore claims that Volpone, “by blood and rank a gen-
tleman,” cannot receive the punishment that those of lower social statuses 
may endure (5.12.118); yet the play’s later description of Volpone’s character 
undercuts this elevated rank, as the Avocatore uses the term “imposture” to 
characterize Volpone’s performance—a term explicitly likening him to Paré’s 
beggar-impostors.26
 Volpone, “by feigning lame, gout, palsy, and such diseases,” must “lie 
in prison, cramp’d with irons, / Till [he] be’st sick and lame indeed” in the 
Incurabili hospital (5.12.120–24). Through this punishment,27 the Avocatore 
condemns Volpone to a space where his criminal body will be contained, 
and yet his insistence that the Fox becomes “lame” emphasizes contempo-
rary denotations for the term, including crippled, impaired, and maimed,28 
and hence indeed marks Volpone as a person with a disability. Furthermore, 
Volpone’s relocation to the hospital of the Incurabili situates him in a place 
typically reserved for impoverished syphilitics. According to Kevin Siena, 
hospitals of the Incurabili initially served to isolate and care for victims of 
the pox during this time: “Italians . . . define[d] the disease as ‘incurable’ and 
develop[ed] special hospitals to cater to the poor so afflicted.” Siena explains 
that with the growth of mercury treatments for venereal disease came the 
perception that the pox could be treated, but he adds, “The Incurabili hospi-
tals continued to provide the most important service of housing and treating 
the infected poor.”29 
 As a result, Volpone’s containment among the Italian poor near the dra-
ma’s conclusion plays with the conventional social ordering of early modern 
bodies. The punishment evidences how the judges have a desire for Vol-
pone to become truly “lame indeed.” Unlike the beggar whose guise of dis-
abling illness is stripped away, Volpone’s drag intentionally is reassembled by 
a social institution (the judicial system); the wealthy Volpone in his disabil-
ity drag is forced into a place for people with “real” disabilities. The judges 
in the play hence reconstruct the construct of disability for Volpone in order 
to justify his corporeal performance. This reconstruction is, again, an exact 
inversion from what happens to Paré’s female beggar; her body is violated 
and her drag costume torn apart in ways that disrupt the distance between 
observer and observed. Volpone’s judges, who must also look, dissect, and 
decide his character’s fate, take the opposite approach: though the drag has 
been exposed to everyone on stage by this point, the judges endeavor to 
reinstate the suspension of disbelief underscored in his consistent theatrical-
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ity. The stage and its characters are (once more by way of metatheater) reas-
sembled and redressed. Isolated and contained like the beggars—and, in the 
case of Volpone, the impoverished syphilitics—of their time, abject subjects 
are not redeemed through Jonson’s treatment of Volpone, particularly the 
socially abject who may be ailing. A wealthy person, exposed for imposture 
among people who want to believe his “sick dress,” destabilizes the important 
materiality of bodily suffering among all social strata—in the hospital of the 
Incurabili or elsewhere. The play’s final aim to make someone “lame indeed” 
increasingly betrays unequal social structures and a perverse pleasure in the-
atricality rather than honest attention to individuals’ actual material condi-
tions and suffering.
 Paré’s “The Imposture of a Certain Beggar Who Was Counterfeiting 
a Leper” further substantiates the tenuous and socially hypocritical sense 
of justice made visible in Volpone through performances of false disability. 
Like the female beggar, the “big knave of a beggar” in Paré has a face that 
“shows no sign of leprosy.”30 The same brother from the previous narrative 
again strips this beggar and “condemns him to get the whip.” This false leper 
then undergoes public torture and death: he is “banished forever from the 
country by the halter,” and “the people [have] shouted at the top of their 
voices to the executioner: ‘Strike, strike, officer! He can’t feel anything: he’s 
a leper! ’ wherefore at the voice of the people the executioner was cruelly 
bent on whipping him so hard that shortly afterward he died” (emphasis 
added).31 The spectacle of this beggar’s death is distinct, of course, from Vol-
pone’s public condemnation but private punishment. Regardless, however, 
the viewers’ denial of the beggar’s ability to feel discomfort or pain—coupled 
with their paradoxical reinforcement of his feigned status as a leper—paral-
lels how he and the Fox both are linguistically made “lame” while, in many 
ways, perceived simultaneously by audiences as incapable of actual physical 
suffering.
 Volpone’s ending, too, affirms the perceived instability of disability and 
pain while underscoring its performativity. Volpone usurps the Epilogue of 
the drama, reminding audiences again of the metatheatricality of his punish-
ment to ail among the poor:
The seasoning of a play is the applause.
Now, though the Fox be punish’d by the laws,
He yet doth hope, there is no suff’ring due,
For any fact which he hath done ‘gainst you;
If there be, censure him; here he doubtful stands:
If not fare jovially, and clap your hands. (1–6, emphasis added)
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Volpone once more asserts to the audience that the entire drama is a per-
formance; he seeks to detach his character’s legal punishment from physical 
embodiment, claiming, “there is no suff’ring due.” “Due,” implicating both 
monetary payment and justice, works in this instance as another pun that 
allows Volpone’s character to escape the condemnation of the masses by call-
ing for applause over “censure.” Finally, the character also escapes material 
embodiment of any kind by invoking the third person. No longer does the 
actor playing Volpone refer to his body and actions using “I” or “me”; he 
instead affirms detachment by invoking “he” and “the Fox.” This detachment 
becomes further compounded by the invocation that “here he .  .  . stands.” 
Audiences see an actor playing Volpone, and the actor acknowledges that a 
representation of the character stands before them. The speaker fails to link 
materially to the body he enacts. By concluding the drama in this way, Jon-
son utterly eliminates the potential for legitimate representations of discom-
fort or suffering and reinforces the initial problem of material embodiment 
revealed in disability drag and its metatheatricality.
Volpone faIls to redeem the material credibility of the ailing body in both 
social and corporeal spheres by satirizing disability and its discomfort and 
rendering the disabled body a tool for exaggerated performance, spectacle, 
and manipulation. Moreover, images of ailments, particularly when revealed 
as costumes and performances on the Renaissance stage, remind audiences of 
the metatheatricality of disability—even when the drama ends. The notion 
of disability as performance gets internalized: as Volpone’s character asks his 
audience to “censure” or “clap,” viewers are encouraged to look, unveil, and 
pass judgment. While some spectators may “jovially” applaud the drag per-
formance of illness onstage, offstage and in “real life” these sorts of judgments 
likely lead to punishment and containment of those who were either truly 
disabled or socially abject.
 The metatheatrical manifestation of disability drag in Volpone destroys the 
boundary between actor and audience. This destruction ironically empow-
ers viewers outside dramatic spheres while disempowering the object of their 
view—as is the case with Paré’s beggars. The spectator’s gaze becomes rooted 
in skepticism and disbelief, and people with physical or mental ailments 
become spectacles for analysis and eventual containment. As a result, the 
metatheatricality of drag performances such as Volpone’s extends beyond the 
stage, both shaping Renaissance ideologies around disability and discomfort 
and reflecting early modern social structures that encouraged the elimina-
tion of impostors and containing of syphilitics. Lastly, it is worth noting that 
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disability drag is not unique to Volpone: Antonio feigns mental illness in Mid-
dleton and Rowley’s The Changeling, and Beaumont’s Knight of the Burning 
Pestle employs boy actors to play adult men who then transform into char-
acters such as George, a dwarf, and Sir Pockhole, a syphilitic. These Renais-
sance dramas, among others such as Shakespeare’s King Lear (in which Edgar 
famously fashions himself into a beggar with mental illness), can serve as a 
broader cultural window into how disability drag, particularly when acknowl-
edged as a metadramatic performance, often problematically engenders doubt 
about the lived materiality of disability in the early modern period.
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When I think of the intersection of the English Renaissance and the issue of disability, no one seems to come to mind as prominently as Shakespeare’s Richard III. Indelibly categorized as “deformed” 
by Thomas More (a label faithfully maintained by Hall and Holinshed), the 
persona of Richard rearticulated by Shakespeare permeated Western popular 
consciousness far beyond the relatively narrow fields of history and drama. 
As Sharon Snyder remarks, thanks to Shakespeare, Richard has been infa-
mously elevated to the position of the “arch-defective in all literature,” the 
pinnacle example of “malevolent disability.”1 It is of course up for discus-
sion whether Richard’s reported physical disfigurement is historically accu-
rate or inserted by pro-Tudor historians eager to heap damnation on the 
king.2 In this essay, however, I choose to focus elsewhere, namely, on the 
culturally contextual reception of Richard III. I posit that Shakespeare’s text, 
while forceful in its demonization of Richard’s body and soul, is surpris-
ingly ambiguous in describing the physical nature of Richard’s deformity. 
This ambiguity is particularly perplexing considering that the text is destined 
for staging: after all, a theater audience needs to be both told and shown 
Richard’s deformed body to subscribe to the larger early modern ideologi-
cal linking between bodily and psychological evil. Even more importantly, 
this ambivalence challenges each production to invent its own bodily pro-
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jection of Richard’s evil interiority to attend to contextually specific modern 
perceptions of the correlative between disabled exteriority and psychological 
interiority. Inevitably, the play thus invites a series of stagings, each of which 
disables the Renaissance text on the par of current discourses of disability in 
a given cultural context. I will here examine one specific example—a wildly 
popular production of Richard III in the postcommunist Czech Republic—to 
pursue the ways in which a particular case of disabling the Renaissance may 
feed off of—and feed into—contemporary political tensions surrounding the 
normative discourses of humanity, masculinity, and citizenship.
 Despite an immense cultural devotion to Shakespeare and a relative cul-
tural notoriety for the formidable “hunchback” Richard, Richard III was 
rarely performed in communist Czechoslovakia.3 The 1989 Velvet Revolu-
tion did not bring an immediate change in this trend, although Shakespeare 
performances in general multiplied on postcommunist Czech stages in the 
absence of ready material independent of the communist taint. This Rich-
ardian dearth came to an abrupt end at the very end of the second millen-
nium, even as the first decade of political transition was expected to give way 
to the free democratic future promised by the impending acceptance into the 
European Union in 2004. In the midst of a general disenchantment with new 
political circumstances, which for much of the Czech population brought a 
worse standard of living than communism, Richard III seemed to offer a rel-
evant opportunity for reflection on the trappings of political power and the 
futility of political engagement of the average citizen. The Czech late 1990s 
increasingly were plagued by undisguised battles for political control among 
the supposedly liberated postcommunist politicians. These battles frequently 
were punctuated by embarrassing performances of anxious masculinity and 
resulted in corruption charges that tended to equal or even supersede the 
“tunneling” scandals of the communist era. The three Czech productions of 
Richard III that opened in 1999 and 2000 (two of them competing with each 
other in the capital, Prague),4 offered three more or less explicitly reflective 
mirrors of the current political power structure.5
 Among these three Richards, the longest-lived became Richard III pro-
duced by Divadelní Spolek Kašpar (Theater Guild Clown), which opened 
in September 2000 at Divadlo v Celetné (Theater in Celetná Street). This 
production made overtures toward Renaissance theatrical practices in a mini-
malist set as well as sophisticated and expensive “historic” costumes bristling 
with armor and showcasing voluptuous fabrics. Moreover, the production 
gestured toward Renaissance practices in that all but two of the actors dou-
bled in multiple roles, often cross-gendered. The major draw of the produc-
tion, however, rested on the interpretation of Richard’s famed deformity in 
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casting a well-known and well-liked actor, Jan Potměšil, in the leading role. 
Formerly a rising star of the Czech theater and film scene whose protago-
nists included romantic leads in films marketed to young viewers, Potměšil’s 
career came to an abrupt (if eventually temporary) standstill once he began 
using a wheelchair after an accidental injury sustained while engaging in dis-
sident activities against the communist regime. Hailed as possibly the sole 
“casualty” of the Velvet Revolution6 and celebrated for “beating the odds” 
of whole-body paralysis, Potměšil in this role became an immense draw for 
both traditional and nontraditional theater audiences. Far from “disappear-
ing” into his role, Potměšil’s performance—buttressed by the theater collec-
tive and the media—blurred the boundaries between the actor and character 
by foregrounding the actor’s past in all promotional and evaluative materi-
als, frequently as the defining feature of the production and of the entire 
collective.
 In what follows, I will both explore the ways in which this particular 
staging disables the Renaissance text and investigate the cultural implications 
of blurring Richard’s ambiguous “natural deformity” with Potměšil’s acciden-
tal disability acquired in the process of political activism. I am fascinated by 
the ways in which this production uses Shakespeare’s text and cultural capital 
simultaneously to disrupt and to confirm contemporary stereotypes of dis-
ability, particularly as it relates to questions of normative masculine power, 
while commenting on embarrassing and greedy (if not as bloody, in the 
Richardian fashion) machismo of corrupt government officials whose scan-
dals in fact shared newspaper pages with reviews of Richard III. Ultimately, 
I suggest that this production’s version of Renaissance disability, in its multi-
valent ambiguity, uneasily captures a postcommunist transitionality wherein 
(corpo)realities are in flux, the future multiple and uncertain, and the narra-
tives of the past uncomfortably unsettled.
Richard’s (un)fair proportions
Postcommunist transitionality is not limited to the public political sphere. 
As the example of Richard III demonstrates, the transition from communism 
has permeated all spheres of public and private life, and profoundly affected 
intimate conceptions of individual humanity, particularly as it related to 
citizenship and attendant human rights. In the realm of categorizing and 
addressing the question of disability, obvious tensions arose from compet-
ing pressures: on the one hand, the state was entrenched in its communist 
and pre-communist past with its legacy of institutionalization—and disen-
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franchisement—of bodies deemed mentally, physically, sexually, or politically 
deviant; on the other, the Czechs needed to respond to the specific pressures 
of the European Union to impose Western discourses of equality, including 
disability. This conflict fueled the perception that the ability of Czechs to 
define the parameters of their own citizenship had been jeopardized, if not 
made impossible. This perception alone created profound cultural resent-
ment and retrenchment to hostile conservative attitudes. Parallel pressures 
of the EU that sought to redefine postcommunist parameters of gender and 
sexuality7 further intensified this backlash.
 Stepping into these ubiquitous cultural tensions, Kašpar’s Richard III 
brought to the table a host of conflicting interpretive possibilities. In pre-
senting a “past” heartthrob in the title role, the production might challenge 
existing biomedical practices of pathologizing and disenfranchising non- 
normative bodies. In contrast, the not-so-subtle engrained association of 
Richard’s bodily materiality with evil might solidify existing stereotypes of 
disability. Potměšil, as the only visibly disabled person in the influential enter-
tainment industry, could be read equally as an early champion of disability 
rights or as an exotic exception that, as a Czech maxim would argue, proves 
the rule of a dominant repressive norm. More widely, Richard’s exacting 
hypermasculinity in Potměšil’s articulation of Shakespeare’s usurping ruler, 
in the context of neocolonial EU expansion, can serve as a warning against a 
national future in which an economically exploitive European Union dam-
agingly exacts its power structure on its new (if vainly protesting) potential 
members. Or the spectacle of an empowered murderous deviant might fuel 
a growing paranoia that more inclusiveness in terms of citizenship—particu-
larly as it rests on normative, able-bodied masculinity—would politically and 
socially empower those who previously were systematically disenfranchised.
 In Shakespeare’s textual template, the link between power, masculinity, 
and deformity is laid out in Richard’s first soliloquy, which serves as a de 
facto prologue and thus establishes the organizing principles of the play. 
His disabled masculinity—or the inability to perform normative masculin-
ity adequately—fuels his anxiety of disempowerment and subsequent dis-
qualification from normative courtly activities. Posing the dual prongs of 
normative masculine power—military and heterosexual conquest—Richard 
seeks to supplement the shortcomings in the latter: instead of exerting sexual 
power, he sets out to manipulate his political surroundings through cun-
ning, and sometimes brutal, intrigue. His bodily deformity, though never 
explicitly articulated, acts as the necessary linchpin that engenders his self-
professed villainy. Yet the play’s occasional commentary on other charac-
ters’ comparable brutality (Margaret), duplicity (Buckingham), and selfish 
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political agility (nearly everyone else) leaves the uncomfortable impression 
that Richard offends not because he is ruthless, per se, but rather because he 
dares to grasp for power for which his deformity makes him ineligible. In 
other words, claiming that which all of the other agents of power in the play 
seek, Richard temporarily transgresses the confines of the implicit imperative 
conflation of deformity with disempowerment from conventional venues of 
social and political power. Seen from this perspective, Shakespeare’s ending 
seems to restore power to the Lancastrians not because they are more ethical 
than Richard but because they are normatively bodied.
 The link between Richard’s “misshapen” body and his ethics, particularly 
in the context of Renaissance ideology of interiority/exteriority, as Michael 
Torrey reminds us, is an ambiguous one. On the one hand, Torrey argues, 
Anne and Margaret believe that “his deformity is a clear sign that he is odious 
and wicked,” suggesting their concurrence with the ideology of clear overlap 
between the normative aesthetics of exteriority and the interior moral code.8 
On the other, the play also poses the real problem of Richard’s position as a 
“successful deceiver.”9 Despite his “deformity,” Richard repeatedly leads oth-
ers to suppose him virtuous, bringing forth a contrasting Renaissance view 
that hesitated to conflate one’s visage and moral predispositions. Fluctuating 
between these two views in the course of the play, Richard’s “body alternately 
does and does not seem to give him away.”10 Ultimately, Torrey suggests that 
“[a]lthough Richard’s deceptions might at first seem a rejection of physi-
ognomy[,]  .  .  .  they actually mirror an uncertainty about appearances that 
physiognomy itself betrays.”11
 Despite the importance ascribed to Richard’s body, his deformity is a 
point of great textual ambiguity beyond the extent that Torrey allows. Rich-
ard describes his own body very little, usually as a rhetorical device that serves 
to underscore his unsuitability to public action. In the opening soliloquy, he 
tells the audience of his “rudely stamp’d” appearance that mars “fair propor-
tion” (1.1. 16, 18), caused by a premature birth that left him “deformed, 
unfinished . . . scarce half made up” (20–21).12 He mentions a more specific 
nature of this deformity twice: at the outset of the play, Richard refers to a 
limp (1.2.250), and, when in need of an excuse to behead Hastings, Richard 
produces a previously unmentioned “arm . . . like a blasted sapling, all with-
ered up” (3.4.68–69). It is important to note that the positive correlation 
between Richard’s deformity and his ability to achieve publicly—whether as 
a ruler or a lover—is more fictional than factual: as an aspiring ruler, Rich-
ard out-politics all his opponents; as a lover, he succeeds in wooing not just 
once, in one of the most spectacularly incredible seductions of the English 
stage, but nearly twice.
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 If Richard is unreliable in describing his disabled body or in outlining 
its cultural efficacy, other characters are equally unhelpful. His deformity 
is never mentioned by characters who harbor any real or feigned loyalty to 
Richard of York, later Richard the King. Those who lack such loyalty—
mostly because they have been affected by his ruthless politicking—do not 
stint with negative epithets. It is crucial to note, however, that as a rule they 
resort to name-calling once they grasp the (negative) impact of Richard’s 
machinations as well as their inability to take corrective action. This resort 
to opportunistic Othering therefore serves symbolically to disempower an 
unexpectedly—and presumably undeservedly—powerful agent. Even then, 
negative references to Richard’s body consist of rather vague, general epi-
thets ranging from the well-used “dog,” to “devil,” to “villain” and “toad,” 
which seem commensurate with the anger of each speaker but do not pro-
vide a bodily description of the addressee. Even Margaret’s more imagina-
tive and more descriptive “bottled spider” and “poisonous bunch-backed 
toad” (1.3 241, 245), repeated later by Elizabeth (4.4 81), and relation-
slandering “elvish-mark’d, abortive, rooting hog!  .  .  .  seal’d in [his] nativ-
ity!  .  .  .  the slave of nature and the son of hell!  .  .  .  slander of [his] heavy 
mother’s womb! . . . loathed issue of his father’s loins!” (1.3 225–31), seems 
to zero in on the non-normative aspects of Richard’s bodily materiality only 
as an afterthought of his actions.13 This deferred labeling suggests a culture 
of deep fear of the other, coated by a thin layer of political correctness (or, 
in Renaissance approximations, good breeding and manners) that breaks in 
an instant of power rupture. As much as other characters do not seem to 
ascribe any significance to Richard’s non-normative body while he conforms 
to social expectations, his corporality becomes the central focus of the pro-
cess through which his inappropriate assertions of power are explained.
 The conflicting accounts of Richard’s motives, combined with an absence 
of a definitive word on his bodily state in the text of Richard III, forces the 
discourse of embodiment, power, deformity, and disability into the exceed-
ingly culturally determined stage-world of the play. When Richard refers to 
his body as “misshapen thus” (1.2 250), he foregrounds his own performativ-
ity, calling the audience’s attention to the deformity it sees. Such visual defor-
mity calls for a performance of physical deviance that is highly context- (and 
culture-) specific. Not explicitly articulated, such expression of a culture’s 
commitment to normativity is perpetually lingering in the play’s margins. 
Thus, each production of Richard III plays into the temporal expectations of 
its theatrical audience, contemporary discourses of (dis)ability and deviance, 
masculinity, citizenship, power, and sexuality. All are further blended with 
the cultural capital of transcendental Shakespeare, his own unreliable and 
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ideologically tainted historical accounts, as well as the stage and film legacies 
of preceding productions. More than any other Shakespeare play, I propose, 
the definition of “monstrosity” and “disability” thus becomes a self-reflexive 
cultural text to be read, revealing the underpinnings of the cultural context 
in which the play is produced.
postcommunist Disability
It is somewhat of an understatement to claim that a performance of an unex-
pectedly disabled Richard challenges the Czech normative discourse of dis-
ability, which—around the time of incorporation into the EU—was not 
favorably predisposed toward including persons with disabilities in the cat-
egory of equal citizenry. The unwavering tendency to conceptualize disability 
biomedically as a pathology in the Czech context (and in Central Eastern 
Europe in general), as Daniel Holland has found, has resulted in an under-
standing of disability as an “impairment in psychological, physiological, or 
anatomical function.”14 Disability, thus categorized, becomes “a deficit that 
is ‘possessed’ by an individual and necessitat[es] individual treatment.”15 
Consequently, it is possible to deny a group of such separate individuals—
deprived of the benefit of structural collectivity of persons who depart from 
standards of bodily and mental “wholeness”—collective political platform 
that would help lessen some of the “particularly severe challenges to health 
status and quality of life” and, more broadly, elicit a shift in discourse delin-
eating individuality and citizenship.16
 The overwhelming majority of Czechs living with disabilities has been in 
the care of a state that has continued the communist practice of sequestering 
them from the able-bodied population in separate institutions where they 
are not likely to interfere with the accepted societal norm. As a result, depar-
tures from the norms of “ability” have remained invisible, sensationalized, 
deviant, abnormal, and taboo.17 The removal of persons who do not meet 
standards of mental and physical normalcy from the normative collective eye 
into separate facilities has been strengthened further by the reluctance with 
which authorities have provided required public accommodations. The U.S. 
Department of State, for the first time in 2002, included disabilities as one 
of its foci in human rights reports on individual countries. According to this 
report, the Czech Republic performed poorly in providing necessary support 
for the disabled.18
 The great reluctance to accommodate persons with disabilities, even in 
the face of potential sanctions by the European Union, speaks to a degree 
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of cultural disruption that spans beyond mere logistical change. A shift in 
the level of provisions to persons with specific needs would inevitably open 
the question of equality of all, starting with the public education system. 
There, the engrained cultural practice since the nineteenth century has been 
an early separation (in the fifth or ninth grades, depending on school) into 
vocational tracks—academic, technical, vocational, special—that affirms a 
sociopolitical practice of constructing an intellectual hierarchy that divides 
the young citizenry into implicit tracks of (in)ability. In the great majority 
of cases, these tracks delineate the lifelong career options of each individ-
ual. After the fall of communism, as Mel Ainscow and Memmenasha Haile-
Giorgis have charted in their research, changes to the Czech curriculum have 
made it “more demanding in the belief that this will raise standards in edu-
cation” relative to international educational achievements.19 This persistent 
practice of early categorization systematically discriminates against children 
from less affluent backgrounds, rural areas, and ethnic minorities. Ainscow 
and Haile-Giorgis point out that, for instance, “between 25 and 100 per cent 
of pupils in schools for children with moderate learning difficulties are from 
Romany backgrounds. In explanation of this, it has been argued that main-
stream schools have too many socio-cultural/racial tensions and conflicts for 
Romany children.”20 As the elementary example of education attests, any 
discussion of disability is a discussion of enfranchisement that threatens to 
undermine the very classificatory system that fuels Czech culture and its 
society, economy, and political system. Alex McClimens, a Western disability 
scholar, proposed that accepting established Western discourse of disability 
would equal a “loss of national identity and culture” for many postcommu-
nist societies.21 In other words, the question of establishing individual norm 
of ability and humanity lies in the core of the national conception of citi-
zenship, so much so that reorienting toward Western (dis)ability discourse 
would threaten to undermine the entire ideological system of a society.
 It is not surprising, then, that the Czech tradition in which the Kašpar 
Richard III inevitably positions itself sees Richard mainly as an evil malcon-
tent whose external physique merely reflects his inner malevolence. An emi-
nent Shakespearean, Zdeněk Stříbrný, provided a more nuanced assessment 
of Czech Richards performed since 1945, calling the title character “both a 
Machiavellian titan and a cripple suffering from a deep-seated sense of infe-
riority, a raging tyrant and wisecracking comedian, God’s chief enemy and 
the scourge of God avenging the old crimes of the Red and the White Rose 
upon the two houses and opening the way for historical progress.”22 Though 
broader in its interpretive possibilities than the unequivocal popular view, 
such interpretation continues to collapse implicitly Richard’s behavior with 
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his deviant body, reluctant to acknowledge the structural implications of 
damaging discourses of disability and deviance that permeate both worlds of 
the play and the Czech culture.
 In a context where disability is a widely pathologized umbrella term that 
inadvertently catches all groups that are to be culturally disenfranchised, put-
ting an explicitly disabled—yet profoundly able—body on ritualistic public 
display in a Shakespeare play is likely to create a rupture in existing discourse. 
This publicized non-normative body cannot escape, as Carrie Sandahl and 
Philip Auslander remind us, being understood as solely “about disability.”23 
The superimposition of contemporary views of disability discourages—even 
actively prevents—the actor from “disappearing” into his role as is usually 
expected.24 Instead, the overlay of disability inevitably demands additional 
narratives that inescapably interact with a plot of whichever play or charac-
ter is onstage. Rosemarie Garland-Thomson argues that “the disabled body 
is novelty writ large for the captivated starer, prompting persistent curiosity 
and launching a troubling tangle of identification and differentiation,” so 
that the able-bodied audience is perpetually “seeking a narrative that puts 
their disrupted world back in order.”25 Moreover, these narratives are always 
already circumscribed by the able-bodied mentality that requires narratives 
that, as Sandahl and Auslander maintain, articulate the balance of disability 
and power in that they “must inevitably show how we conquer our disabili-
ties or how they eventually conquer us.”26
 Intriguingly, in the case of Kašpar’s Richard III, the superimposed narra-
tive of the disabled actor is in conflict with the traditional interpretation of 
the character he portrays. While Potměšil’s commanding presence on stage 
provides unarguable evidence of his victory over the assumed limitations of 
his impairment, his stage persona Richard is gradually stripped of every last 
vestige of whatever power he temporarily grasped. Potměšil’s Richard further 
disrupts the ingrained binary between the two apparently opposite discourses 
of disability, drawing together Richard’s congenital difference, which left him 
“misshapen, scarce half made up” with the actor’s “tragic” accidental disfig-
urement. This overlap is further strengthened by the perpetual rearticulation 
(by the theater and the press) of Potměšil’s progression from Romeo to Rich-
ard, recalling that the fateful car accident caught the promising, handsome 
actor in the midst of rehearsals for the title role in Shakespeare’s Romeo and 
Juliet. Since the only marker of Richard’s deformity is a wheelchair, this per-
formance offers a potential cognitive impasse that invites alternative interpre-
tations of the character, normative difference, as well as of the wider social 
context. Have we just witnessed a Coriolanian tragedy wherein a national 
hero has been stripped of his just deserts, only to descend into villainous 
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rage and lash out at his discriminatory environment? Or, have we witnessed 
another Iago-like treachery that reinforces the red flags that non-normativity 
presumably raises in any good citizen?
Richard’s Romeo
The sheer success of the production, which kept it on stage for the last 
decade27 and carried it through more than three hundred performances in 
the repertory theater, tells us little about the specific reaction of Czech audi-
ences beyond their voracious appetite to see an exotic celebrity performance. 
More informative are the ways in which the production is promoted by 
the Kašpar collective and reviewed by the press. While wrapped in com-
mendable rhetoric of equality, Kašpar unabashedly cashed in on its unique 
member, promoting his contributions to the collective efforts while charging 
disproportionally inflated prices for performances in which he appears. The 
reviews, in turn, divide between badly hidden condescension and admiring 
sensationalism. Thus far, the focus on all fronts is a surprise encounter with 
the previously unknown and, more so, a surprise at the ability in the pre-
sumed disabled that ironically parallels the discomfort felt at Richard’s usur-
pation of state power.
 Kašpar promotional materials seem to confirm the already cited assump-
tion that “the disabled body is naturally about disability.”28 Since his first 
theatrical appearance in Kašpar productions after his accident, Potměšil was 
cast in a series of roles marked by various degrees of physical and mental 
deviance. For instance, in the case of the theatrical adaptation of Daniel 
Keyes’s Flowers for Algernon, Potměšil’s physical difference was to symbol-
ize—or to accentuate—Charlie Gordon’s considerable mental impairment. 
Richard III, then, is merely another in a series, one that Potměšil ironically 
deems the most “normal” compared to the others he performed previously. 
His presumed, and by now inevitably acquired, “expertise in disabled char-
acters” provides an identity for the entire ensemble. Indeed, in all substantial 
interviews with the director, Jakub Špalek, whether about the production or 
the Kašpar company in general, Potměšil is its only member who is men-
tioned at any length.29 In sum, regardless of whatever arrangement exists 
inside the Kašpar collective, the materials suggest a profitable exploitation 
of Potměšil’s non-normative body to satisfy the public’s craving for a safe 
spectacle of deviance that, despite its inroads into a deliberately uncharted 
territory, validates the boundaries of normative discourse of ability and 
citizenship.
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 With few exceptions, the overwhelming majority of reviews seem to 
share and fuel further this notion of an exciting non-normative spectacle 
neatly articulated for consumption by eager audiences. As if working from 
a template, most reviews of Richard III follow the introductory paragraph 
with an overview of Potměšil’s accident and his subsequent recovery. While 
some depart into the specifics of overwhelming (and ultimately erroneous) 
medical prognoses, others stress Kašpar’s generosity in providing a space for 
Potměšil to “resurrect” his craft, or offer accounts of the actor’s personal life 
marked by consistent humility in face of public scrutiny and crowned with 
the birth of a son. All of these responses then tend to transition seamlessly 
into polite praise for the actor’s performance as Richard, frequently men-
tioning—but failing to reflect on the effects or implications of—the dis-
crepancy between the actor’s positive attitude and Richard’s villainy. Indeed, 
Karel Kříž calls Potměšil “an institution of goodness,”30 and Zdene˘k Tichý 
sees him as “predestined for protagonist roles.”31 Most also speak admir-
ingly of Potměšil’s ability to act despite his impairment. Some comment on 
his commendable ability to “make up” for his physical shortcomings: Mar-
tina Hrdličková, for instance, notes that Potměšil “balances out his physical 
handicap with the dynamism of his dialogues.”32 The reviews, as a rule, end 
with cursory courtesy nods to the rest of the cast, who appear as the more-
or-less (depending on the reviewer) successful and/but necessary also-rans. 
All in all, the reviews equally underscore the narrative of an unfortunate-
but-grateful gifted subject who is happy to be subjected to public personal 
scrutiny thinly veiled in the guise of theatrical performance.
 Rather than Richard III, Richard III, or even Potměšil as a celebrity, it 
is Potměšil’s non-normative body that is the heart of this sought-after spec-
tacle that provides an audience with the unprecedented ability to indulge 
the otherwise forbidden (yet difficult to resist) urge to stare at the disabled 
body. Indeed, since staring here is a prerequisite of the exercise of theatri-
cal performativity, such exercise is hardly to be questioned. Yet such a stare 
is not likely to produce the necessary familiarity that might lead to de-
tabooization of the non-normative bodies in the larger social and cultural 
context. The unclear and unexplored link between bodily non-normativity 
and moral depravity in Richard III, together with the pervasive discourse of 
inability attendant upon the concept of “disability,” undermines the poten-
tial this particular production could have had to begin renegotiating the cat-
egories of (in)ability in the Czech context. Potměšil’s progress from Romeo 
to Richard, particularly in the framework of the transcendental Shakespear-
ean cultural capital that is tapped to sanctify most Czech productions’ ide-
ological message, provides a clear narrative of cultural categorization that 
marCela kOSTihOvá • 147
seems ready to counter the overtures of the European Union for cultural 
assimilation.
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Recent conversation about disability in the early modern period has largely concerned overt representations of disability, those for which Western culture has had a long taxonomic history—cultural historians 
using familiar terms for familiar conditions. This work has without question 
been useful to our understanding of nonstandard bodies and minds, but 
its tendency to identify and define according to familiar terminology has 
perhaps also limited the development of a disability heuristic that would 
otherwise allow for a more inclusive model for theorizing disability. In this 
emerging investigative field within early modern studies, a disability stud-
ies1 of the English Renaissance, Carol Thomas Neely’s work has become the 
most notable example.2 Neely shows that madness, figured in the various 
discourses of the Renaissance as “distraction,” exemplified a fluidity and, 
sometimes, subtlety that study of Shakespeare’s plays in particular and early 
modern subjectivities more generally ought to include. Neely argues that 
“early moderns drew on the traditional humoral discourses of Galen and 
Aristotle to rethink the parameters of the human by reimagining madness” 
and that “discourses of madness flourished because they were useful in recon-
ceptualizing the boundaries between natural and supernatural, masculinity 
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and femininity, body and mind, feigned and actual distraction.”3 In stark 
contrast to modern conceptions of madness that inform how we look at such 
cognitive disability, her investigation of the discourses that articulated the 
theorized sources and observable symptoms of madness and her close reading 
of its textual history in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century England evidences, as 
she claims, that early modern “discourses did not yet dehumanize distracted 
persons, as the concept of ‘insanity’ later would do.”4 Neely’s work is inclu-
sive of a range of discourses (medical, theological, literary) that converge and 
overlap to construct representations of early modern subjectivity and mad-
ness on the stage and is an example of how attention to nuanced discursivity 
can enable modern readers to attend more sensitively to historical construc-
tions of difference and disability.
 Yet for all of its sensitivity to the differences that characterize the his-
torical distance between early modern and modern subjectivities, Neely’s 
approach does at times overly rely for its identifications of “distraction” upon 
textual signifiers of difference: words that would act as labels or diagnoses for 
madness within a specific discursive history. And though Neely shows how 
“Shakespeare’s tragedies . . . invent a new language for the mad, a stylistically 
italicized and culturally inflected speech peculiar to distracted characters,”5 
the inflection and italicization are nonetheless evidenced through language 
used by figures in the plays. Examples include a look at the anonymous 
Gentleman’s description of Ophelia in Hamlet 4.5.6–8, in which her speech 
is described, for example, as “but half sense” and “nothing,” and finally as 
“unshaped.” And Neely’s careful reading of period medical treatises also focus 
upon a writer’s use of some native form of terminology to describe maladies 
that afflict body or mind (or both in some cases). She cites Timothy Bright’s 
Treatise of Melancholie (1586) in which Bright discusses “the terrour of the 
afflicted minde.”6 Neely’s work is illuminating, but it is also limited by its 
core methodological focus upon the linguistic sign.
 Methodological logocentrism is not uncommon in the study of literary 
history, so concerned are scholars with material evidence in the form of a tex-
tual, if not often strictly linguistic, record. But as I hope to show, omissions 
in the textual history of a culture can also signify the presence of the scholar’s 
topic of interest. The wider cultural and social uses of a specific text might 
overlap with possible therapeutic uses of that same text, so that a devotional 
text, for example, could be read as a behavioral script that ushered those of 
atypical cognitive development into corporate religious and social life. Schol-
ars would thus practice a very different kind of logocentrism, one that focuses 
upon a text’s uses as a sign of its participation in an early modern discourse 
of disability. And while attention to actual language enables scholars to trace 
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out the various discursive locations that collectively speak of madness, for 
instance, as difference, it may also prevent them from noting silences or 
omissions in a discursive history that nonetheless would speak of forms of 
difference and disability that are present in a culture’s historical record.
 Stephen Dobranski has argued, for example, that a particular kind of 
Renaissance textual omission, one that “differ[s] from other unfinished or 
censored Renaissance works because their authors and/or publishers seem to 
want readers to notice the imperfections,” acted for early modern readers as 
“ostensive stimuli,” inviting them into “a cooperative relationship between 
writers and readers.”7 Dobranski’s study contributes to the body of litera-
ture known as reception studies, but his insights into the cultural function 
of the textual omission in early modern England are suggestive for how we 
might also read omissions in the historical record, or for how we might again 
see, in Louis Montrose’s famous formulation, the textuality of history.8 The 
Elizabethan Book of Common Prayer functioned as a communicative mode 
that uniquely made accessible to those in the pews the emerging theological 
system of belief and the physical movements and utterances that comprised 
the church’s liturgical service, despite the absence of commentary in the his-
torical record concerning parishioners with receptive or expressive language 
differences.
 Departing from the work done by some early modern disability studies 
scholars, the present essay considers the Book of Common Prayer in light 
of modern cognitive theory in an effort to explain more specifically how 
the prayer book functioned as a mechanism for wider social access for those 
with cognitive disabilities of a specific kind. In its capacity to standardize 
reformed rites within the church, the Book of Common Prayer simulta-
neously enabled willful, cognitively and socially atypical, prayer book con-
formists9 to enter into broader normative participation in the larger social 
sphere. For these individuals, specific cognitive differences influenced their 
development of what modern cognitive science calls Theory of Mind, a term 
that refers to an acute inability “to take the perspective of another person” 
or the inability “to understand the different perspective of others.”10 With-
out this capacity, an individual is essentially locked within a perpetual state 
of egocentrism. To exhibit atypical Theory of Mind development meant 
that these individuals would also have been different in terms of their wider 
social acceptance. This would have been especially so in early modern Eng-
land, since, as Christopher Haigh, Judith Maltby, and Ramie Targoff have 
shown, conformity to nominal religious practice also meant acceptance into 
the wider social fabric of a community,11 especially after the passing of the 
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Act of Uniformity of 1559. For those individuals with limited, impaired, 
or simply atypical Theory of Mind, and for those with nonstandard lan-
guage receptivity, the Book of Common Prayer functioned, quite literally, as 
a religious script and story that could be read and memorized, a script that 
detailed expectations for the church year, including all the relevant rites and 
ceremonies that constituted church life. This script/story enabled these indi-
viduals to be more than merely outwardly identified by members of their 
congregation as devotees of the faith, but ultimately, and more significantly, 
as self-identified and self-understood adherents to the faith and participating 
members in the wider social world of early modern England.
cartesian theory of Mind, 
Modern cognitive Science, and autism
While the term Theory of Mind has a long history, dating back to the writ-
ings of Augustine and, even earlier, Plato, the origins of the modern con-
ception of Theory of Mind are found in the writings of René Descartes. In 
his now famous letter to Gibieuf, dated 19 January 1642, Descartes makes a 
rather auspicious claim that is the result of several years thinking and writing 
on the subject of human cognition, specifically its location, function, and 
capabilities. He writes:
I am certain that I can have no knowledge of what is outside me except 
by means of the ideas I have within me; and so I take great care not to 
relate my judgements immediately to things, and not to attribute to things 
anything positive which I do not first perceive in the ideas of them. But I 
think also that whatever is to be found in these ideas is necessarily also in 
the things themselves.12
Locating the core of the human sense of self outside of the confines of the 
material body, Descartes argues that the mind is inherently immaterial, dis-
embodied, and ineluctably separate from the corporeal. The theory of mind 
at the heart of modern cognitive science owes much to this formulation of 
the relationship of the mind to the body that also forms the core of Des-
cartes’ philosophical (or neurophilosophical) project. Yet he also nonetheless 
acknowledges that there is something like an interanimation of these, or that 
the mind and body echo one another’s existence, so that neither one can be 
said to exist without the copresence of the other. He goes on to state,
154 • 9: The bOOk OF COmmOn Prayer
We cannot have any knowledge of things except by the ideas we conceive 
of them; and consequently, that we must even think that whatever conflicts 
with these ideas is absolutely impossible and involves a contradiction.13
Arguing further, and by analogy, Descartes claims:
Thus we have no reason to affirm that there is no mountain without a val-
ley, except that we see that the ideas of these things cannot be complete 
when we consider them apart; though of course by abstraction we can 
obtain the idea of a mountain, or of an upward slope, without considering 
that the same slope can be travelled downhill.14
For Descartes, and for the emerging early modern medical discourse, the 
psychological inheres in the physiological, though each remains distinct. In 
contrast to Augustinian theory of mind, Charles Taylor has argued that for 
Descartes reality is a product of perception. “A representation of reality now 
has to be constructed,” Taylor writes, so that “As the notion of ‘idea’ migrates 
from its ontic sense to apply henceforth to intra-psychic contents, to things 
‘in the mind,’ so the order of ideas ceases to be something we find and 
becomes something we build.”15 No longer should the individual struggle 
to orient himself or herself toward some identifiable cosmic order; the indi-
vidual should instead recognize the impossibility in the first place of such 
an order ever existing outside of the mind whose sole purpose is to impose 
order upon the otherwise chaotic, to call order into existence. In his widely 
referenced analysis of what he calls Descartes’s “Disengaged Reason,” Taylor 
argues that “The order of representations must thus meet standards which 
derive from the thinking activity of the knower.”16 In his analysis of the 
sources and function of Descartes’ cogito, Taylor finds that rationality results 
from following an internally defined set of procedures used to order what 
exists outside the individual’s mind; thus, rationality results from employing 
a method for imposing the ordered self upon a disordered cosmos.
 Reconsidering and responding to Taylor’s analysis of Descartes’ “source 
of the self,” John Sutton has argued that the separation of the mind from 
the body-as-material accredited to Descartes in Western philosophy since 
the mid-seventeenth century is probably overstated. Sutton traces a thread of 
Galenism in more modern medical theory’s understanding of mind through 
as late as the nineteenth century. He notes that the older “psychophysi-
ological  .  .  .  frameworks were dynamic in the sense that they assumed the 
importance of what modern . . . cognitive science call[s], ‘continuous recip-
rocal causation.’”17 Citing the work of Andy Clark, Sutton points out that a 
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resurgence of interest in “embodied cognition is particularly suggestive in the 
light of . . . the old fluid physiologies.”18 The mind may not be entirely dis-
connected from the body according to modern medical observation and the-
ory. “As in jazz improvisation,” Sutton writes, citing Clark, “the behavior of 
every part of the system changes continuously as the patterns of input within 
a dense web of causal complexity alter.”19 These scientists and researchers 
might even agree with literary and cultural historians of the early modern 
period such as Michael Schoenfeldt that “the lexicon of Galenic medicine 
has survived the demise of its intellectual framework in part because of its 
cogent experiential basis and its profoundly sentient terminology,”20 recog-
nizing the abiding explanatory potential of a pre-Cartesian theory of the 
mind as embodied. Gail Kern Paster, in writing about “embodied passions” 
in early modern England, has similarly shown that “For the early moderns, 
emotions flood the body not metaphorically but literally, as the humors 
course through the bloodstream carrying choler, melancholy, blood, and 
phlegm to the parts and as animal spirits move like lightning from brain 
to muscle, from muscle to brain.”21 Modern cognitive science, as Sutton 
and Clark show, may be returning to an earlier, ancient notion of mind/
body interinfluence and moving away from the sharp division postulated by 
Descartes.
 In modern cognitive science, neurobiology, and psychology, Theory of 
Mind (conveniently differentiated now from earlier conceptions of the term 
by the acronym ToM) is once again, as it was for Descartes in the early mod-
ern period, an au courant area of investigation, and while the modern ToM 
remains a hypothesis, it is a highly well-regarded one often cited by devel-
opmental psychologists and neuroscientists alike as an explanation for why 
the vast majority of individuals with significant language deficits, especially 
receptive language, demonstrate a profound unawareness of what others 
might think and feel.22 Researchers such as Simon Baron-Cohen have found 
that ToM deficits are primarily typical of individuals with autism spectrum 
disorder (ASD). Baron-Cohen, an evolutionary psychologist at Cambridge 
University, describes ToM as the ability to infer “the full range of [another 
individual’s] mental states from [observing his or her] behavior,” and a key 
developmental feature that allows a person to distinguish between true and 
false belief.23 The beginning of ToM, as Michael Tomasello’s research would 
show, occurs in infancy, a point in an individual’s development of intersub-
jectivity when intentionality is ascribed to others and to self.24
 ASD is defined in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) as “The presence of markedly abnor-
mal or impaired development in social interaction and communication and 
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a markedly restricted repertoire of activity and interest”; the definition adds, 
“Younger individuals may have little or no interest in establishing friend-
ships,” and, further, “Older individuals may have an interest in friendship 
but lack understanding of the conventions of social interaction.”25 Regarding 
the ability to communicate effectively, the DSM-IV entry states, “The impair-
ment in communication is also marked and sustained and affects both ver-
bal and nonverbal skills.”26 The term “autism” was coined by Leo Kanner in 
1943, yet he and many psychologists before him had noted peculiar inabili-
ties in some individuals to access the social world that existed around them. 
Histories of the disorder note that in earlier times the disorder would have 
been categorized as profound emotional distress or “retardation.”27
 The causes for ASD and the attendant failure to develop ToM are cur-
rently hotly debated by a wide spectrum of specialists, including neurolo-
gists, neurobiologists, social psychologists, environmental biologists, and, 
most notably in recent years, immunologists. And although researchers pres-
ently do not agree on the causes of autism, there is wide agreement that 
so-called impaired social cognition and receptive and expressive language 
differences, characteristics of ASD that are comorbid with lack of ToM, 
result from problems with the interactivity between the superior tempo-
ral gyrus (STG), the amygdala, and medial prefrontal cortex.28 As Bigler et 
al. explain, “In autism . . . the interplay between impaired social cognition 
and deficits in communication, including verbal and nonverbal aspects of 
social communication, comes via a link between the STG and the amyg-
dala, and other frontotemporolimbic connections. Dysfunctions in this neu-
ral circuitry could easily contribute to  .  .  .  impaired language.”29 It is also 
widely held that the use of social scripts enables an individual with ASD 
and notably atypical ToM to begin “rewiring” his or her brain so that medi-
cally and socially defined normative social interaction is increasingly pos-
sible. Yet it should be noted that like ToM itself, the neurological substrates 
of this rewiring have not yet been identified.30 Changes in an individual’s 
behavior that are said to result from the intervening use of specific cognitive 
therapies, especially in children below the age of five, are cited as evidence 
that key neuropathways in the brain have undergone some fundamental 
alteration.
 In the late decades of the twentieth century, researchers in autistic brain 
function designed therapies and strategies for increasing these individuals’ 
awareness of pretense, but the longitudinal study of patients with ASD or 
those who exhibit atypical ToM development has revealed that this cognitive 
difference tends to remain pronounced throughout their lives.31 Those who 
exhibit variable ToM often require visual modes of communication in order 
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to compensate for nonstandard language reception if they are to understand 
what others may expect of them or how they are to complete a series of steps 
in a process.32 And research into this inability to understand the motiva-
tions, perspectives, beliefs, and emotions of others has revealed that “initial 
impairments in theory of mind may be further exacerbated as time goes on 
by poor expressive and receptive language abilities,” which then progressively 
limit their ability to engage in a wider social world.33 For these individuals, 
mechanisms must be identified that will allow them to compensate for atypi-
cal neurology, a neurology that results in their identification, and categoriza-
tion within the prevailing medical discourse, as cognitively disabled.
 The primary cognitive therapy that interventionists use to catalyze the 
development of ToM is known as social skills training, and the main tech-
niques used are the social script and the social story.34 A social script is a 
written text that involves the individual with ASD in a scenario of verbal 
exchange, a back-and-forth conversation, matched to appropriate nonverbal 
communication such as appropriate hand gestures and predictable eye con-
tact. Such scripts typically engage individuals in a customary conversation 
that allows him or her essentially to practice interacting with another per-
son along fairly predictable patterns of verbal exchange. The effectiveness of 
the social script technique stems from the very predictability of future social 
interactions that directly imitate or are strongly reminiscent of the scripted 
version. Individuals are taught how to socialize through this experience and 
are encouraged to generalize the pattern of exchange to include future such 
encounters. Socializing becomes conventional. Like the social script, the 
social story is a written text but a narrative that depicts common social situ-
ations, such as the most acceptable way to greet someone, the proper way to 
respond when someone is upset, and what behaviors are involved in attend-
ing church. Because those with ASD and/or atypical ToM “struggle to read, 
interpret, and respond .  .  . to their social world,” social stories are used by 
therapists to map out the kinds of interactions that are nearly autonomic for 
individuals who are neurotypical.35 Social stories break the social world down 
into micronarratives that can be learned the way one learns, for example, 
about genre (or, in this case, genres of social interaction). The genre of lyric 
includes a variety of more specific poetic forms, or microgenres, such as the 
sonnet and the ode, with the sonnet exemplifying a more rigid form than 
the ode, which is defined more by tone and purpose than it is by line length, 
stanzaic pattern, and meter. Yet for all the differences between the various 
microgenres within the larger genre of lyric, it is nonetheless possible to learn 
to identify each as distinct, and, perhaps most importantly, one can learn the 
basic features of each in order to reproduce them.
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the Early Modern Book of common prayer 
as cognitive and Social therapy
With its tripartite narrative design composed of an interweaving of the 
calendrical, doctrinal, and theological religious scripts that contain the story 
of the church, the Book of Common Prayer functioned for early modern 
individuals with atypical ToM (as well as for those who were neurotypical) as 
a macrosocial story, a collection of micronarratives that included the church’s 
calendar, the litany (doctrinal instruction and statements), collects (a com-
bination of basic theological tenets and prayer instruction),36 and scriptural 
passages from both Old and New Testaments. To learn to participate in the 
common prayer service necessarily involved one in the larger social life of 
the church community, since the basic patterns of church life were outlined 
and scripted in the Book of Common Prayer, the communal touchstone that 
bound individuals together. John N. Wall notes on this subject “Aggressively 
linear, prayer book worship links past and present in terms of the prom-
ise that [parishioners] share a common future; it enables ancient texts to 
become what makes possible the saying of something vital to the present and 
to glimpse an as yet unsayable future while it also enables modern texts to 
become facilitators of such interchanges.”37 The prayer book, in other words, 
serves the people as a historical narrative of their theological identity, linking, 
as Wall points out, the past to the present. For those exhibiting atypical ToM, 
a historical narrative aids them in constructing a reasonable and longitudinal 
understanding of where they came from in a historical sense and what the 
larger community of which they are a part expects to do in the future, thus 
eliminating some confusion regarding who they might be within a larger 
body of believers.38
 Thomas Cranmer, the primary architect of the Book of Common Prayer, 
was convinced that a prayer book and accompanying liturgy could unite 
English devotees of the Christian faith even as it spiritually transformed 
them. Cranmer believed that an ordered and theologically coherent narrative 
could standardize religious practice, a belief that reflects at least a nascent 
understanding of the formative power narrative held for shaping cognition 
and identity.39 This point about early modern English reformers is too often 
neglected. Critical neglect of this kind may be a result of scholars’ com-
mon assumption that individuals in the Elizabethan Church of England used 
the prayer book in merely a perfunctory manner. If scholars demonstrated 
instead that many individuals found the prayer book to be devotionally effi-
cacious, then they might also come to acknowledge its larger social func-
tion for the cognitively disabled within the church and wider community. 
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Ramie Targoff notes, for example, “Despite the prominence of the liturgi-
cal reforms that the prayer book introduced, their impact on early modern 
religious culture has often been underestimated,” and that “when historians 
have acknowledged the extent to which the prayer book sought to standard-
ize the devotional voice of both the laity and clergy, they have frequently 
represented this commitment to uniformity in terms of the religious estab-
lishment’s political, and not devotional, motivations. . . . Those sympathetic 
to ‘traditional religion’ have regarded common prayer as a superficial practice 
that had no real meaning for most English worshippers.”40
 Citing Patrick Collinson’s The Religion of Protestants as one well-known 
study of early modern reformed prayer book religion, Targoff notes that Col-
linson acknowledges how use of the prayer book resulted in greater religious 
conformity, though he “never imagines” that prayer book conformity no 
doubt fundamentally remade congregants’ devotional lives.41 Collinson does 
not conceive of prayer book conformity as desirable for many people, that 
is, or as a positive influence upon their personal—and not merely politi-
cally and socially expedient—faith commitments. In contrast, however, to 
this earlier work on Elizabethan prayer book religion, Judith Maltby treats 
the prayer book as “the most pervasive agent of change . . . in the religious 
consciousness and even affections of the English laity. Its success may be 
explained in part by the element of continuity it gave its users along with 
innovation.”42 Maltby’s central claim is that the prayer book “succeeded as an 
agent of change as well as of continuity from the middle of Elizabeth’s reign 
onwards,” evidencing a widespread commitment to its use as an efficacious 
devotional aid and not merely as a means of state-imposed conformity.43 
While historians of early modern England continue to debate the relative 
devotional significance of the Book of Common Prayer for those who were 
expected to make use of it, their critical discussion of its reformative effects 
upon parishioners, with few exceptions, continues to overlook the cognitive 
influence of its overarching narrative.
 In the 1559 edition of the prayer book is a section titled “Proper Lessons 
to be Read,” which details in the form of a chart, a kind of early modern 
spreadsheet or desk calendar, exactly which Old and New Testament pas-
sages, including the Proverbs and Psalms, were to be read on each day of 
the year. This was a programmatic approach to scripture instruction and one 
that, in its starkness (no textual commentary weaved either into the readings 
or in the form of notes at the bottom of the printed page), put readers into 
direct contact with the holy scriptures. And so, in addition to this section 
serving as the calendar for the church year, it exemplified a basic Reforma-
tion theological conviction that laity should be given direct access to scrip-
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ture. The calendar readings also usually coincide with the remembrance of 
a particularly significant figure in the history of the life of the church; they 
marked the beginnings and endings of elongated purification rites (such as 
fasts) and compelled laity to celebrate Christ’s birth, death, and resurrection. 
This calendrical narrative situated the passing of the days of the year within 
the larger symbolic history of the church and within the additional frame-
works of biblical knowledge and Reformed theological conviction.
 The church calendar is followed by scripted morning and evening prayers 
and then by the Litany, or the basic script for the church service that laity 
were to recite (or read) as a corporate body, thus subsuming individuals’ 
voices within the larger communal one. The Litany begins with the solemn 
recognition, “O God the Father of heaven: have mercy upon us miserable 
sinners. O God the Father of heaven: have mercy upon us miserable sin-
ners.”44 This structure of repeated lines is sustained throughout the Litany 
and would have been no doubt particularly effective at not merely reminding 
laity of their need for God’s mercy and grace but also uniting them in an act 
of scripted contrition, especially memorable for the cognitively disabled who 
required reminding and verbal, if not experiential, reinforcement, the kind 
that actively shaped one’s religious and social subjectivities.
 The Collects, Epistles, and Gospels immediately follow the Litany and 
were to be read in accordance with the church calendar. These collects were 
intended by Cranmer to involve the laity in a kind of second layering of 
prayer that logically should follow the laity’s corporate admission of sinful-
ness found in the Litany. But they were also micronarratives that piecemeal 
contributed to the prayer book’s construction of the larger Christian narra-
tive, and some even were intensely compressed narratives that would contain 
the entire story of Christ’s sacrificial redemption of humankind. In the first 
collect, for example, it reads: “Almighty God, give us grace that we may cast 
away the works of darkness, and put upon us the armor of light, now in the 
time of this mortal life (in the which thy Son Jesus Christ came to visit us 
in great humility); that in the last day, when he shall come again in glorious 
majesty to judge both the quick and the dead, we may rise to the life immor-
tal, through him who liveth and reigneth with thee and the Holy Ghost, 
now and ever. Amen.”45 For individuals with less acute ToM, this collect, 
repeated many times throughout the lifetime of the faithful, dutiful user of 
the prayer book, is an essential religious story that once learned marked the 
cognitively disabled person as a member of the larger social world accessed 
only through a corporately, publicly understood and privately embraced reli-
gious identity.
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 A careful reading of Cranmer’s writings in the 1540s and 1550s on the 
topic of the prayer book’s cognitive influence upon the people reveals that 
in his own thinking he made an important distinction between “heard” and 
read prayers, a distinction that further helps us understand the role of lit-
urgy in the lives of individuals with cognitive disability. Cranmer’s belief in 
the efficacy of narrative was limited to the hearing of it and not the reading 
of it.46 His preface, for example, to the English litany of 1544, a precursor 
to the vernacular liturgy, makes clear that the laity’s understanding should 
result from what “enters in at their ears,”47 noting later in his Preface first 
added to the prayer book of 1552, “Whereas St. Paul would have such lan-
guage spoken to the people in the church as they might understand and have 
profit by hearing the same, the service in this church of England (these many 
years) hath been read in Latin to the people, which they understood not, so 
that they have heard with their ears only: and their hearts, spirit and mind 
have not been edified thereby.”48 Cranmer does not appear to have been con-
vinced that the practice of reading the church service was more effective at 
“edifying” congregants. He privileges the heard prayer over the written and 
read. Returning to the preface of his Litany of 1544, Cranmer had written 
then, “These holy prayers and suffrages following are set forth of most godly 
zeal for edifying, and stirring of devotion of all true faithful christian hearts: 
so it thought convenient in this common prayer of procession to have it set 
forth and used in the vulgar tongue, for stirring the people to more devo-
tion: and it shall be every christian man’s part reverently to use the same.”49 
Cranmer’s primary concern for prayer book use was that the congregation 
prayed as if with one voice: this was the source of the book’s spiritual efficacy. 
Its power to “stir” primarily derived from hearing and not reading, from 
corporate voice that subsumed the individual. Conformity was key, and his 
comments regarding common prayer in the preface to his Litany and in the 
preface to the Book of Common Prayer demonstrate his belief that the aural 
was of greater value than the written and read.
 For those congregants who could not access the aural as successfully 
because of their varied (or different) mechanisms for language reception, 
this would have often presented a problem, one that might even constitute 
a threat to the conformity Cranmer sought to establish among the laity. Yet 
since Cranmer did not inveigh against the practice of prayer book read-
ing during a service, the possibility still existed for those who could read to 
access the larger subjectivity-shaping narrative that the prayer book repre-
sented. Moreover, one could also argue that because the reading of common 
prayer occurred within the context of the recitative church body, reading 
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was a means of attending to the aural in a manner that would not otherwise 
be possible, thus fulfilling Cranmer’s most basic goal for the use of common 
prayer.
I have commented on important findings in neurobiology that offer schol-
ars of the early modern era important insights into the role the Book of 
Common Prayer played for laity who were cognitively disabled. Yet the 
sciences are not the only disciplines to offer such insights. Scholarship in 
the field of narratology offers mutually confirming conclusions about the 
influence narrative has upon cognition and subject formation, whether an 
individual is neurotypical or struggling with language acquisition or related 
cognitive difficulties. This disciplinary interplay has rich potential for future 
investigations of cognitive disability and difference in the English Renais-
sance, and some theory of mind approaches to the study of literary texts and 
the reading experience are already under way.50 Jerome Bruner argues that 
for the study of narrative and its effects upon the mind, “The central concern 
is not how narrative as text is constructed, but rather how it operates as an 
instrument of mind in the construction of reality.”51
 How might the early modern religious subjectivity of the cognitively 
different have been shaped by the narratives woven together in the Book of 
Common Prayer? This is at core a structural question. Bruner would respond 
that “the best hope of hermeneutic analysis is to provide an intuitively con-
vincing account of the meaning of the text as a whole in the light of the 
constituent parts that make it up.”52 Combining calendrical, doctrinal, and 
theological narratives in a single text, and one to be used daily by nearly all 
those one knew, the early modern prayer book linked Protestant religious 
narrative to an individual’s identity. But this religious narrative also served as 
a social story that invited the cognitively disabled into fuller public existence. 
On the role of narrative in this sense, neuroscience and narratology seem to 
agree, mutually confirming a similar, if not the same, conclusion via seem-
ingly unrelated methodological and analytical approaches.
 The argument I have offered here—that the early modern Book of Com-
mon Prayer functioned simultaneously as a religious and social script and 
story and, by extension, an enculturating textual mechanism for parishio-
ners with atypical neurology—has much to suggest to modern historians of 
early modern England. It may be, for example, that theological statements 
and systems communicated in a homily or sermon were not enough to cre-
ate points of access to religious life for those who exemplified noticeable 
cognitive differences in their undirected or spontaneous social interactions. 
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Some individuals may have also required a concrete religious script, one that 
would have facilitated in the form of printed words in a handheld book con-
tent that also communicated larger social expectations, a point that Thomas 
Cranmer’s writings indeed suggest. A “social script” (to use the language of 
modern cognitive therapy), because it catalyzes comprehension in a way that 
the strictly aural cannot, may have been for early modern parishioners with 
variable ToM development the only effective means by which the abstract 
dimensions of public religious practice and private belief could be accessed, 
functioning then also as a primary facilitator of participation in the larger 
social sphere that was characteristically recognized, in the medically defined 
language of early modern England, as normative.
 Written and circulated in parishes nearly one hundred years before Des-
cartes formulated his famous phrase and theory of mind, the Book of Com-
mon Prayer nonetheless functions as a projection and materialization of the 
power of reason to impose itself upon scattered theological writings, church 
creeds, calendars, and rites. In the same way that institutions of all kinds 
commit to print their basic policies and procedures for self-governance, cre-
ating what might be usefully termed a paper infrastructure, the prayer book 
functioned as a paper infrastructure of the religious mind. It was, in other 
words, a textual apparatus that recorded the ordering capacities of human 
reason and reflexively and habitually, through repeated use, influenced the 
continued ordering of the mind and self, making no distinction between the 
mind of persons who were cognitively atypical and those defined by early 
modern medical discourse as “normal.”
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the history of early modern political thought is not just a history of particular figures—mostly “able-bodied” men—who wrote political and philosophical treatises but a history of concepts as well. The early 
modern era ushered in a way of thinking about humans’ relationship to 
God, government, and each other that turned on new conceptions of obliga-
tion, duty, justice, equality, and freedom. The last of these concepts is argu-
ably the most central. Indeed, one could say that modern political thought 
began with a thought experiment that centered on a first principle of natural 
freedom: the state of nature, from which men emerged to form civil soci-
ety, postulates freedom as a first principle of human nature, a fundamen-
tal building block of the modernist definition of “human being.” Starting 
humans in “a State of perfect Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose 
of their Possessions, and Persons as they think ﬁt,”1 social contract theorists, 
most notably Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, defined natural freedom in 
a very particular way that showcased the individual as divorced from cul-
ture, society, and natural relationships. This conception then became the 
foundation for all other Enlightenment concepts: obligation was defined by 
way of a “social contract” that involved people making free choices to give 
up their natural liberty in exchange for social order and political freedom; 
equality was defined as an equality of right, and an equality of freedom; 
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justice was defined by redressing unequal impositions on entitlement and 
rights, and thereby unequal restrictions of liberty. Putting liberty at the cen-
ter of humans’ moral universe, and this particular way in which freedom was 
conceptualized, was to retain a solid hold on the philosophical and political 
imagination for the centuries to follow, up to the present day.
 This concept of freedom has particular implications for persons with dis-
abilities, not just in the seventeenth century but today as well. This essay will 
show various ways in which Hobbes’s and Locke’s conceptions of freedom 
depend on a particular body with particular physical and mental capacities 
and orientations, a particular set of assumptions about what constitutes a 
human being, and a particular set of social relations that exclude disabled 
individuals from the role of political citizen. My aim is not to fault Hobbes’s 
and Locke’s views of disability per se, however. Rather, it is to shed light 
on a concept of freedom that derives from Hobbes and Locke but persists 
into twenty-first-century political theory and philosophy. This conception 
of freedom fails to appreciate the disability perspective and, in the process, 
takes a historically specific view of disability and turns it into a transhistori-
cal universal. It not only fails to reflect the experience of disabled persons, 
however; it also implicitly draws on the disabled body to articulate the lim-
iting conditions of freedom. While starting their conceptualizations from 
assertions about the universality and naturalness of freedom, they reveal a 
conceptual dependency on the abilities of particular bodies, and especially 
disabled bodies, as a way to illustrate the meaning of freedom: what the dis-
abled body or mind can or cannot do shapes the parameters of what free-
dom can mean. The deployment of disability imagery in these early works, 
though often subtle, is nevertheless significant in pointing out the “ableism” 
in the assumptions we bring to our understanding of freedom today.
 From the start such a project might seem anachronistic; as those who 
explore gender and race in leading canonical figures can attest, there is often 
so little material to work with that arguments can become weak, even distort-
ing the original texts. Admittedly, Hobbes and Locke do not say a great deal 
about disability. Moreover, as Skinner, Pocock, and other historians of politi-
cal thought have shown us, a theorist’s use and meaning of concepts must 
always be situated in their specific historical and social contexts.2 And the sit-
uation of disabled individuals in the seventeenth century was quite different 
from today. In the first place, there may have been far fewer disabled people 
then. As Rushton bemoans, the lack of consistent record-keeping makes a 
count of disabled people in the seventeenth century impossible to determine; 
most records that exist, for example, are concerned solely with “idiocy” and 
“lunacy.”3 But we can also surmise that, despite the troubled reputation of 
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“the medical model” in twentieth- and twenty-first-century disability stud-
ies, medical advances have resulted in vastly improved longevity for a wide 
variety of disabling conditions, indeed making it possible for people with 
certain conditions to live at all.4 Second, much of the assistive technology 
we have today was clearly not available then; though there is evidence of a 
wheelchair dating to the sixth century b.c.e., and King Phillip II of Spain—
who was not disabled—had a wheelchair made for him at the very end of the 
sixteenth century, it was not until the twentieth century that the wheelchair 
as we know it came into common usage. Prosthetics were relatively crude, 
and electronic assistive devices were obviously unavailable. Thus the limita-
tions of the physical world may have been greater for disabled people in the 
seventeenth century.
 At the same time, we must acknowledge the probability that contem-
porary society, with its pollution, processed food, and stress, has likely pro-
duced many more disabilities and disabling diseases.5 Furthermore, more 
one-story living, no curbed sidewalks, and other manifestations of industrial 
society, as well as the lack of stigma for those with “peg legs,” eye patches, 
and crutches may have meant that the seventeenth-century world was not 
as disabling for certain impairments as it is today. Henri-Jacques Stiker’s 
history of disability suggests, in fact, that although the mentally and physi-
cally disabled were seen as struck by afflictions from God, which must be 
borne by those individuals, whose families and communities cared for them 
out of Christian charity, they were also—indeed thereby—fairly well inte-
grated within the “normal” community throughout the seventeenth cen-
tury.6 Rushton’s consideration of official court records suggests that although 
some persons were put in jail and houses of correction, significant percent-
ages of cognitively disabled individuals lived in the custody of relatives, 
while others “were left in virtual independence . . . with no hint of custody 
or care by others.”7 Similarly, although Foucault dates “the great confine-
ment” of the insane, which often included individuals with only physical 
impairments, to the seventeenth century, Roy Porter maintains that in Eng-
land the mentally disabled were not institutionalized in great numbers until 
the late eighteenth and, more likely, nineteenth centuries.8 Disabled indi-
viduals were thus both a commonplace and intimate part of the dominant 
society and excluded from it in various ways. Locke and Hobbes therefore 
must undoubtedly have encountered disabled people in their societies, even 
if not explicitly discussing them at length in their theories. And as I will 
show, their brief references to and invocations of various disabilities play a 
subtle but significant role in defining who, or what, is an appropriate “sub-
ject” of freedom.
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 A final prefatory note: in this essay, I should note that I use the terms 
“disabled” and “disability” to refer to people with bodily and mental impair-
ments. This should not be taken as an uncritical endorsement of a medi-
cal model approach to disability—though that would probably accurately 
describe the attitudes of the theorists I consider here. But the terms “impair-
ment” and “handicap” are equally problematic and ambiguous, and since 
this essay focuses on the specific issue of freedom rather than the meaning 
of disability itself, I suggest that, fully cognizant of the social model of dis-
ability, we also must realize that seventeenth-century society was not partic-
ularly accessible to people with a wide range of non-normative conditions. 
Thus anyone with such conditions would be, by definition, “disabled.” But 
the more important concern I have here is whether such people could also 
ever be “free,” and what implications that has for the meaning of the concept 
itself.9
thomas hobbes: ability as the Limit of Liberty
“A free-man is he, that in those things, which by his strength and wit he is 
able to do, is not hindered to doe what he has a will to.”10 With these words, 
Thomas Hobbes arguably ushered in the modernist conception of freedom. 
It is generally accepted among historians of political theory that Thomas 
Hobbes was one of the first of the early modern figures to focus on liberty 
as a central element of his theory of human nature and of politics. Quen-
tin Skinner notes that as Hobbes’s work progressed throughout his life, he 
became more and more concerned with defining liberty as a key intellec-
tual project, culminating in Leviathan.11 But equally important is Hobbes’s 
role as a founding figure in the modern conception of freedom, namely, the 
conception that we take for granted today. What Isaiah Berlin was later to 
call “negative liberty”—freedom as the absence of restraint, interference, and 
coercion, the most basic understanding of freedom today12—finds its most 
coherent articulation in Hobbes’s famous definition, “By liberty, is under-
stood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of 
externall impediments: which impediments, may oft take away part of man’s 
power to do what he would.  .  .  . Liberty, or freedom, signifieth (properly) 
the absence of Opposition; (by Opposition, I mean externall Impediments 
of motion)” (Leviathan 14, 189; 21, 261).
 There are two parts to Hobbes’s account. The first is the fact that obsta-
cles must lie outside the self, they are “external”; second is the relationship 
between freedom and ability, or what Hobbes calls “power.” Most contem-
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porary theorists who write on Hobbes focus on the “hindrances” or restraints 
caused by “external impediments,” but an equally important dimension of 
Hobbes’s definition is ability or power: that “which by his strength and wit 
he is able to do.” Both of these aspects are significant for disability theory, 
but it is arguably the case that the latter aspect of his definition is most sig-
nificant, for it has become such an important assumption of contemporary 
freedom theory as to merit hardly any notice.
 For Hobbes, this criterion of ability—like freedom itself—is applied to 
animate and inanimate beings alike.13 Thus a stone that “lyeth still” is no 
more unfree than “a man . . . fastned to his bed by sicknesse,” because both 
simply lack the ability to move (Leviathan 21, 262); it is as much the prop-
erty of stones not to be able to move under their own force as it is for some-
one with a bad case of flu or a severe spinal injury to be unable to rise from 
her bed. What prevents them from motion lies within themselves, and free-
dom concerns the absence or presence of strictly external obstacles.
 This invocation of illness is startling. The image that most harshly strikes 
the twenty-first-century disability scholar is the comparison of the disabled 
or ill person to a “stone”—not merely an inanimate object, but possibly the 
most inanimate of objects in the common imagination. In this, of course, 
twenty-first-century scholars will also note the collapsing of the two catego-
ries of illness and disability together, a move that is justified by the seven-
teenth-century view of disability and the profound lack of knowledge about 
the variety of specific disorders that produce specific impairments. But the 
point from Hobbes’s perspective is that in his strictly descriptive account, 
if freedom presupposes ability, disabled individuals are not made unfree by 
their conditions. Instead, those conditions define the limiting condition of 
their freedom.
 It might be suggested that what the sick man and stone lack is not abil-
ity but will; the man may be so ill as to not wish to arise, and the stone has 
no will at all. However, Hobbes’s particular construal of the will rules this 
out, for he collapses will into desire. We are driven by appetites and aver-
sions, and hence “No man can determine his own will. For the will is appe-
tite; nor can a man more determine his will than any other appetite, that is, 
more than he can determine when he shall be hungry and when not. When 
a man is hungry, it is in his choice to eat or not eat; this is the liberty of the 
man. But to be hungry or not hungry, which is that which I hold to pro-
ceed from necessity, is not in his choice.”14 Will is the function of desire, and 
desire simply comes to us, it is not something that we choose. I choose only 
whether and how to fulfill (or deny) my desires, not whether to have them; 
“One can, in truth, be free to act; one cannot, however, be free to desire.”15
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 By the criteria of pursuing desire, we might want to argue that Hobbes is 
logically committed to the conclusion that disabled people, like nondisabled 
people, lack liberty insofar as “external impediments” prevent them from 
doing particular things; they cannot be “free” or “unfree” in general. Hobbes 
rejects the general notion of “a free man,” despite his own use of this term 
throughout his writings, saying that we can really talk only about being free 
to do specific things. Hobbes does not envision, as contemporary freedom 
theorists do, humans having “life plans” or “projects” that define their being 
but rather a more discrete and temporal sense of life, perhaps based on his 
fearful account of human nature. Such an account might bode well for the 
freedom of disabled individuals; if I cannot walk across the room, that does 
not mean that I am not free to do other things. I am free to do whatever I 
can do.
 But the logic of Hobbes’s construal also suggests that if I cannot walk 
across the room, all I need is to not want to cross the room, and I would 
thereby be free. For in Hobbes’s account, if my legs cannot support me, this 
fact of my body is likely to restructure my desires: that is, I may not want to 
endure the effort that would be required of me to cross the room. Return-
ing to Stiker’s argument that disability was seen as an affliction from God 
that must be borne, combined with the absence of many assistive technolo-
gies, the seventeenth-century disabled person would have had to adjust her 
sense of desire to the realm of what it was possible for her to do. This view 
meshes perfectly with Hobbes’s: according to him, if I am torn between two 
desires, “deliberation” consists in a vacillation between “contrary appetites,” 
and between appetite and aversion, weighing the balance of what would help 
me more or hurt me less. Thus in one of his more infamous examples, if a 
robber threatens to kill me if I refuse to hand over my wallet, I act freely in 
choosing to give up my money in order to save my life. Fear has only given 
me a reason for making a particular choice that expresses my immediate, or 
more intense, desire. “Extrinsical” factors that prevent me from doing what I 
want impede my liberty—such as when I push you away from the door and 
physically prevent you from leaving the room—but not those that cause me 
to change what I want—such as when my threat to hit you if you leave the 
room results in your deciding that you do not want to leave the room.
 Additionally, freedom is an either/or proposition for Hobbes, not a mat-
ter of degree. I cannot be more or less free: either I can do what I want, or I 
cannot. And that “can” is strictly defined by the limits of my inherent abil-
ity; for me to complain that I am unfree because I want to walk across the 
surface of the ocean and cannot do so would involve a nonsensical use of the 
term “freedom.” Humans are physically unable to walk on water, and there-
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fore my desire is not the proper subject of the concept “liberty.” Rather, it is 
the product of “fancy,” “madnesse,” or “lunacy.” Similarly, if I am physically 
unable to walk across the room, my desire to do so is not the proper object 
of liberty. That does not mean that I am not free to try to cross the room 
by dragging myself across the floor, or supporting myself on my arms on a 
series of rails, for instance. Again, because such effort is more difficult, even 
dangerous, than the act of walking across the room is for an ambulatory per-
son, we might think that the latter is intrinsically freer than the former; but 
Hobbes would disagree. If getting across the room is so difficult and tiring 
that I decide it is not worth the effort, then, Hobbes says, that shows that 
I just don’t want to do it. My decision to sit where I am, therefore, is a free 
one. The disabled person might have a different number of things that he is 
free to do, but he does not thereby have lesser freedom. And if I think it is 
worth the effort but I fail, then that simply demonstrates that I am unable 
to do it, and therefore freedom does not enter the matter.
 This distinction might seem simply semantic for most twenty-first-cen-
tury readers, who will likely believe that the scope of freedom for the dis-
abled person is more circumscribed than it is for the nondisabled person. 
There is a certain disingenuousness to the Hobbesian account of freedom 
from a twenty-first-century disability perspective, as he simply defines away 
the challenge that disability poses. But given the influence of Hobbes on 
contemporary thinking about freedom, we cannot simply dismiss it. Fur-
thermore, we have to recall that this argument is coming from someone who 
thought that absolute monarchy was the surest way to escape the uncer-
tainties of the state of nature, and that all men would rationally choose to 
give up much of their natural liberty to such a sovereign power: built into 
his conception of the social contract is a severe curtailment of the kinds of 
freedoms that we take for granted in contemporary liberal democracies, like 
the freedom to criticize the government. This curtailment was universal, not 
dependent on differences in various men’s and women’s abilities.16
 The importance of being able to make the choices that Hobbes deems 
rational—to make the “right” choices, whether we realize it or not—sug-
gests that Hobbes’s text may relate more to cognitive disability than physical. 
In addition to the passage cited earlier of “a man . . . fastned to his bed by 
sicknesse,” Hobbes makes reference to some physical impairments, such as 
“Epilepsie, or Falling-sickness,” to serve as an analogy for academic religion’s 
effect on the state (Leviathan 29, 371). He refers to lameness as an example 
of fraud: “two men conspiring, one to seem lame, the other to cure him with 
a charme” (37, 476); and again in discussing salvation, he refers to scriptural 
passages in which sickness and lameness are cured (38, 492). But his refer-
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ences to cognitive disabilities are more frequent, particularly to “Madnesse.” 
He distinguishes madness from lunacy, which is a specific form of madness; 
he refers to “Lunatiques” in critiquing the inaccuracy with which people talk 
about “Evill Spirits . . . entered into men” (34, 441). But madness is a fairly 
universalizable concept for him, merely an overabundance of passion, which 
can be temporary (as in intense jealousy or rage) or longer lasting (leading 
to distraction). This condition is possible in all men, and indeed one could 
argue that Hobbes believes it was the main cause of the English civil war. 
Curbing this madness, this overabundance of passion, is the purpose of men’s 
giving up natural liberty to an absolute monarch in Hobbes’s account of the 
social contract.
 But in curbing passion, we curb our freedom: passions are the primary 
motivating force for human action, but they paradoxically often interfere 
with our ability to choose what is in our best interest. If we are rational, 
thinking about our survival, we will consent to establish a sovereign power 
with absolute authority to rein in the passions and limit our natural liberty 
by creating law and punishing those, including ourselves, who break the 
law. Since this is the only rational choice that we can possibly make in the 
state of nature, those who fail to consent to the social contract must in fact 
have intended to consent to it whether they realize it or not; for anyone who 
chooses to violate his own interests “is not to be understood as if he meant 
it” (14, 192).17 All such passions as vainglory, rage, jealousy, and so forth can 
be seen as instances of madness, thus justifying others to speak on his behalf: 
“Children, Fooles, and Madmen that have no use of Reason, may be Person-
ated by Guardians, or Curators” (16, 219). Thus all are obligated to the con-
tract regardless of whether they (think they) want to or not, for “as well he 
that Voted for it, as he that Voted against it, shall Authorize all the Actions 
and Judgements, of that Man, or Assembly of men, in the same manner, as 
if they were his own” (18, 229).
 In other words, Hobbes defines freedom based on the assumption that 
many, perhaps most, men are driven by various forms of madness, and he 
constructs his social contract accordingly. This is the paradox of modern free-
dom; it is only by freely choosing to curtail our freedom that we can be free. 
And given the ease with which any of us can be mad temporarily, such as 
when we are in a jealous rage, or in a frenzy of “blind lust,” Hobbes might be 
taken to be saying that disabled persons are not that different from nondis-
abled persons: we can all go into the depths of passion-driven madness, but 
the difference is the ease and speed with which some of us can “come back.”
 Indeed, Hobbes does not think that impairments—cognitive or physi-
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cal—“disable” one from participating in the social contract or being a civil 
subject per se, because even if one is not capable of giving express consent, 
we can still infer it from the fact that all humans would rather not live in 
the “nasty, brutish, and short” state of nature. Furthermore, Hobbes even 
more explicitly grants civil status to disabled individuals when he argues that 
“whereas many men, by accident unevitable, become unable to maintain 
themselves by their labour; they ought not to be left to the Charity of private 
persons,” running contrary to dominant views about the poor at this time; 
instead, the sovereign has a duty to provide economically for such individu-
als “by the Lawes of the Common-wealth,” an early version of social welfare 
entitlements (Leviathan 30, 387). This strongly suggests that disabled people 
are civil subjects, entitled to civil recognition by the sovereign just as much 
as nondisabled ones, with the same civic freedom to act within the bounds 
of law.
 So in one sense, disabled individuals are no less free than the nondis-
abled in Hobbes’s view; they may have a different range of things that they 
may be free to do, but it is not necessarily a lesser range. Whether disabled 
people are free or not in Hobbes’s view, however, may be less significant than 
the way in which he uses images of disability, such as madness and sick-
ness, to demarcate the limits of liberty at the limits of ability. And in this 
the verdict is clearer: I must have a power in order to make its nonexercise a 
question of freedom. Insofar as disabled people lack certain powers, we can-
not say that they are unfree to exercise them. We can only say that they are 
“unable.” Indeed, given the extreme way in which Hobbes defines the con-
cept, freedom is not even a relevant concern for such individuals, by defini-
tion. If freedom is at issue only when other people prevent me from doing 
what I otherwise could, then when my own impairments prevent me from 
doing something, they make me unable, not unfree. This semantic distinc-
tion, which seems rather disingenuous to twenty-first-century readers famil-
iar with the social model of disability, is really a philosophical and political 
one in Hobbes’s account, for it defines “the individual” as self-contained and 
contextless, and “freedom” as running contrary to the rational self-interest of 
such abstract individuals. Such assumptions can only lead to a political form 
of absolute monarchy. Moreover, his definitions of both freedom and mad-
ness suggest that freedom, while a central feature of humanity, is not actually 
an important quality for most people who are driven by passions. This is a 
troubling conclusion given Hobbes’s influence on twenty-first-century ideas 
of freedom, but it shows the ways in which Hobbes’s construction of free-
dom depends on his deployment of disability and the “able” body.
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John Locke: property, Reason, and ability
John Locke, the other great seventeenth-century figure in the history of 
freedom theory, made a quite different assessment, though agreeing with 
Hobbes on many fundamentals. In his Essay Concerning Human Under-
standing, Locke makes a clear distinction between the terms “voluntary” and 
“free,” the former referring to the will and desire, the latter to the physical 
conditions that permit or prevent my acting on my will. Locke says, much 
like Hobbes, that “Liberty is not an Idea belonging to Volition,” for willing 
is different from acting on the will. But the theoretical meaning of not act-
ing as one wills is not the reduction it is for Hobbes. For Locke, when “a 
Palsie” prevents my legs from moving me across the room when I want to 
move, “there is want of freedom.”18 This suggests that Locke allows for inter-
nal barriers to freedom; my own legs can prevent me from enacting my will. 
Although will may be a necessary condition for freedom to exist, it is not a 
sufficient condition; indeed, Locke says that “Liberty cannot be, where there 
is no Thought, no Volition, no Will; but there may be Thought, there may 
be Will, there may be Volition, where there is no Liberty” (Essay 2.21.8). 
Accordingly, “there is want of Freedom, though the sitting still even of a 
Paralytick, whilst he prefers it to a removal, is truly voluntary” (2.21.11). In 
other words, even if a “paralytick” doesn’t want to move from where he is sit-
ting, his inability to move demarcates a limitation on his freedom regardless 
of what he desires. The paralysis is, to all intents and purposes, a barrier to 
his freedom, though it may not be confounding his will.
 Thus, contrary to Hobbes, Locke seems to believe that my will can be 
at odds with my freedom. Certainly, as with Hobbes, we still do not yet 
advance to the paradox posed by Rousseau, wherein following appetite is 
“slavery” and freedom entails following laws that I prescribe to myself.19 But 
contrary to Hobbes, my own body—or rather its limitations—can serve as 
a “barrier” to my freedom, as in the case of the “paralytick.” For both theo-
rists, however, the particularities of one’s body and one’s ability constitute the 
limiting condition of freedom. For Hobbes, the disabled person’s freedom 
concerns a more limited range of activities; for Locke, the disabled person is 
simply less free.
 But in both cases, the universality of freedom is based on a set of assump-
tions about a very particular kind of body. As C. B. Macpherson has argued, 
it is a relatively wealthy body;20 as feminists have shown, it is a male body;21 
as critical race theorists have argued, it is a white body.22 But I suggest that 
it is also an “able” body: able to engage in certain kinds of physical action, 
particularly labor, and in rational thought. Labor is particularly important 
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to Locke because it is central to property: God gives all humans “property in 
the person,” and by adding my labor to things in nature, they become my 
property. This understanding of property is the engine that moves his entire 
theory, and property is the key to individual freedom.
 At first glance the criteria of labor may seem to be negated by wealth. 
After all, a physically disabled property owner would be little different from 
a nondisabled one: both would hire laborers to work the land for them. But 
in order to be a free agent, the owner would have to engage in some sort of 
labor, either mental or physical. Locke was highly critical of wealthy people 
who squandered their inheritances and contributed nothing to enhancing 
the value of their estates. The connection—and distinction—between these 
two is reason. “Right reason” involves the full engagement of the mind, 
requiring the learning of Latin and mathematics, and thus could be devel-
oped by a wealthy but physically disabled son who could run his inherited 
estate as long as he had a foreman (or a younger brother) he could trust to 
tour the estate on a regular basis and make sure that the workers (who were 
inclined toward laziness) were doing what they should do.
 By contrast to “right reason,” reason simpliciter allows considerable gra-
dation and is generally linked not merely to class, as Macpherson argued, 
but to the kind of labor associated with class. Hence, Locke says, “a coun-
try gentleman, who, leaving Latin and learning in the University, removes 
thence to his mansion house, and associates with neighbors . .  . who relish 
nothing but hunting and a bottle” may become a judge or magistrate owing 
to “the strength of his purse and party.” But he is still inferior in reason to 
“an ordinary coffee-house gleaner of the City,” because the latter is being 
industrious, while the former dissipates his learning and his mind. And even 
within the working classes, there is gradation: “The day laborer in a country 
village has commonly but a small pittance of knowledge, because his ideas 
and notions have been conﬁned to the narrow bounds of a poor conversation 
and employment; the low mechanic of a country town does somewhat outdo 
him; porters and cobblers of great cities surpass them.” On the bottom were 
the unemployed, beggars, and those on parish relief.23
 The majority of seventeenth-century physically disabled persons were 
likely to occupy the latter categories, as Locke’s “Essay on the Poor Law” sug-
gests. The point of his essay is the reform of the poor laws, urging the shift 
from outdoor parish relief (or direct payments to the poor), which was estab-
lished by Elizabeth I, to work programs (or “indoor relief ”). The disabled 
had been linked since the thirteenth century to the “deserving poor,” who 
were willing but unable to work, contrasted to the “undeserving” poor who 
were simply social misfits or lazy. According to Anita Silvers, a category of 
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“disabled” was designated that lumped together “persons with quite different 
disabilities into a single inferior class” to constitute the “deserving” poor.24 In 
Locke’s writings, this would seem to include three distinct categories of dis-
ability. The first is physical, and the one explicit recognition of physical dis-
ability causing an inability to work is found in his writings on the Irish linen 
trade, where Locke urged double the normal relief allowance for “any double 
wheel spinner” in the trade who became unable to work due to injury on the 
job.25 The purpose of such provision was to make such work more attractive 
rather than any specific concern for “disability rights” or freedom, but such 
provisions indicate that Locke acknowledged the existence of the physically 
disabled and a social responsibility to provide for those with physical dis-
ability who were unable to work, particularly those who became disabled as 
a result of industrious labor, which signaled good “deserving” character.
 The second category included the severely cognitively disabled. The few 
scholars who have discussed Locke in terms of disability have focused on his 
remarks on “ideots” and “lunaticks.” As Stacy Clifford suggests, in Locke’s 
work “idiocy reflects a deformed mirror image of the ideal citizen’s rationality 
and freedom.”26 Though Locke talks at considerable length about “brutes, 
idiots and madmen” in terms of their relationship to reason, their compari-
son to “natural man” in the state of nature, and their ability to develop rea-
son, he treats their relationship to freedom with efficient dispatch:
if through defects that may happen out of the ordinary course of Nature, 
any one comes not to such a degree of Reason, wherin he might be sup-
posed capable of knowing the Law [whether natural or positive] and so 
living within the Rules of it, he is never capable of being a Free Man, he 
is never let loose to the disposure of his own Will (because he knows no 
bounds to it, has not Understanding, its proper Guide) but is continued 
under the Tuition and Government of others, all the time his own Under-
standing is uncapable of that Charge. And so Lunaticks and Ideots are 
never set free from the Government of their Parents. (Two Treatises 2.60)
These two categories of disabled individuals constitute the “deserving poor,” 
because they are dependent on others through no fault of their own. The 
“undeserving poor,” however, posed a different kind of problem, and in fact 
I want to suggest they constitute a third kind of “disability” in the form of 
irrationality. Locke’s essay, written during England’s “seven barren years,” 
from 1692 to 1699, when pauperism was extremely common and 2 per-
cent of the British population owned 65 percent of the land,27 nevertheless 
asserted that poverty resulted “not from scarcity of provisions, nor from want 
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of employment for the poor, since the goodness of God has blessed these 
times with plenty,” but rather from “the relaxation of discipline and corrup-
tion of manners; virtue and industry being as constant companions on the 
one side as vice and idleness are on the other.”28 Locke argued that poverty 
was caused by lack of reason—for why would anyone choose to be poor? 
Since economic opportunities were always available, those who were poor 
must be so because they simply did not understand the necessity of work; 
and as long as parish relief was offered, allowing such individuals to get 
something for nothing, that lack of understanding would persist.
 But in contrast to “ideocy and lunacy,” such irrationality could be “cured” 
by labor, as Locke the physician tacitly adopts a medical model approach to 
this particular form of cognitive disability. So Locke prescribed various forms 
of forced labor: those who asked for relief would be made to work for mem-
bers of the parish “at a lower rate than is usually given” (“Essay” 188). Such 
an outcome, Locke believed, would quickly teach the rationally deficient 
poor that they should seek work on their own, since the pay would be bet-
ter and there was no alternative of a free lunch. Begging was subject to even 
harsher treatment: adult male beggars served as enforced labor aboard sail-
ing ships for three years; women would be assigned to forced labor locally 
for three months, and children for six weeks. But he also recommended 
permits for begging, claiming that some were “entitled” to beg, just as some 
were entitled to parish relief, because they were genuinely unable to work. 
Presumably these permits were to go to the first two categories of disabled 
people, as well as the “infirm,” once again deploying the trope of the “deserv-
ing poor.”
 I postulate this not because Locke explicitly designated the “infirm” 
as unable to work but because almost everybody else was included in the 
rather large sweep of those who he claimed could work. For instance, Locke 
claimed that poor mothers should work, at least part time. Moreover, their 
children would be put into “working schools,” which were basically wool fac-
tories, not only to free up the mothers’ time for wage labor but also so the 
children could provide for their own upkeep and, most importantly, learn 
the lesson that working for your living is an important aspect of civil society. 
Elderly people, of course, worked until they could no longer do so. That left, 
for the most part, the physically and cognitively disabled. Moreover, given 
the harshness of his measures, with children as young as three in working 
schools, and his assumption that most beggars and requesters of parish relief 
were simply lazy, the level of disability that would entitle one to “deserve” 
parish relief, a begging permit, or a linen trade pension would have to be 
quite severe.
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 But in all three cases, disability, defined by the inability to work, links 
to freedom for Locke in a significant way: through rationality. In Locke’s 
account, freedom has an intimate relationship to reason; hence in the previ-
ous quote that “ideots and lunaticks” are never “free from the Government 
of their Parents,” Locke describes lack of freedom not on its own terms but 
rather by talking about reason, which is what leads to his abrupt conclusion. 
Freedom is about doing what I wish; but desire itself, what I wish, must be 
“within the bounds of the law of nature” and “reason . . . is that law” (Two 
Treatises 2.4, 2.6). Thus, insofar as cognitively disabled individuals are unable 
to utilize reason like “normal men,” they are, according to Locke, unable to 
achieve freedom.29
 Yet why the “Poor Law” essay, in particular, is so revealing is that, just as 
Hobbes’s conception of madness could include most people, Locke’s concep-
tualization of reason is one that might well exclude large numbers of “normal 
men” who are illiterate laborers. Indeed, Locke had fairly minimal hopes for 
the reason of the poor; getting them to understand the value of work would 
be about as much as could be hoped in the usual course. This was not neces-
sarily because of inadequate natural capacity, however—since God provides 
all (or most) men with that—but rather because the circumstances of pov-
erty prevent them from developing it; the “constant drudgery to their backs 
and their bellies”30 means that laborers have insufficient time and energy to 
develop reason. This distinction did not apply to “ideots” because they sim-
ply lacked innate capacity. In this, “lunaticks” were better off; they had the 
capacity to reason. Their problem was that they applied their reason to faulty 
premises (e.g., believing “I am the king” when I am not). Locke seemed to 
believe, then, that “lunaticks” had the potential to regain their equilibrium, 
much as Hobbes seemed to believe about madmen.31
 The average illiterate worker, however, insofar as Locke viewed him or 
her as disabled by irrationality, could be, as noted above, “cured” specifi-
cally through labor and reading scripture on Sundays.32 But such “cure” was 
limited in his view: illiterate workers could never attain the “right reason” 
that seemed to be required of true citizens, those who could vote and hold 
office; they could only ever attain enough reason to obey the laws and work 
hard. Class mobility—the logical outcome of a “full cure” in the Lockean 
framework—was not yet commonplace in seventeenth-century capitalism 
and was therefore not something that Locke could readily employ in his 
argument, but working was nevertheless key to rationality. Though “God 
gave the World to Men in Common,” he speciﬁcally “gave it to the use 
of the Industrious and Rational  .  .  . not to the Fancy or Covetousness of 
the Quarrelsome and Contentious” (2.34). After all, land in its uncultivated 
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state was useless; thus “God, when he gave the World in common to all 
Mankind, commanded Man also to labour, and the penury of his Condition 
required it of him” (2.32). God set things up in such a way that we were 
compelled to industry, as “Labour was to be his [man’s] Title to” property 
and we needed property to stay alive. Hence, “God and his [i.e., man’s] Rea-
son commanded him to subdue the Earth” (2.34, 2.32). For those in whom 
rationality seemed insufficiently developed or, more specifically, those who 
seemed not to appreciate God’s gift (whether they have a “defect in nature” 
or are “nurtured in vices” and “love the darkness”),33 work would have to 
be coerced. Forcing people to work would enhance individuals’ freedom by 
enhancing their basic rationality—at least, if their “defect in nature” was 
not too great. The implication that the poor are “disabled” because they 
lack rationality dovetails with the assumption that the way to enhance their 
rationality is to force them to work. Work is the cure for this particular form 
of potentially widespread disability, just as absolute obedience is the cure for 
Hobbes.
 In all three cases, however—physical disability and the two kinds of cog-
nitive disability, ranging from incurable “ideots” and lunaticks” to the lazy 
poor—we are left with the conclusion that disabled people are unfree in 
Locke’s view. The improperly working bodies of the physically disabled pre-
vent them from doing certain things, regardless of what they want, like the 
“paralytick” discussed earlier. And insofar as the physically disabled cannot 
participate in labor, the key to gaining property, their rationality will likely 
decline unless they find some other way to be useful and productive. Those 
disabled individuals who can work to support themselves, of course, are bet-
ter off on this score. The cognitively disabled are similarly unfree because 
they lack the ability to reason altogether. To the extent that “lunaticks” have 
reason but use it wrongly, they are just as unfree as if they had no reason 
at all. People’s reason and wills must be driven to the right choices: “change 
but a Man’s view of these things; let him see that Virtue and Religion are 
necessary to his Happiness” (Essay 2.21.60). Such direction of the will is not 
constraint but liberty, for “The being acted by a blind impulse from without, 
or from within, is little odds” (2.21.67). In the third category, poor unem-
ployed people who prefer begging or parish relief to hard work, who thereby 
demonstrate that they have faulty reasoning, Locke uses external force or 
constraint to remove internal blockage or compulsion because what is essen-
tial to attaining freedom is choosing well. To be an agent, we must not only 
think critically about our choices but also make the right choices—the path 
to which, Locke indicates, is clear, even if not everyone can see it. Disabled 
persons, then, are not the proper subjects of liberty in Locke’s theory.
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Embodied Individualism and the history of Freedom
From a disability perspective, this conclusion is disturbing enough. But when 
we consider the fact that both theorists end up including large numbers of 
people in the category—those who do not agree with absolute monarchy 
for Hobbes, large numbers of illiterate workers for Locke—the implications 
expand. It is a commonplace of twenty-first-century disability theory to 
point out the ways in which “we are all disabled”—if not now, eventually, as 
we age. But Hobbes and Locke present the flip side of that; for if the major-
ity of individuals are disabled in some way, the theorists can still deploy 
ableist frameworks to dismiss that majority from the demos. In focusing on 
freedom in particular, we can see that disability constitutes a central element 
in the notion of “the individual” on which their conceptions depend. In the 
1960s Marxist theorist C.  B. Macpherson developed a famous notion of 
“possessive individualism,” which he argued came out of seventeenth-century 
liberal thought and emerging market capitalism. It marked a conception of 
the individual as driven by the desire for wealth and property, with ration-
ality directed to that end. Possessive individualism introduced to political 
theorists new ways of understanding what human nature meant in the mod-
ern era, situating our understanding of “man” in a specific historical context 
of emerging capitalism and private property.
 A disability perspective shows us that this “possessive individual” was 
also an “embodied individual.” That is, individuals were required to have a 
body with certain sorts of capacities that, like race and gender, fit into the 
social economy in very particular ways. These ways excluded those who, 
such as women and disabled people, supposedly were incapable of perform-
ing physical labor and therefore of owning property; and those who, such 
as women, the disabled, Africans, Caribbeans, and the poor, were deemed 
to lack the rational capacities required to see the logic and reason of the 
particular choices consistent with the liberal democratic state and market 
capitalism.34 The representation of freedom and reason as “natural” that char-
acterizes Enlightenment theories of freedom thus reflects particular kinds of 
bodies that are marked by class, gender, race, and other forms of typology, 
such as disability.
 Hobbes’s and Locke’s conceptions of freedom, and many of their concep-
tual and theoretical fundamentals, form the essential foundation for twenty-
first-century political theory, legal theory, and philosophy; and I suggest that 
the persistent individualization of disability in contemporary medical and 
political discourses stems from a long historical tradition that defines indi-
vidualism, justice, rights, and freedom in terms of a particular notion of the 
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able body that is socially located in a seventeenth-century conception of the 
individual. The centrality of this sort of imagery, and its use to circumscribe 
the limits of freedom, suggests that only a particular kind of person—a par-
ticular kind of body—is the appropriate subject of liberty. As illustrated by 
these two iconic figures, Hobbes and Locke, the distinction between freedom 
and ability confuses the natural with the socially constructed and historically 
specific, depends on a limited perspective of able-bodied men, and is built 
on a view of illness and disability that requires its designation as subhuman, 
more akin to “brutes” than to the rational, laboring man.35 This individual, 
with his particular form of abilities, underlies the modern conception of 
the “man” and “citizen” who participated in the social contract and led to 
twenty-first-century understandings of the free agent and the democratic 
citizen.
 Embodied individualism, as a result, affects contemporary understand-
ings of what it means to be a human being and how social relations and 
institutions should be structured. These assumptions have had their clearest 
twentieth- and twenty-first-century articulations in Supreme Court decisions 
regarding application of the Americans with Disabilities Act to the work-
place. These decisions are made possible only by a particular conception of 
the working citizen as “embodied individual,” which from the start elimi-
nates disabled people from the categories of both “citizen” and “individual.” 
Indeed, this was so blatant that in 2008, the U.S. Congress passed the Amer-
icans with Disabilities Act Amendment Act in order to address problems 
in how the courts interpreted the original ADA on a highly individualistic 
medical model of disability, completely ignoring the social model’s claim that 
disability is produced by a hostile physical environment. But they are also 
illustrated in a wide variety of other ethical values and choices. Though this 
issue is well beyond the scope of my essay in the space I have allocated to 
me, I suggest that tying contemporary conceptions of ability and disability 
to their underlying philosophical foundations enables an ethical and political 
argument that has potential for reorienting people’s thinking about disability 
in both theory and public policy fora.
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introducing disability studies to the early modern period might transform not just our scholarship but our classroom practices as well. We invite readers of this collection to imagine the essays herein as instruments of 
an “enabling pedagogy” that conceives of, as Brenda Brueggemann writes, 
“disability as insight.”1 Disability pedagogy understands and remarks upon 
disability as inherent in human experience and hence universally crucial to 
our students’ educations. As one example of how teachers might integrate 
disability into their classroom practices and conversations, we would like 
to briefly narrate the trajectory of a course, “Shakespeare and Disability,” 
that Allison Hobgood offered while teaching at Spelman College, a histori-
cally Black women’s institution in Atlanta, Georgia. The goal of the course, 
as Hobgood explained it to her undergraduates, was threefold: to introduce 
disability studies as a critical approach, to imagine how contemporary dis-
ability theory might shape readings of Renaissance literature, and to uncover 
new disability histories in the early modern period. Further, she framed the 
academic venture with some basic questions: Where is the disabled body 
located in Shakespeare’s canon, and how is it figured? How and where do 
both material and literary representations of disability appear in this period 
more broadly? What traditions relating to disability did Shakespeare inherit, 
and what early modern views inform our contemporary notions of differ-
C O D a
Shakespearean Disability pedagogy
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ence? Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, what innovative critical interven-
tions might we make by interrogating disability in Shakespeare?
 In a seminar of twenty-five aspiring Shakespeareans, only one or two 
students identified as disabled, and even then, only timidly. Over time, 
though, many women began to see how their normative identities were con-
structed in relation to disability and how a subtle yet pervasive ableist dis-
course shaped their daily experiences and practices. Students began to notice 
a lack of disabled classmates at Spelman, for instance, and wondered about 
institutional support for disability. They found themselves identifying dis-
ability in close friends and family in ways they had never expected or noticed 
before. Most frequently, however, students teased out the intersections of 
disability, gender, race, and class, exploring, for example, how Aaron’s black-
ness in Titus Andronicus could be “disabling” yet was not “disability.”2 Their 
own subject positions as predominately able-bodied, black women gave them 
unique insights into these intersections, especially in terms of exploring ten-
sions between the materiality of the early modern body—its tangible pain 
or visible skin color—and its social construction. They began to see how, 
amidst their well-honed impulses to “decry racism, sexism, and class bias, it 
[had] not occurred to most of them,” as Lennard Davis points out, “that the 
very foundations on which their information systems are built . . . are them-
selves laden with assumptions about  .  .  . ability and disability in general.”3 
Throughout the semester, students not only read Shakespeare to expose a 
new history of the early modern disabled body and to discover how that his-
tory was shaped, inflected, and complicated by other sorts of embodiment 
during the English Renaissance but also to shake up their complacent par-
ticipation in a modern ableist hegemony that normatively insists on marking 
disabled individuals—and, indeed, all difference—as “other.”
 The course began fairly conventionally with readings by Stephen Green-
blatt, Andrew Gurr, and Russ McDonald that outlined the fundamentals of 
early modern English theater—playhouse spaces, audience members, acting 
companies, and so on—as well as the historical contexts that surrounded play-
going.4 Students then tackled Shakespeare’s Tragedy of Richard III alongside 
Margaret Winzer’s “Disability and Society before the Eighteenth Century.”5 
This conjunction was meant to provide students with some background on 
disability throughout the ages, to remind them of its sociohistorical situat-
edness, and to coax them into discussion about disability more generally. In 
Shakespeare’s depiction of a ruthless and “rudely stamped” king (1.1.16), 
Richard III confirms students’ initial, somewhat narrow sense of disability as 
always both physical and visible. Richard is an accessible character who ini-
tiates a crucial, though rather predictable, conversation about early modern 
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subjectivity: What is the correlation between exterior materiality and inte-
rior selfhood? Does Shakespeare’s play suggest that Richard’s disabled body 
betrays a corrupted soul punished for its sinfulness? Is Richard “naturally” 
evil or has his embodiment, and circumstantial responses to it, created his 
discontent? In this class, however, the play also provoked new insights about 
the junctures of class, disability, and even metaphor: for example, could 
Richard’s representation as a “lump of foul deformity” (1.2.57) reflect his 
status as a third-born son? It also prompted musings about the play’s por-
trayal of women as both more aware of and sensitive to the advantages and 
limitations of Richard’s physical difference. As a counterpoint especially to 
this discussion of gender and disability in Richard III, students then read 
Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus and investigated Lavinia’s rape and mutila-
tion as a gendered disability performance. Again, however, the bodies in this 
particular play are characterized by physical difference—lost limbs and sev-
ered tongues abound—and hence are easily recognized and categorized by 
students as “disabled.”
 In the next section of the course, therefore, Hobgood encouraged class 
members to expand their notions of what disability “looks like” by asking 
them to conceive of chronic illness as disability. Students specifically took up 
Shakespeare’s Tragedy of Julius Caesar in conjunction with Erving Goffman’s 
Stigma and Lerita Coleman’s “Stigma: An Enigma Demystified.”6 They spent 
time deconstructing Goffman and Coleman, grappling with the connections 
between physical and social stigma as well as the differences between stigma 
and stereotype. These conversations occurred in tandem with a reading of 
Julius Caesar and discussions of how disabilities such as epilepsy (as well 
as deafness) are often visually unidentifiable.7 Caesar “passed,” the students 
decided, as nondisabled for most of the play and hence embodied disabil-
ity in a much more complex fashion than Shakespeare’s Lavinia or Richard 
III. Students also identified, among other things, how this drama evidenced 
coincident, cultural disability narratives in the Renaissance; the narrative of 
Caesar’s “falling sickness” is informed simultaneously by a latent medieval 
sense of the marvelous as well as a burgeoning early modern trend toward 
scientific rationalism.
 The second half of the semester gained focus around Tobin Siebers’s essay 
“Disability in Theory” and viewing of a video called “Talk” by the UK Dis-
ability Rights Commission.8 This pairing was meant to throw into practical 
relief many of the theoretical issues students had addressed thus far and to 
remind them how much of their work in the course was explicitly histori-
cal.9 “Talk” especially prompted conversation about how the scholarly activ-
ity of recovering disability histories was relevant to contemporary disability 
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activism. The class then read The Tragedy of King Lear alongside Bradley 
Lewis’s essay “A Mad Fight: Psychiatry and Disability Activism” and engaged 
disability and activism in the contexts of madness, “sanism,” and ageism.10 
Could Lear be characterized as disabled? When does he begin to identify 
as such? Does his status as disabled have more to do with age or insan-
ity? One young woman even went so far as to recognize other “disabling” 
instances in King Lear, positing Edmund’s illegitimacy as a very broad form 
of impairment in the play. She imagined Edmund’s blood as deviant, as the 
invisible physical marker of his stigma and bastardization. Edmund’s biol-
ogy, according to her logic, rendered him less able to function in a society 
that refused to acknowledge positively his unconventional kinship ties and 
mottled blood lineage.
 These discussions of Lewis and King Lear were followed closely by an 
investigation of representations of the “freak” in early modern literature. 
Students first read Shakespeare’s long poem Venus and Adonis and explored 
Venus as embodying freakishness.11 They combined more traditional readings 
of gender inversion, homoeroticism, and androgyny in this epyllion with 
a disability narrative about Venus’s Amazonian size and strength.12 Specifi-
cally, a number of students conceived of what previously has been imagined 
as Venus’s transgressive gender and sexuality instead as the poem’s exploita-
tion of her physical difference: Venus as freakishly super-abled.13 The catalyst 
for this interesting reading was Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s chapter “The 
Cultural Work of American Freak Shows” from her influential book Extraor-
dinary Bodies: Figuring Physical Disability in American Literature and Cul-
ture.14 The challenge of using this particular essay lay in reminding students 
of the specificity of Garland-Thomson’s argument and helping them resist 
an ahistorical collapsing of her narrative onto Shakespeare’s work. Carefully, 
then, students worked to clarify representations of freakishness in both Venus 
and Adonis and in the final play of the semester, The Tempest. They put into 
fruitful conversation three texts widely disparate in their geographical and 
historical interests but similar in their understanding of the sometimes tragic 
and yet always seductive spectacle that is human variation.15
 As even this very brief review of Hobgood’s undergraduate course attests, 
early modern disability studies, in all its iterations, develops from a flexible 
array of historicist and presentist methodologies and textual- and perfor-
mance-related concerns that work together to examine difference, selfhood, 
and identity in the Renaissance. Recovering Disability in Early Modern Eng-
land thus serves as an initiating example of how we might complicate and 
deepen current work on disability and an illustration of how Renaissance 
studies informs disability studies and vice versa. Training ourselves to pursue 
non-normativity and its various manifestations in the full breadth of early 
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modern English literature allows us to understand as new that which we have 
presumed to be settled. Reading and thinking from a disability perspective 
can usefully recondition us—and our students—not only to the historicized 
ways in which early modern writing once meant, but also to the multivalent 
ways in which it continues to do so.
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